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Preface
The thesis consists of three chapters, which can be read independently. The com-
mon theme across all three chapters is the relation between asset prices and investor
preferences and beliefs.
The first chapter addresses the question of whether it is possible to recover physical
probabilities, marginal utilities, and the discount rate from observed asset prices. We
show when such a recovery is possible - and when it isn’t - using a simple but general
“counting argument”. Recovery is possible when the number of states of the economy
is no greater than the number of time periods. Our counting argument shows why
recovery is impossible in most standard financial models where the state space grows
as a multinomial tree. Nevertheless, we provide conditions under which recovery is
possible in such an economy. While leaving probabilities fully free, we show that
recovery is possible in an economy that evolves as a multinomial tree, if the number
of parameters governing the stochastic discount factor is no greater then the number
of time periods.
The second chapter addresses the question of how financial market tail risks vary
over time and how we can infer such tail risks from asset prices. We show how the
market’s higher order moments can be estimated ex ante using options written on the
market. We find that, the market’s higher order moments move together in the sense
that skewness becomes more negative when kurtosis becomes more positive. In other
words, there are times when higher-moment risk is high, in the sense that the return
distribution is both substantially left skewed (due to the large negative skewness) and
fat tailed (due to the large positive kurtosis). Interestingly, higher-moment risk tends to
be high at times when volatility is low, suggesting that when volatility is low, risk hides
in the tails of the market return distribution. We show that this systematic variation
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in higher-moment risk has large implications for investors; for example, the tail loss
probability of a volatility-targeting investor varies from 3.6% to 9.7%, entirely driven
by changes in higher-moment risk. Lastly, we show that times when higher-moment
risk is high are characterized by high market and funding liquidity, high turnover, and
low expected future returns.
The third chapter addresses the question of how investor risk aversion varies over
time and how we can infer this risk aversion from asset prices. Using options written
on the market and historical market returns, I present a new method for estimating the
market’s time-varying risk aversion. Interestingly, I find that the market’s risk aversion
is negatively related to variance, suggesting that the market became more risk tolerant
during the recent 2008-2009 financial crisis. This finding is difficult to reconcile with
the leading asset pricing models. Therefore, I discuss two possible explanations for
this systematic variation in risk aversion. First, I find that my results are consistent
with investors salience. At times of high volatility the expected return on the market is
usually high relative to the risk-free return. The relatively high expected return on the
market becomes salient for investors which induces heightened risk tolerance among
investors. Second, I show how the systematic variation in risk aversion can arise if the
stock market is not a perfect proxy for aggregate consumption.
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Introduction and Summaries
The central formula in asset pricing relates the price of an Arrow-Debreu security to
an investor’s preferences and beliefs:
Price of an Arrow-Debreu security = Preferences× Beliefs
We observe the prices of Arrow-Debreu securities in the option markets. But we do not
directly observe the extent to which these prices are driven by preferences or beliefs.
Decomposing and investigating preferences and beliefs is essential for understanding
asset prices, and it is therefore the focus of this thesis. In chapter one, my co-authors
and I develop a model in which we can disentangle the contribution in asset prices
which is driven by preferences and beliefs. In chapter two, my co-author and I estimate
investor beliefs and study how these beliefs vary over time. In chapter three, I estimate
investor preferences and study how they co-vary with investor beliefs.
1 Summaries in English
Generalized Recovery
Decoding risk preferences and beliefs from asset prices has been viewed as impossible
until Ross (2015) provided sufficient conditions for such a recovery. Ross’ recovery
relies on two critical assumptions: (1) The economy evolves as a time-homogeneous
Markov chain. (2) Preferences are time-separable.
In this paper, we generalize Ross’ recovery theorem to handle a general probability
distribution which makes no assumptions of time-homogeneity or Markovian behavior.
We show when recovery is possible – and when it isn’t – using a simple “counting”
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argument, which focuses the attention on the economics of the problem. Specifically,
we show that recovery is possible if the number of states of the economy is no greater
than the number of time periods with observable option prices. Furthermore, we
show that our recovery inversion from prices to probabilities and preferences can be
implemented in closed form.
Next, we consider an economy that evolves as a standard multinomial tree. We
show that in this economy recovery is impossible because the number of states is
higher than the number of time periods. Hence, achieving recovery without further
assumptions is typically impossible in most standard models of finance where the
state space grows in this way. Nevertheless, we show that recovery is possible in a
large (continuous) state space model under certain conditions. While maintaining
that probabilities are fully general, recovery is possible if we can parameterize the
stochastic discount factor by a number of parameters which is no greater than the
number of time periods with observable option prices.
Finally, we implement our methodology empirically using a large data set of call
and put options written on the S&P 500 stock market index over the time period 1996-
2015, testing the predictive power of the recovered expected return and volatility. The
recovered expected returns have weak predictive power for the future realized returns,
but the predictability is stronger when we exclude the global financial crisis. Recovered
volatility has much stronger predictive power for future realized volatility.
Higher-Moment Risk
This paper investigates how financial market tail risk varies over time. Times of fi-
nancial market distress pose threats to the macroeconomy, as we witnessed in the
2008-2009 financial crisis. For policymakers to act in a timely and preemptive manner
in the event of financial market distress, it is important to measure the perceived tail
risks in real time.
We estimate the market’s higher order moments in real time using a new method
based on Martin (2017) and arrive at five main results. First, we show that the
moments of the market return, measured ex ante using option prices, predict future
realized moments. Specifically,w e show that our ex ante skewness, kurtosis, hyper-
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skewness, and hyperkurtosis all have significant predictive power over ex post realized
moments.
As our second main result, we find that higher order moments move together in the
sense that skewness and hyperskewness are more negative at times when kurtosis and
hyperkurtosis are more positive. In other words, there are times when higher-moment
risk is high, in the sense that the return distribution is both substantially left skewed
(due to the large negative skewness and hyperskewness) and fat tailed (due to the
large positive kurtosis and hyperkurtosis). We estimate the principal components of
the space spanned by skewness, kurtosis, hyperskewness, and hyperkurtosis. The first
principal component explains 90% of the joint variation in the market’s higher order
moments. We define this first principal component as a higher-moment risk index
(HRI) which is meant to capture market tail risk.
As our third main result, we find that higher-moment risk varies systematically
with variance. Higher-moment risk tends to be high at times when volatility is low,
suggesting that when volatility is low, risk hides in the tail of the market return
distribution. In addition, we find that higher-moment risks tend to be high subsequent
to market run-ups, which are usually “calm” times as measured by variance.
As our fourth main result, we show that higher-moment risk has important im-
plications for investors; for example, the tail loss probability of a volatility-targeting
investor and varies from 3.6% to 9.7%, entirely driven by changes in higher-moment
risk.
Finally, as our fifth main result, we investigate what can explain the systematic
variation in higher-moment risk. In particular, we test if financial intermediaries are
more levered when variance is low, and if such variation in financial intermediary
leverage can explain our observed variation in higher moment risk. We find no relation
between higher-moment risks and aggregate financial intermediary leverage. Next, we
investigate how higher-moment risks are related to previously suggested measures of
“bubble” characteristics and market valuation. We consider the “bubble” characteris-
tics: acceleration (Greenwood, Shleifer, and You (2017)), turnover (Chen, Hong, and
Stein (2001)), issuance percentage (Pontiff and Woodgate (2008)), and the market
valuation measures: CAPE, the dividend-price ratio, and cay (Lettau and Ludvigson
(2001)). We find that higher-moment risk is positively related to price acceleration:
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there is more higher-moment risk when the recent price path is more convex. Also,
higher turnover after market run-ups is associated with more higher-moment risk. Fur-
thermore, there is more higher-moment risk when cay (Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001)
is high. We find no conclusive relation between higher-moment risks and CAPE, the
dividend-price ratio, or equity issuance.
The Market’s Time-Varying Risk Aversion
This paper investigates how the market’s risk aversion varies over time. Specifically,
I provide a new method for estimating the market’s time-varying risk aversion. My
methodology allows me to investigate the co-movements between risk-aversion and the
physical distribution of market returns.
I find that the market’s risk aversion is negatively related to market variance,
suggesting that investors are less risk averse during times of financial turmoil, e.g.,
during the recent 2008-2009 financial crisis. Next, I show that the market’s risk aversion
is positively related to market skewness, suggesting that investors are more risk averse
at times when the normalized market return distribution is more risky.
Finally, I discuss two possible explanations for the systematic variation in market
risk aversion. First, I investigate salience theory (Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer
(2012)) as a possible behavioral explanation. Specifically, I follow Lian, Ma, and
Wang (2018) who argue that, at times of low interest rates the relatively high expected
returns on risky assets are salient, and this salience on the upside of a higher return on
the risky asset induces heightened risk tolerance and “reaching for yield” tendencies
among investors. I therefore regress the ratio of expected gross returns on the market
to gross risk-free returns, Et(Rt,T )/R
f
t,T , onto risk aversion. Consistently with the
findings of Lian, Ma, and Wang (2018), I find that investors become more risk tolerant
as the ratio of expected returns to risk-free returns increases. Second, I discuss how
the systematic variation in risk aversion can arise if the stock market is not a perfect
proxy for aggregate consumption.
x
2 Summaries in Danish
Generalized Recovery
Gendannelse af risiko præferencer og sandsynligheder fra aktivpriser blevet betragtet
som umuligt indtil Ross (2015) gav tilstrækkelige betingelser for en s˚adan gendannelse.
Ross’ metode afhænger af to kritiske antagelser: (1) Økonomien udvikler sig som en
tidshomogen Markov-kæde. (2) Risiko præferencer er tidsseparable.
I dette kapitel generaliserer vi Ross’ gendannelsesteorem til at h˚andtere en generel
sandsynlighedsfordeling, der ikke er afhængig af en antagelse om tidshomogenitet eller
Markov adfærd. Vi viser hvorn˚ar gendannelse er muligt, og hvorn˚ar det ikke er, ved
hjælp af et simpelt “tælle”-argument. Specifikt viser vi, at gendannelse er mulig, hvis
antallet af mulige udfald i økonomien er mindre end antallet af tidsperioder med ob-
serverbare optionspriser. Desuden viser vi, at vores gendannelse fra priser til sandsyn-
ligheder og præferencer kan implementeres i lukket form.
Dernæst betragter vi en økonomi, der udvikler sig som en standard multinomial
træ. Vi viser at, i denne økonomi er gendannelse umulig, fordi antallet af mulige udfald
er højere end antallet af tidsperioder. Dermed viser vi at, gendannelse uden yderligere
antagelser er umuligt i de fleste standardmodeller for finansiering, hvor økonomien
udvikler sig p˚a denne m˚ade.
Herefter viser vi under hvilke forudsætninger, at gendannelse er mulig i et stort
(kontinuerligt) tilstandsrum. Samtidig med at vi lader sandsynligheder være helt
generelle, er gendannelse mulig, hvis vi kan beskrive prisningskernen ved hjælp af
en række parametre, som er mindre end antallet af tidsperioder med observerbare
optionspriser.
Til sidst implementerer vi vores metode empirisk ved hjælp af et stort datasæt af op-
tioner skrevet p˚a det amerikanske aktie indeks S&P 500 i perioden 1996-2015. Vi tester
hvor godt vores gendannede forventede afkast of varians prædikterer de fremtidige re-
aliserede afkast. Det gendannede forventede afkast har en svag forudsigelseskraft for
det fremtidige realiserede afkast, men forudsigeligheden er stærkere, n˚ar vi udelukker
den globale finanskrise. Den gendannede varians har meget stærkere forudsigende kraft
for fremtidig realiseret varians.
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Higher-Moment Risk
I dette kapitel undersøger vi hvordan halerisikoen i finanssektoren varierer over tid.
Tider hvor den finansielle sektor er i nød udgør trusler mod hele makroøkonomien,
som vi oplevede i finanskrisen i 2008-2009. For at regulatorer kan handle rettidigt
og forebygge fremtidige kriser i finanssektoren, er det vigtigt at kunne m˚ale hvordan
investorerne opfatter hale risici i finanssektoren.
Vi estimerer finanssektorens højere ordens momenter i realtime ved hjælp af en
ny metode baseret p˚a resultater i Martin (2017) og kommer frem til de følgende fem
hovedresultater. For det første viser vi, at markedets momenter, m˚alt ex ante ved
hjælp af optionspriser, forudsiger fremtidige realiserede momenter. Specielt viser vi, at
vores ex ante skewness, kurtosis, hyperskewness og hyperkurtosis alle kan prædiktere
fremtidige realiserede momenter.
Som vores andet hovedresultat finder vi, at højere ordens momenter bevæger sig
sammen i den forstand, at skewness og hyperskewness er mere negative, n˚ar kurtosis
og hyper kurtosis er mere positive. Med andre ord er der tidspunkter, hvor risikoen i
de højere momenter er høj i den forstand, at finansmarkedets afkastfordelingen b˚ade er
væsentligt venstre skæv (p˚a grund af den store negative skewness og hyperskewness) og
har fede haler (p˚a grund af den store positive kurtosis og hyper kurtosis) . Vi estimerer
de principale komponenter i rummet udspændt af skewness, kurtosis, hyperskewness og
hyper kurtosis. Det første principale komponent forklarer 90% af den fælles variation i
markedets højere ordens momenter. Derfor definerer vi det første principale komponent
som et højere ordens moment risiko index (HRI).
Som vores tredje hovedresultat finder vi, at risikoen i højere momenter varierer
systematisk med finanssektorens varians. Risiko associeret med de højere momenter
har tendens til at være høj i tider hvor variansen i finanssektoren er lav, hvilket tyder
p˚a, at n˚ar variansen er lav, skjuler risikoen sig i halen af afkastfordelingen. Derudover
finder vi, at risici associeret med højere momenter har tendens til at være høje efter
store opsving i finansmarkedet, hvilket normalt er “rolige” perioder m˚alt ved varians.
Som vores fjerde hovedresultat viser vi, at risici associeret med højere momenter
har store konsekvenser for investorer; for eksempel varierer sandsynligheden for et hale
udfald i porteføljen for en investor der m˚alrettet har konstant varians i hans portefølje
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fra 3,6 % til 9,7 %, denne variation er udelukkende drevet af ændringer i finanssektorens
højere ordens momenter.
Som vores femte hovedresultat undersøger vi hvad der kan forklare den system-
atiske variation i finanssektorens højere ordens momenter. Vi tester om finansielle
institutioner gearer sig mere n˚ar variansen er lav, og hvis en s˚adan variation i fi-
nansiel institutioners gearing kan forklare vores observerede variation i højere ordens
moment risiko. Vi finder ingen sammenhæng mellem højere ordens moment risici og
gearingsniveauet for finansielle institutioner. Dernæst undersøger vi, hvordan højere
ordens moment risiko er relateret til tidligere foresl˚aede variable der er associerede med
finansielle “bubbler”. Vi finder, at risikoen for højere ordens moment risici er positivt
relateret til prisaccelerationen: Der er mere risiko for højere øjeblik, n˚ar den seneste
prisstigning har været mere konveks. Desuden er højere omsætning efter marketsopsv-
ing forbundet med mere risiko i finanssektorens højere ordens momenter.
The Market’s Time-Varying Risk Aversion
Dette kapitel undersøger hvordan markedets risikoaversion varierer over tid. Specifikt
præsenterer jeg en ny metode til at estimere markedets tidsvarierende risikoaversion.
Min metode giver mig mulighed for at undersøge samspillet mellem risikoaversion og
fordeling af markedsafkast.
Jeg finder at, markedets risikoaversion er negativt relateret til markedets varians,
hvilket tyder p˚a, at investorer er mindre risikoaverse i tider med finansiel uro, fx under
den seneste finansielle krise i 2008-2009. Dernæst viser jeg, at markedets risikoaver-
sion er positivt relateret til markedets skewness, hvilket tyder p˚a, at investorer er
mere risikoaverse i tider hvor den normaliserede fordeling for markedets afkast er mere
risikabel.
Til sidst diskuterer jeg to mulige forklaringer for den systematiske variation i
markedsrisikoaversion. Først undersøger jeg salience teori (Bordalo, Gennaioli, and
Shleifer (2012)) som en mulig adfærdsmæssig forklaring. Specielt følger jeg Lian, Ma,
and Wang (2018), som argumenterer for at, i perioder med høj varians er markedets
forventede afkast højt i forhold til den risikofrie rente, og at det høje forventede
markedsafkast er “salient” (ekstra fremtrædende) i bevidstheden for investorer hvilket
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medfører øget risikotolerance blandt investorer. For at teste deres hypotese regresserer
jeg forholdet mellem markedets forventede afkast of det risiko-frie afkast p˚a risikoaver-
sion. Konsistent med resultaterne i Lian, Ma, and Wang (2018) finder jeg at, inve-
storer bliver mere risikotolerante n˚ar forholdet mellem det forventede markedsafkast
og det risikofrie afkast stiger. Dernæst viser jeg hvordan den systematiske variation
i risikoaversion kan opst˚a, hvis aktiemarkedet ikke er en perfekt proxy for det samlet
forbrug i økonomien.
xiv
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Chapter 1
Generalized Recovery
Co-authored with David Lando and Lasse Heje Pedersen
Accepted for publication in the Journal of Financial Economics
Abstract:
We characterize when physical probabilities, marginal utilities, and the discount rate
can be recovered from observed state prices for several future time periods. We make
no assumptions of the probability distribution, thus generalizing the time-homogeneous
stationary model of Ross (2015). Recovery is feasible when the number of maturities
with observable prices is higher than the number of states of the economy (or the
number of parameters characterizing the pricing kernel). When recovery is feasible,
our model allows a closed-form linearized solution. We implement our model empiri-
cally, testing the predictive power of the recovered expected return and other recovered
statistics.
We are grateful for helpful comments from Jaroslav Borovicka, Peter Christoffersen, Horatio
Cuesdeanu, Darrell Duffie, Lars Peter Hansen, Jens Jackwerth, Pia Mølgaard, Stephen Ross, Jose
Scheinkman, Paul Schneider, Paul Whelan as well as from seminar participants at London Business
School, University of Zurich, University of Konstanz, University of Toronto, ATP, HEC-McGill winter
finance workshop 2015, SED summer conference 2016, EFA 2016, AFA 2017, and especially to Dan
Petersen for guiding us through Sard’s theorem. All three authors gratefully acknowledge support
from the FRIC Center for Financial Frictions (grant no. DNRF102) and Jensen and Pedersen from
the European Research Council (ERC grant no. 312417).
1
1 Introduction
The holy grail in financial economics is to decode probabilities and risk preferences from
asset prices. This decoding has been viewed as impossible until Ross (2015) provided
sufficient conditions for such a recovery in a time-homogeneous Markov economy (using
the Perron-Frobenius Theorem). However, his recovery method has been criticized by
Borovicka, Hansen, and Scheinkman (2016) (who also rely on Perron-Frobenius and
results of Hansen and Scheinkman (2009)), arguing that Ross’s assumptions rule out
realistic models.
This paper sheds new light on this debate, both theoretically and empirically.
Theoretically, we generalize the recovery theorem to handle a general probability dis-
tribution which makes no assumptions of time-homogeneity or Markovian behavior.
We show when recovery is possible – and when it isn’t – using a simple “counting”
argument (formalized based on Sard’s Theorem), which focuses the attention on the
economics of the problem. When recovery is possible, we show that our recovery inver-
sion from prices to probabilities and preferences can be implemented in closed form.
We implement our method empirically using option data from 1996-2015 and study
how the recovered expected returns predict future actual returns.
To understand our method, note first that Ross (2015) assumes that state prices
are known not just in each final state, but also starting from each possible current state
as illustrated in Figure 1.1, Panel A. Simply put, he assumes that we know all prices
today and all prices in all “parallel universes” with different starting points. Since we
clearly cannot observe such parallel universes, Ross (2015) proposes to implement his
model based on prices for several future time periods, relying on the assumption that all
time periods have identical structures for prices and probabilities (time-homogeneity),
illustrated in Figure 1.1, Panel B. In other words, Ross assumes that, if S&P 500 is at
the level 2000, then one-period option prices do not depend on the calendar time at
which this level is observed.
We show that the recovery problem can be simplified by starting directly with the
state prices for all future times given only the current state (Figure 1.1, Panel C).
We impose no dynamic structure on the probabilities, allowing the probability distri-
bution to be fully general at each future time, thus relaxing Ross’s time-homogeneity
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assumption which is unlikely to be met empirically.
We first show that when the number of states S is no greater than the number of
time periods T , then recovery is possible. To see the intuition, consider simply the
number of equations and the number of unknowns: First, we have S equations at each
time period, one for each Arrow-Debreu price, for a total of ST equations. Second, we
have 1 unknown discount rate, S − 1 unknown marginal utilities, and S − 1 unknown
probabilities for each future time period. In conclusion, we have ST equations with
1 + (S − 1) + (S − 1)T = ST + S − T unknowns. These equations are not linear, but
we provide a precise sense in which we can essentially just count equations. Hence,
recovery is possible when S ≤ T .
To understand the intuition behind this result, note that, for each time period, we
have S equations and only S − 1 probabilities. Hence, for each additional time period
we have one extra equation that can help us recover the marginal utilities and discount
rate — and the number of marginal utilities does not grow with the number of time
periods.
By focusing on square matrices, Ross’s model falls into the category S = T so
our counting argument explains why he finds recovery. However, our method applies
under much more general conditions. We show that, when Ross’s time-homogeneity
conditions are met, then our solution is the same as his and, generically, it is unique.1
On the other hand, when Ross’s conditions are not met, then our model can be solved
while Ross’s cannot. Further, we illustrate that our solution is far simpler and allows
a closed-form solution that is accurate when the discount rate is close to 1.
To understand the economics of the condition S ≤ T , consider what happens if the
economy evolves in a standard multinomial tree with no upper or lower bound on the
state space: For each extra time period, we get at least two new states since we can go
up from highest state and down from the lowest state. Therefore, in this case S > T ,
so we see that recovery is impossible because of the number of states is higher than
the number of time periods. Hence, achieving recovery without further assumptions is
typically impossible in most standard models of finance where the state space grows
1Generically means that the result holds for all parameters except on a “small” set of parameters
of zero measure. For the measure-zero set of parameters where a certain matrix of prices has less than
full rank such that there is a continuum of solutions to our generalized recovery problem, we show
that the multi-period version of Ross’s problem also has a continuum of solutions.
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in this way. In other words, our model provides a fundamentally different way – via
our simple counting argument – to understand the critique of Borovicka, Hansen, and
Scheinkman (2016) that recovery is impossible in standard models.
Nevertheless, we show that recovery is possible even when S > T under certain
conditions. While maintaining that probabilities can be fully general (and, indeed,
allow growth), we assume that the utility function is given via a limited number of
parameters. Again, we simply need to make our counting argument work. To do this,
we show that, if the marginal utilities can be written as functions of N parameters,
then recovery is possible as long as N + 1 < T . This large state-space framework is
what we use empirically as discussed further below.
We illustrate how our method works in the context of three specific models, namely
Mehra and Prescott (1985a), Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979), and a simple non-
Markovian economy. For each economy, we generate model-implied prices and seek
to recover natural probabilities and preferences using our method. This provides an
illustration of how our method works, its robustness, and its shortcomings. For Mehra
and Prescott (1985a), we show that S > T so general recovery is impossible, but, when
we restrict the class of utility functions, then we achieve recovery. For the binomial
Cox-Ross-Rubinstein model (the discrete-time version of Black and Scholes (1973)),
we show that recovery is impossible even under restrictive utility specifications because
consumption growth is iid., which leads to a flat term structure, a pricing matrix of a
lower rank, and a continuum of solutions for probabilities and preferences. While the
former two models fall in the setting of Borovicka, Hansen, and Scheinkman (2016)
(with a non-zero martingale component), we also show how recovery is possible in the
non-Markovian setting, which falls outside the framework of Borovicka, Hansen, and
Scheinkman (2016) and Ross (2015), illustrating the generality of our framework in
terms of the allowed probabilities.
Finally, we implement our methodology empirically using a large data set of call
and put options written on the S&P 500 stock market index over the time period
1996-2015. We estimate state price densities for multiple future horizons and recover
probabilities and preferences each month. Based on the recovered probabilities, we de-
rive the risk and expected return over the future month from the physical distribution
of returns using four different methods. The recovered expected returns vary substan-
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tially across specifications, challenging the empirical robustness of the results. The
recovered expected returns have weak predictive power for the future realized returns,
but the predictability is stronger when we exclude the global financial crisis. We can
also recover ex ante volatilities, which have much stronger predictive power for future
realized volatility. We note that a rejection of the recovered distribution is a rejection
of the joint hypothesis of the general recovery methodology and the specific empirical
choices including the state space and the available options.
The literature on recovery theorems is quickly expanding.2 Bakshi, Chabi-Yo, and
Bakshi (2017) and Audrino, Huitema, and Ludwig (2014) empirically test the restric-
tions of Ross’s Recovery Theorem. Martin and Ross (2013) apply the recovery theorem
in a term structure model in which the driving state variable is a stationary Markov
chain, illustrating the role played by the (infinitely) long end of the yield curve, a
role already recognized in Kazemi (1992). Several papers focus on generalizing the
underlying Markov process to a continuous-time process with a continuum of values
and an infinite horizon (Carr and Yu (2012), Linetsky and Qin (2016)) and Walden
(2017) in particular derive intuitive results on the importance of recurrence. All these
papers impose time-homogeneity of the underlying Markov process.3 Qin and Linet-
sky (2017) go beyond the Markov assumption, discussing factorization of stochastic
discount factors and recovery in a general semimartingale setting.
These approaches require an infinite time horizon while our approach only re-
quires the observed finite-maturity data. Indeed, the martingale decomposition used
by Borovicka, Hansen, and Scheinkman (2016) is only defined over an infinite horizon,
as is the recurrence condition used by Walden (2017), and the factorization of Qin and
Linetsky (2017).4
2Prior to Ross (2015), the dynamics of the risk-neutral density and the physical density along with
the pricing kernel has been extensively researched using historical option or equity market data (e.g.,
Jackwerth (2000), Jackwerth and Rubinstein (1996), Bollerslev and Todorov (2011), Ait-Sahalia and
Lo (2000), Rosenberg and Engle (2002), Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004) and Christoffersen, Heston,
and Jacobs (2013)).
3See also Schneider and Trojani (2017a) who focus on recovering moments of the physical distribu-
tion and Malamud (2016) who shows that knowledge of investor preferences is not necessarily enough
to recover physical probabilities when option supply is noisy, but shows how recovery can may be
feasible when the volatility of option supply shocks is also known.
4Said differently, if we observe a data from a finite number of time periods from an economy
satisfying the conditions on Borovicka, Hansen, and Scheinkman (2016), then there is no unique
Markov decomposition. Recurrence means that each state is being visited infinitely often so it can
only be defined over an infinite horizon. The factorization of Qin and Linetsky (2017) relies on limits
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Our paper contributes to the literature by characterizing recovery of any probability
distributions observed over a finite number of periods, by proving a simple solution
and its closed-form approximation, and by providing natural empirical tests of our
generalized method. Rather than relying on specific probabilistic assumptions (Markov
processes and ergodocity) as in Ross (2015) and Borovicka, Hansen, and Scheinkman
(2016), we follow the tradition of general equilibrium (GE) theory, where Debreu
(1970) pioneered the use of Sard’s theorem and differential topology. Bringing Sard’s
theorem into the recovery debate provides new economic insight on when recovery
is possible.5 Indeed, the martingale decomposition applied by Borovicka, Hansen,
and Scheinkman (2016) relies on knowing the infinite-time distribution of Markov
processes, which imposes much more structure than needed and removes the focus
from the essence of the recovery problem, namely the number of economic variables
vs. economic restrictions.
2 Ross’s Recovery Theorem
This section briefly describes the mechanics of the recovery theorem of Ross (2015) as a
background for understanding our generalized result in which we relax the assumption
that transition probabilities are time-homogeneous.
The idea of the recovery theorem is most easily understood in a one-period setting.
In each time period 0 and 1, the economy can be in a finite number of states which we
label 1, . . . , S. Starting in any state i, there exists a full set of Arrow-Debreu securities,
each of which pays 1 if the economy is in state j at date 1. The price of these securities
is given by pii,j .
The objective of the recovery theorem is to use information about these observed
state prices to infer physical probabilities pi,j of transitioning from state i to j. We
can express the connection between Arrow-Debreu prices and physical probabilities by
introducing a pricing kernel m such that for any i, j = 1, ..., S
pii,j = pi,jmi,j (1.1)
of T -forward measures as T goes to infinity.
5We thank Steve Ross for pointing out the historical role of Sard’s theorem in general equilibrium
theory.
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It takes no more than a simple one-period binomial model to convince oneself, that if
we know the Arrow-Debreu prices in one and only one state at date 0, then there is in
general no hope of recovering physical probabilities. In short, we cannot separate the
contribution to the observed Arrow-Debreu prices from the physical probabilities and
the pricing kernel.
The key insight of the recovery theorem is that by assuming that we know the
Arrow-Debreu prices for all the possible starting states, then with additional structure
on the pricing kernel, we can recover physical probabilities. We note that knowing the
prices in states we are not currently in (“parallel universes”) is a strong assumption.
In any event, under this assumption, Ross’s result is that there exists a unique set
of physical probabilities pi,j for all i, j = 1, . . . , S such that (1.1) holds if the matrix
of Arrow-Debreu prices is irreducible and if the pricing kernel m has the form known
from the standard representative agent models:
mi,j = δ
uj
ui
(1.2)
where δ > 0 is the discount rate and u = (u1, . . . , uS) is a vector with strictly positive
elements representing marginal utilities.
The proof can be found in Ross (2015), but here we note that counting equations
and unknowns certainly makes it plausible that the theorem is true: There are S2
observed Arrow-Debreu prices and hence S2 equations. Because probabilities from a
fixed starting state sum to one, there are S(S − 1) physical probabilities. It is clear
that scaling the vector u by a constant does not change the equations, and thus we can
assume that u1 = 1 so that u contributes with an additional S − 1 unknowns. Adding
to this the unknown δ leaves us exactly with a total of S2 unknowns. The fact that
there is a unique strictly positive solution hinges on the Frobenius theorem for positive
matrices.
It is important in Ross’s setting as it will be in ours, that a state corresponds to a
particular level of the marginal utility of consumption. This level does not depend on
calendar time. In our empirical implementation, a state will correspond to a particular
level of the S&P500 index.
The most troubling assumption, however, in the theorem above is that we must
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know state prices also from starting states that we are currently not in. It is hard to
imagine data that would allow us to know these in practice. Ross’s way around this as-
sumption is to leave the one-period setting and assume that we have information about
Arrow-Debreu prices from several future periods and then use a time-homogeneity as-
sumption to recover the same information that we would be able to obtain from the
equations above.
We therefore consider a discrete-time economy with time indexed by t, states in-
dexed by s = 1, ..., S, and pii,jt,t+τ denoting the time-t price in state i of an Arrow-Debreu
security that pays 1 in state j at date t+ τ . The multi-period analogue of Eqn. (1.1)
becomes
pii,jt,t+τ = p
i,j
t,t+τ m
i,j
t,t+τ (1.3)
Similarly, the multi-period analogue to equation (1.2) is the following assumption,
which again follows from the existence of a representative agent with time-separable
utility:
Assumption 1 (Time-separable utility). There exists a δ ∈ (0, 1] and marginal utili-
ties uj > 0 for each state j such that, for all times τ , the pricing kernel can be written
as
mi,jt,t+τ = δ
τ u
j
ui
(1.4)
Critically, to move to a multi-period setting, Ross makes the following additional
assumption of time-homogeneity in order to implement his approach empirically:
Assumption 2 (Time-homogeneous probabilities). For all states i, j and time hori-
zons τ > 0, pi,jt,t+τ does not depend on t.
This assumption is strong and not likely to be satisfied empirically. We note that
Assumptions 1 and 2 together imply that risk neutral probabilities are also time-
homogeneous, a prediction that can also be rejected in the data.
In this paper, we dispense with the time-homogeneity Assumption 2. We start by
maintaining Assumption 1, but later consider a broader assumption that can be used
in a large state space.
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3 A Generalized Recovery Theorem
The assumption of time-separable utility is consistent with many standard models of
asset pricing, but the assumption of time-homogeneity is much more troubling. It
restricts us from working with a growing state space (as in standard binomial mod-
els) and it makes numerical implementation extremely hard and non-robust, because
trying to fit observed state prices to a time-homogeneous model is extremely difficult.
Furthermore, the main goal of the recovery exercise is to recover physical transition
probabilities from the current states to all future states over different time horizons.
Insisting that these transition probabilities arise from constant one-period transition
probabilities is a strong restriction. We show in this section that by relaxing the
assumption of time-homogeneity of physical transition probabilities, we can obtain
a problem which is easier to solve numerically and which allows for a much richer
modeling structure. We show that our extension contains the time-homogeneous case
as a special case, and therefore ultimately should allow us to test whether the time-
homogeneity assumption can be defended empirically.
3.1 A Noah’s Arc Example: Two States and Two Dates
To get the intuition of our approach, we start by considering the simplest possible case
with two states and two time-periods. Consider the simple case in which the economy
has two possible states (1, 2) and two time periods starting at time t and ending on
dates t + 1 and t + 2. If the current state of the world is state 1, then equation (1.3)
consists of four equations:
pi1,1t,t+1 = p
1,1
t,t+1 m
1,1
t,t+1
pi1,2t,t+1 = (1− p1,1t,t+1) m1,2t,t+1
pi1,1t,t+2 = p
1,1
t,t+2 m
1,1
t,t+2
pi1,2t,t+2 = (1− p1,1t,t+2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
2 unknowns
m1,2t,t+2︸ ︷︷ ︸
4 unknowns
(1.5)
We see that we have 4 equations with 6 unknowns so this system cannot be solved in
full generality. However, the number of unknowns is reduced under the assumption
of time-separable utility (Assumption 1). To see that most simply, we introduce the
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notation h for the normalized vector of of marginal utilities:
h =
(
1,
u2
u1
, . . . ,
uS
u1
)′
≡ (1, h2, . . . , hS)′. (1.6)
where we normalize by u1. With this notation and the assumption of time-separable
utility, we can rewrite the system (1.5) as follows:
pi1,1t,t+1 = p
1,1
t,t+1δ
pi1,2t,t+1 = (1− p1,1t,t+1)δh2 (1.7)
pi1,1t,t+2 = p
1,1
t,t+2δ
2
pi1,2t,t+2 = (1− p1,1t,t+2)δ2h2
This system now has 4 equations with 4 unknowns, so there is hope to recover the
physical probabilities p, the discount rate δ, and the ratio of marginal utilities h.
Before we proceed to the general case, it is useful to see how the problem is solved
in this case. Moving h2 to the left side and adding the first two and the last two
equations gives us two new equation
pi1,1t,t+1 + pi
1,2
t,t+1
1
h2
− δ = 0 (1.8)
pi1,1t,t+2 + pi
1,2
t,t+2
1
h2
− δ2 = 0
Solving equation (1.8) for h2 yields
1
h2
= (δ − pi1,1t,t+1)/pi1,2t,t+1 and we can further arrive
at
pi1,1t,t+2 −
pi1,2t,t+2pi
1,1
t,t+1
pi1,2t,t+1
+
pi1,2t,t+2
pi1,2t,t+1
δ − δ2 = 0 (1.9)
Hence, we can solve the 2-state model by (i) finding δ as a root of the 2nd degree
polynomial (1.9); (ii) computing the marginal utility ratio h2 from (1.8); and (iii)
computing the physical probabilities by rearranging (1.7).
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3.2 General Case: Notation
Turning to the general case, recall that there are S states and T time periods. Without
loss of generality, we assume that the economy starts at date 0 in state 1. This allows
us to introduce some simplifying notation since we do not need to keep track of the
starting time or the starting state — we only need to indicate the final state and the
time horizon over which we are considering a specific transition.
Accordingly, let piτs denote the price of receiving 1 at date τ if the realized state is
s and collect the set of observed state prices in a T × S matrix Π defined as
Π =

pi11 ... pi1S
...
...
piT1 ... piTS
 (1.10)
Similarly, letting pτs denote the physical transition probabilities of going from the cur-
rent state 1 to state s in τ periods, we define a T×S matrix P of physical probabilities.
Note that pτs is not the probability of going from state τ to s (as in the setting of Ross
(2015)), but, rather, the first index denotes time for the purpose of the derivation of
our theorem.
From the vector of normalized marginal utilities h defined as in (1.6) we define the
S−dimensional diagonal matrix H = diag(h). Further, we construct a T−dimensional
diagonal matrix of discount factors as D = diag(δ, δ2, . . . , δT ).
3.3 Generalized Recovery
With this notation in place, the fundamental TS equations linking state prices and
physical probabilities, assuming utilities depend on current state only, can be expressed
in matrix form as
Π = DPH (1.11)
Note that the (invertible) diagonal matrices H and D depend only on the vector h
and the constant δ so, if we can determine these, we can find the matrix of physical
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transition probabilities from the observed state prices in Π:
P = D−1ΠH−1 (1.12)
Since probabilities add up to 1, we can write Pe = e, where e = (1, . . . , 1)′ is a vector
of ones. Using this identity, we can simplify (1.12) such that it only depends on δ and
h:
ΠH−1e = DPe = De = (δ, δ2, . . . , δT )′ (1.13)
To further manipulate this equation it will be convenient to work with a division of Π
into block matrices:
Π =
[
Π1 Π2
]
=
Π11 Π12
Π21 Π22
 (1.14)
Here, Π1 is a column vector of dimension T , where the first S−1 elements are denoted
by Π11 and the rest of the vector is denoted Π21. Similarly, Π2 is a T × (S−1) matrix,
where the first S − 1 rows are called Π12 and the last rows are called Π22. With this
notation and the fact that H(1, 1) = h(1) = 1, we can write (1.13) as
Π1 + Π2

h−12
...
h−1S
 =

δ
...
δT
 (1.15)
where of course h−1s =
1
hs
. Given that these equations are linear in the inverse marginal
utilities h−1s , it is tempting to solve for these. To solve for these S−1 marginal utilities,
we consider the first S − 1 equations
Π11 + Π12

h−12
...
h−1S
 =

δ
...
δS−1
 (1.16)
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with solution6 
h−12
...
h−1S
 = Π−112


δ
...
δS−1
−

pi11
...
piS−1,1

 (1.17)
Hence, if δ were known, we would be done. Since δ is a discount rate, it is reasonable
to assume that it is close to one over short time periods. We later use this insight to
derive a closed-form approximation which is accurate as long as we have a reasonable
sense of the size of δ. For now, we proceed for general unknown δ.
We thus have the utility ratios given as a linear function of powers of δ. The
remaining T − S + 1 equations give us
Π21 + Π22

h−12
...
h−1S
 =

δS
...
δT
 (1.18)
and from this we see that if we plug in the expression for the utility ratios found
above, we end up with T − S + 1 equations, each of which involves a polynomium in
δ of degree a most T. If T = S, then δ is a root to a single polynomium so at most
a finite number of solutions exist. If T > S, then generically no solution exists for
general Arrow-Debreu prices Π since δ must simultaneously solve several polynomial
equations (where “generically” means almost surely as defined just below Proposition
1). However, if the prices are generated by the model, then a solution exists and it
will almost surely be unique. To be precise, we say that Π has been “generated by the
model” if there exist δ, P , and H such that Π can be found from the right-hand side
of (1.11). The following theorem formalizes these insights (using Sard’s Theorem):
Proposition 1 (Generalized Recovery). Consider an economy satisfying Assumption
1 with Arrow-Debreu prices for each of the T time periods and S states. The recovery
problem has
1. a continuum of solutions if S > T ;
2. at most S solutions if the submatrix Π2 has full rank and S = T ;
6Of course, to invert Π12 it must have full rank. As long as Π2 has full rank, we can re-order the
rows to ensure that Π12 also has full rank.
13
3. no solution generically in terms of an arbitrary positive matrix Π and S < T ;
4. a unique solution generically if Π has been generated by the model and S < T .
The proof of this and all following propositions are in the appendix. The proposition
states our results using the notion “generically,” which means that they fail to hold
at most for a set of measure zero. Said differently, if someone picks parameters “at
random,” then our results hold almost surely.7
Further, since Sard’s theorem is not a standard tool in asset pricing theory, some
words here on the basic intuition behind our use the theorem are in order. To get
started, consider a linear function f(x) = Ax from Rm to Rn given by the n × m
matrix A. We know that if n = m and A has full rank, then the image of A is all of
Rn, i.e., every point of Rn is being “hit” by A. If, however, n > m, then the image of A
is a linear subspace of Rn, which is vanishingly small (has Lebesgue measure 0 in Rn).
By Sard’s theorem, we can extend this result to a non-linear smooth function f and
still conclude that, when n > m, the image of f is vanishingly small. Said differently,
there exists no solution x to f(x) = y generically (i.e., if you pick a random y then
almost surely no solution exists).8
4 Generalized Recovery vs. Other Forms of Recovery
Proposition 1 provides a simple way to understand when recovery is possible, namely,
essentially when the number of time periods T is at least as large as the number of
states S. We now show how our method relates to Ross’s method and other recovery
results.
4.1 Generalized Recovery in a Ross Economy
We first show that our method generalizes Ross’s recovery method in the sense that,
if we are in a Ross economy, then any solution to Ross’s problem has a corresponding
solution to our problem.
7We note that the fact that our results hold only generically is not a consequence of our solution
method – indeed, there exist counter-examples for special sets of parameters as discussed in our
examples.
8On a more technical note, Sard’s theorem in fact states, that if M is the set of critical points of
f (i.e., the set of points for which the Jacobian matrix of f has rank strictly smaller than n), then
f(M) has Lebesgue measure zero in Rn. When n > m all points are critical points, and therefore in
this case f(M) is the same as the image of f , which is what we need for our proof.
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It is important to be clear about the terminology here. In Ross’s recovery prob-
lem, physical transition probabilities are specified in terms of a one-period transition
probability matrix P¯ which includes transition probabilities from states that we are
currently not in (“parallel universes”). Our problem focuses on recovering the matrix
P of multi-period transition probabilities as seen from the state we are in at time 0,
which we take to be state 1. We say that P is generated from P¯ if the k’th row of P
is equal to the first row of P¯ k. The same terminology can be applied to state prices,
of course.9
Proposition 2 (Generalized Recovery Works in a Ross Economy). If observed prices
Π over S = T time periods are generated by a Ross economy (i.e., an irreducible matrix
Π¯ of one-period state prices and probabilities P satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2) then
1. The matrix P generated from P¯ is a solution to our generalized recovery problem.
2. P is a unique solution to our generalized recovery problem generically in the space
of Ross price matrices Π¯.
3. If Π12 has full rank, then Ross’s parallel-universe prices Π¯ can be derived uniquely
from multi-period prices Π observed from the current state. Otherwise, there may
exist a continuum of Ross prices Π¯ consistent with the observed prices. The rank
condition is satisfied generically in the space of Ross price matrices.
Part 1 of the proposition confirms that any solution to Ross’s recovery problem
corresponds to a solution to our generalized problem. Part 2 of the proposition con-
siders the deeper question of uniqueness. Ross establishes a unique solution while our
generalized recovery solution in our earlier Proposition 1 only narrows the solution set
down to at most S = T solutions. Interestingly, Proposition 2 shows that our method
too yields a unique solution when prices come from a Ross economy, generically. Thus,
in this sense, nothing is “lost” by using generalized recovery even when we are in a
Ross economy.
One way to understand this result is to note that Ross’s problem comes down to
solving a characteristic polynomial, and, similarly, our generalized recovery problem
9The notion of generating P from P¯ is based on the fact that, in a Ross economy, the matrix of
probabilities of going from state i to state j in k time periods is given by P¯ k. Likewise, the k-period
state prices are given by Π¯k.
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can be solved via the polynomial given by (1.18). Even though these polynomials come
from different sets of equations, it turns out that they have the same roots when Ross’s
assumptions are satisfied.
Finally, part 3 of the proposition deals with the issue that some of our results only
hold “generically,” that is, for almost all parameters. One might ask whether Ross also
has a similar problem for the (small set of) remaining parameters. The answer turns
out to be “yes,” and for a reason that has not yet been discussed in the context of
Ross’s method. The issue is that Ross finds a unique solution given his parallel universe
price matrix Π¯, but where does this matrix come from? In any real-world application,
we start with observed prices Π over time as in our generalized recovery setting. When
Ross implements his model empirically, he must first find his Π¯ from the observed Π
and then use his recovery method (but he does not consider the mathematics of the
first step, getting Π¯ from Π). Part 3 of the proposition shows that Ross has the same
problem as we do for the small set of parameters where Π12 has less than full rank.
In other words, his lack of uniqueness arises from the difficulty in finding the price
matrix Π¯. Interestingly, this may have been unnoticed since Ross takes Π¯ as given in
his theoretical analysis (and shows that his recovery is unique for each Π¯).
This last point is most clearly seen through an example: Consider two different
one-period transition probability matrices, that are both irreducible:
P¯ =

1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
 and P¯ ′ =

1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
2
3 0
1
3 0
2
3

If we assume that the current state is state 1, then since all powers of the matrices P¯
and P¯ ′ have the same first row, namely (13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3), it follows that the matrices P and P
′
(i.e., the physical transition probabilities as seen from state 1) generated by P¯ and P¯ ′
become the same matrix
P = P ′ =

1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3

For given discount factors D and marginal utilities H, Π = DPH and Π′ = DP ′H
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are then the same, and hence observing the 3 × 3 matrix of state prices Π would
not allow us to distinguish between the physical transition matrices P¯ and P¯ ′. The
problem is not mitigated by observing more periods. It is simply impossible in a
world where we cannot observe parallel universe prices to distinguish between the
two irreducible matrices. In our approach, we do not seek to recover the one period
transition probabilities. Rather, we recover the matrix P , and our ability to do so
depends on the rank of a submatrix the Π matrix. For example, if we let δ = 0.98,
and let h1 = 1, h2 = 0.9, h3 = 0.8, then the sub-matrix of state prices Π12 has rank 1,
and this means that we would not have unique recovery either.
4.2 Ross Recovery in our Generalized Economy
We now establish that our formulation is strictly more general, by showing that for
many “typical” price matrices (e.g., those observed in the data), no solution exists
for Ross’s recovery problem even though a solution exists for the generalized recovery
problem.
Proposition 3 (Generalized Recovery is More General). With S = T , there exists
set of parameters with positive Lebesgue measure for the generalized recovery problem
where no solution exists for Ross’s recovery problem. With S < T , generically among
price matrices for the the generalized recovery problem, there exists no solution to
Ross’s recovery problem.
This proposition shows that generalized recovery may be useful because it can
match a broader class of market prices, in addition to the basic advantage that it
starts with the observed multi-period prices (rather than parallel universe prices).
4.3 Recovery in Infinite Horizon
In addition to generalizing Ross’s method, our result also provides a simple and in-
tuitive way of understanding why, for example, growth may present a challenge for
recovery, cf. the critique of Borovicka, Hansen, and Scheinkman (2016) that recovery
is infeasible in standard models. Indeed, we provide a simple counting argument: Sup-
pose that the economy has growth such that, for each extra time period, the economy
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can increase from the previously highest state and go down from the previously low-
est state. Then we get two new states for each new time period, which implies that
S > T such that recovery is impossible. Nevertheless, we can still achieve recovery
in such a large state space if we consider a class of pricing kernels that is sufficiently
low-dimensional as we discuss below in Section 6.
Our argument is very different from that of Borovicka, Hansen, and Scheinkman
(2016) who rely on a martingale decomposition, which requires infinite time horizon.
Our counting argument is simple and is based on a finite horizon, consistent with the
data observed in practice.
Our finite-horizon recovery theorem is therefore also markedly distinct from the
existing approaches that exist in continuous-time models in that we make no reference
to, and have no need for, recurrence or stationarity conditions. In a diffusion setting,
Walden (2017) shows the fundamental role of recurrence as a necessary condition for
recovery in these models. Recurrence essentially means that each state is being visited
infinitely often so it can only be defined over an infinite horizon. Recurrence bears
some resemblance to Ross’ condition of irreducibility in that an infinite time extension
of an irreducible chain would be recurrent. The result of Walden (2017) is intuitive
since, when states are visited infinitely often, we have a chance to recover probabilities.
Our approach can naturally be used to consider whether recovery is possible in a
finite-time version of infinite-horizon process (i.e., even if a process is defined over an
infinite horizon, we can ask what happens if we only see it over a couple of years).
Further, we can show via some examples that recovery may even be possible for non-
recurrent processes or processes with growth.
To give a simple example of this, consider a two period non-homogeneous Markov
process with two states defined from the probability transition matrices for each time
P¯ (0, 1) =
 0.4 0.6
0.5 0.5
 and, for t ≥ 1, P¯ (t, t+ 1) =
 1 0
0 1

In the first period, the process either stays in its current state or jumps to the other
state, but, after that, the process is absorbed in its current state. If we only observe
prices for two time periods, then this is clearly the restriction of a non-recurrent process.
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Given that S = T = 2, our counting argument shows that generalized recovery is
feasible.
We could also imagine a process with growth, starting in the “lowest state” 1 and
evolving according to a transition matrix specified as an upward drifting process. To
give a simple illustration, imagine Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and that the one-period
transition matrix of physical probabilities across five states is given as
P¯ =

0.5 0.5 0 0 0
0.1 0.5 0.4 0 0
0 0.1 0.5 0.4 0
0 0 0.1 0.5 0.4
0 0 0 0.5 0.5

If we observe prices over five time periods, then our counting argument is satisfied
S = T = 5, and we see that it is not growth per se which makes recovery impossible
— it is the expanding state space necessary to accommodate models with growth that
may cause problems.
In summary, our results complement those in the literature in two ways. First,
generalized recovery may work when other methods don’t and vice versa. Second,
generalized recovery provides an economic intuition in finite economies while other
methods do so in infinite-horizon economies.
4.4 Flat Term Structure and Risk Neutrality
We finally note that the very special case of an observed flat term structure of interest
rates has some special properties. In particular, with a flat term structure there exists
a solution to the problem in which the representative agent is risk neutral, echoing an
analogous result by Ross.
To see this result, note that the price of a zero-coupon bond with maturity τ is
equal to the sum of the τ ’th row of Π, which we write as (Πe)τ . Having a flat term
structure means that the yield on the zero-coupon bonds does not depend on maturity,
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i.e., that there exists a constant r such that
1
(1 + r)τ
= (Πe)τ (1.19)
Let the T × S matrix Q contain the risk-neutral transition probabilities seen from the
starting state, i.e., the k’th row of Q gives us the risk-neutral probabilities of ending
in the different states at date k.
Proposition 4 (Flat Term Structure). Suppose that the term structure of interest
rates is flat, i.e., there exists r > 0 such that 1(1+r)τ = (Πe)τ for all τ = 1, . . . , T .
Then the recovery problem is solved with equal physical and risk-neutral probabilities,
P = Q. This means that either the representative agent is risk neutral or the recovery
problem has multiple solutions.
We note that this result should be interpreted with caution. The knife-edge (i.e.,
measure zero) case of a flat term structure may well be generated by the knife-edge
case of a price matrix Π with low rank, which implies that a continuum of solutions
may exists and the representative agent may well be risk averse (as one would expect).
Intuitively, a flat term structure may be generated by a Π with so much symmetry
that it has a low rank.
5 Closed-Form Recovery
The recovery problem is almost linear, except for the powers of the discount rate δ
which enter into the problem as a polynomial. In practical implementations over the
time horizons where options are liquid, a linear approximation provides an accurate
approximation given that δ is close to one. For instance, we know from the literature
that δ is close to 0.97 at an annual horizon.
The linear approximation is straightforward. To linearize the discounting of δτ
around a point δ0 (say, δ0 = 0.97), we write δ
τ ≈ aτ + bτδ for known constants aτ and
bτ . Based on the Taylor expansion δ
τ ≈ δτ0 + τδτ−10 (δ − δ0), we have aτ = −(τ − 1)δτ0
and bτ = τδ
τ−1
0 . As seen in Figure 1.2, the approximation is accurate for δ ∈ [0.94, 1]
for time horizons less than 2 years.
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With the linearization of the polynomials in δ, the equations for the recovery prob-
lem (1.13) become the following:

pi11
...
piT1
+

pi12 . . . pi1S
...
...
piT2 . . . piTS


h−12
...
h−1S
 =

a1 + b1δ
...
aT + bT δ
 (1.20)
which we can rewrite as a system of T equations in S unknowns as

−b1 pi12 . . . pi1S
...
...
...
−bT piT2 . . . piTS


δ
h−12
...
h−1S
 =

a1 − pi11
...
aT − piT1
 (1.21)
Rewriting this equation in matrix form as
Bhδ = a− pi1 (1.22)
we immediately see the closed-form solution
hδ =
 B−1(a− pi1) for S = T(B′B)−1B′(a− pi1) for S < T (1.23)
We see that, when S = T , we simply need to solve S linear equations with S unknowns.
When S < T , we could simply just consider S equations and ignore the remaining T−S
equations.
More broadly, if S < T and we start with prices Π that are not exactly generated
by the model (e.g., because of noise in the data), then (1.23) provides the values of δ
and the vector h that best approximate a solution in the sense of least squares.
The following theorem shows that the closed-form solution is accurate as long as
the value of δ0 is close to the true discount rate:
Proposition 5 (Closed-Form Solution). If prices are generated by the model and B
has full rank S ≤ T then the closed-form solution (1.23) approximates the true solu-
tion in the following sense: The distance between the true solution (δ¯, h¯, P¯ ) and the
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approximate solution (δ, h, P ) approaches 0 faster than (δ0 − δ¯) as δ0 approaches δ¯.
6 Recovery in a Large State Space
A challenge in implementing the Ross Recovery Theorem is that it does not allow
for an expanding set of states as we know it, for example, from binomial models and
multinomial models of option pricing. Simply stated, the expanding state space in a
binomial model adds more unknowns for each time period than equations even under
the assumption of utility functions that depend on the current state only. We next
show how we handle an expanding state space in our model.
We have in mind a case where the number of states S is larger than the number
of time periods T . In a standard binomial model, for example, with two time periods
we need five states corresponding to the different values that the stock can take over
its path. The key to solving this problem is to reduce the dimensionality of the utility
ratios captured in the vector h. To do that, we replace Assumption 1 with the fol-
lowing assumption that the pricing kernels belong to a parametric family with limited
dimensionality.
Assumption 1* (General utility with N parameters) The pricing kernel at time
τ in state s (given the initial state 1 at time 0) can be written as
m1,s0,τ = δ
τhs(θ) (1.24)
where δ ∈ (0, 1] and h(·) > 0 is a one-to-one C∞ smooth function of the parameter
θ ∈ Θ, an embedding from Θ ⊂ RN to RS, and Θ has a non-empty interior.
With a large number of unknowns compared to the number of equations, we need
to restrict the set of unknowns, and this is done by assuming that the utilities are
parameterized by a lower-dimensional set Θ.
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6.1 A Large Discrete State Space
Let us first consider two simple examples of how we can parameterize marginal utilities
with a low-dimensional set of parameters. First, we consider a simple linear expression
for the marginal utilities and then we discuss the case of constant relative risk aversion
(a non-linear mapping from risk aversion parameters Θ to marginal utilities).
We start with a simple linear example of how the parametrization works. We
consider a matrix B of full rank and dimension (S − 1)×N such that

h−12
...
h−1S
 =

a1
...
aS−1
+

b11 . . . b1N
...
...
bS−1,1 . . . bS−1,N


θ1
...
θN
 = A+Bθ (1.25)
Combining this equation with the recovery problem (1.15) gives
(Π1 + Π2A) + Π2B

θ1
...
θN
 =

δ
...
δT
 (1.26)
This equation has exactly the same form as our original recovery problem (1.15), but
now Π1 + Π2A plays the role of Π1, similarly Π2B plays the role of Π2, and θ plays
the role of (h−12 , ..., h
−1
S )
′. The only difference is that the dimension of the unknown
parameter has been reduced from S−1 to N . Therefore, Proposition 1 holds as stated
with S replaced by N + 1.
Hence, while before we could achieve recovery if S ≤ T , now we can achieve recovery
as long as N +1 ≤ T . In other words, recovery is possible as long as the representative
agent’s utility function can be specified by a number of parameters that is small relative
to the number of time periods for which we have price data.
Assumption 1* also allows for the marginal utilities to be non-linear function of the
risk aversion parameters θ. This generality is useful because standard utility functions
may give rise to such a non-linearity. As a simple example, consider an economy with
a representative agent with CRRA preferences. In this economy, the pricing kernel in
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state s at time τ (given the current state 1 at time 0) is
m1,s0,τ = δ
τ
(
cs
c1
)−θ
(1.27)
where cs is the known consumption in state s of the representative agent and θ is
the unknown risk aversion parameter. Hence, Assumption 1* is clearly satisfied with
h−1s (θ) = (
cs
c1
)θ. Our generalized recovery result extends to the large state space as
stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 (Generalized Recovery in a Large State Space). Consider an economy
satisfying Assumption 1* with Arrow-Debreu prices for each of the T time periods and
S states such that N + 1 < T . The recovery problem has
1. no solution generically in terms of an arbitrary Π matrix of positive elements;
2. a unique solution generically if Π has been generated by the model.
As one simple application of the proposition, we can recover preferences from state
prices if we know that the pricing kernel is bounded and we have sufficiently many
time periods as seen in the following corollary. Said differently, using a simplified or
winsorized pricing kernel (or state space) is a special case of Proposition 5.
Corollary 7 (Generalized Recovery with Bounded Kernel). Suppose that the pricing
kernel is bounded in the sense that there exist states s¯ > s such that hs = hs¯ for s > s¯
and hs = hs for s < s. Then the conclusion of Proposition 5 applies, where N is the
number of states from s to s¯.
6.2 Continuous State Space
Finally, we note that our framework also easily extends to a continuous state space
under Assumption 1* in discrete time (see Walden (2017) for the case of continuous
time and continuous state space). We start with a continuous state-space density piτ (s)
at each time point τ = 1, . . . , T (given the current state at time 0). As before, piτ (s)
represents Arrow-Debreu prices or, more precisely, piτ (s)ds represents the current value
of receiving 1 at time τ if the state is in a small interval ds around s. Similarly, we let
pτ (s) denote the physical probability density of transitioning to s in τ periods. The
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fundamental recovery equations now become
piτ (s) = δ
τhs(θ)pτ (s) (1.28)
By moving h to the left-hand side and integrating, we can eliminate the natural prob-
abilities as before. ∫
piτ (s)h
−1
s (θ)ds = δ
τ (1.29)
For each time period τ , this gives an equation to help us recover the N + 1 unknowns,
namely the discount rate δ and the parameters θ ∈ RN . Hence, we are in the same
situation as in the discrete-state model of Section 6.1, and we have recovery if there
are enough time periods as stated in Proposition 6.
As before, the linear case is particularly simple. Suppose that the marginal utilities
can be written as10
h−1s (θ) = A(s) +B(s)θ (1.30)
where, for each s, A(s) is a known scalar and B(s) is a known row-vector of dimension
N . Using this expression, we can rewrite equation (1.29) as a simple equation of the
same form as our original recovery problem (1.15):
piAτ + pi
B
τ θ = δ
τ (1.31)
where piAτ =
∫
piτ (s)A(s)ds and pi
B
τ =
∫
piτ (s)B(s)ds. Hence, as before, we have T
equations that are linear except for the powers of the discount rate.
7 Recovery in Specific Models: Examples
In this section we investigate recovery of specific models of interest. In a controlled
environment, we show when, given state prices, our model recovers the true underlying
risk-aversion parameter, time-preference parameter along with the true multiperiod
physical probabilities.
10Note that h−1s (θ) denotes
1
hs(θ)
, i.e., it is not the inverse function of hs(θ).
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7.1 Recovery in the Mehra and Prescott (1985) model
The Mehra and Prescott (1985a) model works as follows. The aggregate consumption
either grows at rate u = 1.054 or shrinks at rate d = 0.982 over the next period.
This consumption growth between time t− 1 and t is captured by a process Xt. The
aggregate consumption process can be written as
Yt =
t∏
s=1
Xs (1.32)
where the initial consumption is normalized as Y0 = 1.
Consumption growth Xt is a Markov process with two states, up and down. The
probability of having an up state after an up state is φuu; = Pr(Xt = u|Xt−1 = u) =
0.43 and, equally, the probability of staying in the down state is φdd = 0.43. Hence,
the probability of switching state is φud = φdu = 0.57.
The Arrow-Debreu price of receiving 1 at time t in a state st = (yt, xt) is computed
based on the CRRA preferences for the representative agent with risk aversion γ = 4
as
pi1,st0,t = δ
ty−γt Pr(Xt = xt, Yt = yt) (1.33)
where the time-preference parameter is δ = 0.98 and the physical probabilities Pr(Xt =
xt, Yt = yt) of each state are computed based on the Markov probabilities above.
11
Based on this model of Mehra and Prescott (1985a), we compute Arrow-Debreu
prices in each state over T = 20 time periods and examine whether we can recover
probabilities and preferences based on knowing only these prices (we have also per-
formed the recovery for other values of T ).
We first notice from equation (1.32) that consumption has growth, which imme-
diately implies that S > T . This means that recovery is impossible without further
assumptions. Hence, we proceed using the method concerning a large state space of
Section 6. The simplest way to proceed is to assume that we know the form of the
11We note that prices of long-lived assets, for example the overall stock market, depends on both
Xt and Yt (even if the aggregate consumption Yt is the aggregate dividend). Therefore, stock index
options would provide information on Arrow-Debreu prices on each state st = (yt, xt). Alternatively,
we could consider recovery based only on Arrow-Debreu securities that depend on yt. This would
correspond to observing options on “dividend strips.” Either way, we get the same recovery results in
the Mehra and Prescott (1985) model.
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pricing kernel (1.33), but we don’t know the risk aversion γ, the discount rate δ, or the
probabilities. We can then write the Generalized Recovery equation set on the form
Πh−1(γ) =
[
δ δ2 . . . δT
]′
(1.34)
where h is a one-to-one C∞ smooth function of the parameter γ based on (1.33), see
Appendix B for details.12 Therefore, we are in the domain of Assumption 1* and, as
long as T > 2 (since N = 1 is the number of risk aversion parameters and 2 is the total
number of variables, δ and γ) then by Proposition 6 we know that the Generalized
Recovery equation set generically has a unique solution.
We first seek to recover γ and δ by minimizing the pricing errors (again, see Ap-
pendix B for details). Panel A of Figure 1.3 shows the objective function for this
minimization problem. As seen from the figure, there is a unique solution to the
problem, which naturally equals the true parameters δˆ = 0.98, γˆ = 4.
Finally, we turn to the recovery of natural probabilities. It is worth noticing that
we do not recover the Markov switching probabilities φuu, φdd, φud or φdu. Rather,
what is recovered is the multi-period probabilities p1,st0,t of transitioning from the ini-
tial state to each future state (consistent with the intuition conveyed in Figure 1.1).13
The probabilities p1,st0,t are recovered exactly. Fortunately, these multi-period probabil-
ities are all we need for making predictions about such statistics as expected returns,
variances, and quantiles across different time horizons.
7.2 Cox-Ross-Rubinstein and iid. consumption growth
We can capture the standard binomial model of Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979)
(i.e., the discrete time counterpart to Black-Scholes-Merton) as follows. We consider
the same model for aggregate consumption Yt, but now Xt is iid. (corresponding
to φuu = φdu and φdd = φud). In other words, the standard binomial model has
iid. consumption growth. Specifically, we assume that up and down probabilities are
always 50% (φuu = φdu = φdd = φud = 0.5).
This binomial model implies a flat term structure which puts us in the case of
12Matlab code is available from the authors upon request.
13Recovery of the underlying path-dependent probabilities is possible if we have access to Arrow-
Debreu prices for all paths or if we assume that we know the structure of the underlying tree.
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Proposition 4, where recovery is impossible.14 Concretely, the problem is that the
price matrix Π from (1.34) is not full rank. Hence, as seen in Figure 1.3 Panel B, the
objective of minimizing pricing errors has a continuum of solutions. In other words,
recovery is not feasible.
7.3 A non-stationary model without Markov structure
Lastly, we consider a model where the consumption growth Xt is not Markov. Specif-
ically, we still consider the binomial tree described above in Sections 7.1–7.2, but now
we let the probability of transitioning up/down from any state s at any time t depend
on the path taken from time 0 to time t. At each node at each path, we draw a random
uniformly distributed probability for an “up” move, and, of course, assign one minus
this probability to the next “down” node.
We now seek to recover δ and γ. As seen in Figure 1.3 Panel C, the objective
function has a unique solution which again equals the true parameters δˆ = 0.98 and
γˆ = 4. Hence, recovery can be possible even when the driving process is non-stationary
and non-Markovian, again under parametric assumptions about the utility function
(i.e., a model outside the scope of Ross (2015) and Borovicka, Hansen, and Scheinkman
(2016)).
8 Empirical Analysis
This section describes our data, empirical methodology, and empirical findings.
8.1 Data and Sample Selection
We use the Ivy DB database from OptionMetrics to extract information on standard
call and put options written on the S&P 500 index for every last trading day of the
month from January 1996 to December 2015. We obtain implied volatilities, strikes,
and maturities, allowing us to back out market prices. As a proxy for the risk-free
rate, we use the zero-coupon yield curve of the Ivy DB database, which is derived
14Iid. consumption growth and standard utility functions generally lead to a flat term struc-
ture because the price of a bond with τ periods to maturity can be written as Et(δ
τ ut+τ
ut
) =
Et(
∏
s=1,...,τ δ
ut+s
ut+s−1 ) =: (
1
1+r
)τ , where the expected utility increments are the same for all s be-
cause they depend on consumption growth
ct+s
ct+s−1 , which has constant expected value when it is iid.
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from LIBOR rates and settlement prices of CME Eurodollar futures. We also obtain
expected dividend payments, calculated under the assumption of a constant dividend
yield over the life time of the option. We consider options with time to maturity
between 10 and 360 days and apply standard filters, excluding contracts with zero
open interest, zero trading volume, and quotes with best bid below $0.50, and options
with implied volatility higher than 100%.
8.2 Recovery Methodology
The Generalized Recovery Theorem relies on the knowledge of Arrow-Debreu state
prices from the current initial state to all possible future states for several future
time periods. Unfortunately, there is currently no market trading pure Arrow-Debreu
securities. Therefore, we use options to back out Arrow-Debreu prices. Further, given
the large number of states, we use the parametric kernel method from Section 6.
To study the robustness of recovery, we consider two different methods for backing
out Arrow-Debreu prices and two different specifications of the pricing kernel, for a
total of four different recovered distributions and preferences.
More specifically, we apply the following two methods of extracting Arrow-Debreu
prices from options: (i) the parametric model of Bates (2000) and (ii) the non-
parametric method of Jackwerth (2004). Each of the methods yields Arrow-Debreu
prices across multiple time horizons and mutliple index levels for each day t as described
in detail in Appendix C.
Given these observed Arrow-Debreu prices, we recover preferences and probabilities
based on the two different specifications of the pricing kernel that we denote “piece-
wise linear” and “polynomial” pricing kernels, respectively, as described in detail in
Appendix D.
8.3 Computing Statistics of the Recovered Distribution
Once we have recovered the probabilities of each state for each future time period, it
is straightforward to compute any statistic under the physical probability distribution.
If the level of the index at time t is St, then the state space consists of all integer values
of the index between the minimum value (1 − 2.5VIXt)St and (1 + 4VIXt)St. Let Nt
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denote the number of states as seen from time t and think of state 1 as the lowest state
and Nt as the highest state. We compute the recovered expected excess return µt at
time t by summing over the Nt possible states:
µt = E
P
t [rt,t+1]− rft,t+1 =
Nt∑
ν=1
pt+1,νrt+1,ν − rft,t+1 (1.35)
where rft,t+1 is the risk-free rate, pt+1,ν is the recovered time-t conditional physical
probability for the transition to state ν at time t+ 1, rt+1,ν =
St+1(ν)
St
− 1 is the return
in state ν, and St+1(ν) is the value of the index at time t+ 1 if state ν is realized.
We compute the contemporaneous unpredictable innovation in the conditional ex-
pected return as
∆µt+1 = µt+1 − Et[µt+1] (1.36)
where we impose an AR(1)-process on the innovation to the risk premium Et[µt+1] =
α0 + α1µt based on the regression
µt+1 = α0 + α1µt + εt+1 (1.37)
The estimated persistence parameter α1 is 0.3 at the monthly horizon.
We compute the recovered conditional variance, VARPt (rt,t+1), analogously to how
we computed the expected return and we denote the recovered volatility by σt =√
VARPt (rt,t+1).
8.4 Empirical Results
We next investigate the properties of the recovered probabilities based on each of
our four methods. We first consider the recovered expected return. Table 1.1 shows
the correlation matrix for the recovered expected returns based on each of our four
methodologies as well as the VIX volatility index and the SVIX variable of Martin
(2017). The good news is that all variables are positively correlated, as we would
expect. The ææless good news is that the correlations between the different recovered
expected returns are modest in magnitude, with an average pairwise correlation of
only 0æ.5. This modest correlation is concerning because all these recovered expected
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returns should be measures of the same thing, namely the market’s expected return at
any given time.
Figure 1.4 shows the time series variation of the recovered expected return based
on one of the methodologies (we plot just one time series since it is difficult to look at
all four together). These recovered expected returns do not look unreasonable, but we
next try to test their predictability of actual realized returns. Specifically, we regress
the ex post realized excess return on the ex ante recovered expected excess return, µt,
and the ex post innovation in expected return, ∆µt+1:
rt,t+1 = β0 + β1µt + β2∆µt+1 + t,t+1 (1.38)
where t+1 is a noise term. To understand this regression, note that we are interested
in testing whether the recovered probabilities give rise to reasonable expected returns,
that is, time-varying risk premia. For this, we want to test whether a higher ex ante
expected return is associated with a higher ex post realized return (β1 > 0), whether
an increase in the risk premium is associated with a contemporaneous drop in the price
(β2 < 0), and whether the intercept as zero (β0 = 0).
Table 1.2 reports the results of this regression for each of our four recovery method-
ologies as well as using VIX and SVIX as the expected return over the full sample from
1997 to 2015. First, the intercept β0 is insignificantly different from zero in most speci-
fications, but significantly different from zero using method 2 and using VIX, providing
evidence against these models. Second, β1 is positive and marginally significant from
0 in model 1, but otherwise insignificantly different from zero, providing neither evi-
dence in favor or against the models. The coefficient β2 is highly significant and has
the desired negative sign in all models. Further, as expected the absolute value of β2
is greater than one since a shock to the discount rate leads to a larger shock to the
price (cf. Gordon’s growth model for the extreme example of a permanent shock).
Table 1.3 reports the result of regression (1.38) over the sub-sample that excludes
the global financial crisis (9/2008–7/2009), a sub-sample that has been considered in
the literature (e.g., Martin (2017)). The results here are stronger and more consistent
with theory. All the key parameters have the expected sign, the estimated coefficient
β0 is small and insignificant in all models, the estimated coefficient β1 is positive and
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marginally significant or insignificant, and β2 is negative and significant.
The reason that the models work better when we exclude the crisis is intuitive:
During the crisis, there were several months in which the ex ante recovered expected
return was high, but, nevertheless, the ex post realized return was negative and large
in magnitude. It seems plausible that investors were scared at that time, which means
that it is plausible that the true required return was indeed high, which in turn implies
that the negative realized return was a negative surprise. Hence, one could argue that
the model gets this period wrong for the “right” reason, but we don’t want to push
this argument too far as the most compelling evidence is almost always that of using
the full sample.
Finally, we consider the recovered physical volatility as plotted in Figure 1.5. This
recovered volatility looks reasonable. Further, the recovered volatilities are similar
across the different methodologies with an average pairwise correlation of 0.95 and
an average correlation to VIX of 0.92. It is not that surprising that volatilities can
be recovered, but studying volatility provides a simple and powerful reality check of
our method since the true future volatility is known with much less error than the
expected return. Hence, we regress the ex post realized volatility on the ex ante
recovered conditional volatility, σt:
√
VAR(rt,t+1) = β0 + β1σt + t,t+1 (1.39)
where the realized volatility
√
VAR(rt,t+1) is computed using close-to-close daily data
over the 4 weeks from t to t + 1 by OptionMetrics. We also run the same regression
where we replace the recovered volatilities by the VIX volatility index. The theory
predicts that β0 = 0 and β1 = 1.
Table 1.4 reports the results. As seen in Table 1.4, the estimated intercept coeffi-
cient β0 is insignificant for models 1 and 2, but significant for models 3 and 4. However,
for all models, the intercept is smaller than that of VIX, suggesting that the recovered
volatilities are less biased than VIX.
The estimated slope coefficient β1 is positive and highly significant for all models.
Further, the estimated slope is close to the predicted value of 1, in particular closer
than the estimated value for VIX. Lastly, we see that VIX has a slightly higher R2,
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which may reflect that the recovery method introduces some noise in the volatility
measures.
In summary, we find substantial differences across the recovered probabilities based
on different methodologies, and the predictive power for future returns appears weak
in the full sample, but slightly stronger in the sample that excludes the gælobal finan-
cial crisis. The recovered volatilities predict well the future volatility in a way that is
less biased than VIX, but slightly lower R2. We are able to reject that the recovered
probabilities provide a perfect description of the future evolution of the market based
on a Berkowitz (2001) test.15 This rejection could be due to the details of our imple-
mentation. For instance, while the true pricing kernel may depend on multiple factors,
we assume that the state space is given by the level of S&P500 since we do not observe
option prices depending simultaneously on multiple factors.
9 Conclusion
We characterize when preferences and natural probabilities can be recovered from
observed prices using a simple counting argument. We make no assumptions on the
physical probability distribution, thus generalizing Ross (2015) who relies on strong
time-homogeneity assumptions.
In economies with growth, our counting argument immediately shows that recovery
is generally not feasible. While this finding parallels results by Borovicka, Hansen,
and Scheinkman (2016), our intuitive counting argument is fundamentally different
and does not rely on the assumptions of an infinite-period time-homogeneous Markov
setting, but, rather, is based on the general methods pioneered by Debreu (1970) for
general equilibrium.
To pursue recovery even in economies with growth, e.g., classical multinomial mod-
els, we show how our method can be used when the pricing kernel can be parameter-
ized by a sufficiently low-dimensional parameter vector. When recovery is feasible,
our model allows a closed-form linearized solution. We implement our model empiri-
15The details of this test are not reported for brievity. The idea is that, given the estimated
distribution Fˆt of the excess return rt+1 at time t, the distribution of the transformed variable ut+1 =
Fˆt(rt+1) should be uniform and the distribution of the further transformed variable xt+1 = Φ
−1(ut+1)
should be standard normal, which is tested by estimated the coefficients in the model xt+1 = c+βxt+t
and perform a likelihood ratio test of the joint hypothesis that c = β = 0 and V ar(t) = 1.
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cally using several different specifications, testing the predictive power of the recovered
statistics.
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Panel A. Ross’s Recovery Theorem: one period, two “parallel universes”
t=1t=0
Current state
Other state
Panel B. Ross’s Recovery Theorem: time-homogeneous dynamic setting
t=2t=1t=0
Current state
Other state
Panel C. Our Generalized Recovery: No assumptions about probabilities
t=2t=1t=0
Current state
Other state
Figure 1.1: Generalized Recovery Framework. Panel A illustrates the idea behind
Ross’s Recovery Theorem, namely that we start with information about all Arrow-
Debreu prices in all initial states (not just the state we are currently in, but also prices
in “parallel universes” where today’s state is different). Panel B shows how Ross moves
to a dynamic setting by assuming time-homogeneity, that is, assuming that the prices
and probabilities are the same for the two dotted lines, and so on for each of the other
pairs of lines. Panel C illustrates our Generalized Recovery method, where we make
no assumptions about the probabilities.
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0.90 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98 1.00
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
δ
a + bδ
δt
Panel A: t = 2 years
0.90 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98 1.00
0.95
0.96
0.97
0.98
0.99
1.00
δ
a + bδ
δt
Panel B: t = 0.5 years
Figure 1.2: Closed-Form Solution: Approximation Error. The figure shows
that the generalized recovery problem is very close to being linear. We show that
the only non-linearity comes from the discount rate δ due to the powers of time, δt.
However, the function δ → δt is very close to being linear for the relevant range of
annual discount rates, say δ ∈ [0.94, 1], and the relevant time periods that we study.
Panel A plots the discount function and the linear approximation around δ0 = 0.97
given a horizon of t = 2 years. Panel B plots the same for a horizon of a half year.
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Table 1.1: Correlation Matrix. This tables shows the pairwise correlations between
the recovered conditional expected excess return for different specifications of marginal
utilities and method for estimating risk-neutral prices; (i) µt,1: Bates and polynomial,
(ii) µt,2: Bates and piecewise linear, (iii) µt,3: Jackwerth and polynomial, (iv) µt,4:
Jackwerth and piecewise linear. We augment the table with pairwise correlations with
the VIXt index and the lower boundary on the equity premium, SVIXt, due to Martin
(2017).
µt,1 µt,2 µt,3 µt,4 VIXt SVIXt
µt,1 1 0.359 0.393 0.392 0.534 0.485
µt,2 1 0.642 0.523 0.716 0.794
µt,3 1 0.642 0.784 0.830
µt,4 1 0.634 0.689
VIXt 1 0.928
SVIXt 1
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Panel A: Mehra Prescott (1985)
Panel B: Iid. consumption
Panel C: Non-Markovian
Figure 1.3: Generalized Recovery: Objective Function in Specific Economic
Models. This figure shows the objective function used for the generalized recovery
method, the squared pricing errors in (1.48). Panel A shows that the objective function
for the Mehra Prescott (1985) model has a unique minimum, making the generalized
recovery feasible. Panel B shows that generalized recovery is not feasible in the Black-
Scholes-Merton model with iid. consumption as the objective has a continuum of
solutions. Panel C shows that generalized recovery is feasible in the non-Markovian
model.
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Figure 1.4: Recovered conditional expected excess return. The figure plots
monthly conditional expected excess market returns, recovered last trading day of each
month from 1/1996 to 12/2015. Marginal utilities are piecewise linear and risk-neutral
prices are estimated using Jackwerth (2004).
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. We have already provided a proof for 1 and 2 in the body
of the text. Turning to 3, we note that the set X of all (δ, h, P ) is a manifold-with-
boundary of dimension S · T − T + S. The discount rate, probabilities and marginal
utilities map into prices, which we denote by F (δ, h, P ) = DPH = Π, where, as before,
D = diag(δ, ..., δT ) and H = diag(1, h2, ..., hS)), and F is C
∞. If S < T , the image
F (X) has Lebesgue measure zero in RT×S by Sard’s theorem, proving 3. Indeed, this
means that the prices that are generated by the model F (X) have measure zero relative
to all prices Π.
Turning to 4, we first note that P and H can be uniquely recovered from (δ,Π)
(given that Π is generically full rank). Indeed, H is recovered from (1.17) and P is
recovered from (1.12). Therefore, we can focus on (δ,Π).
For two different choices of the discount rate (δa, δb) and a single set of prices Π, we
consider the triplet (δa, δb,Π). We are interested in showing that the different discount
rates cannot both be consistent with the same prices, generically. To show this, we
consider the space M where the reverse is true, hoping to show that M is “small.”
Specifically, M is the set of triplets where Π is of full rank and both discount rates are
consistent with the prices, that is, there exists (unique) Pi and Hi (i = a, b) such that
DaPaHa = DbPbHb = Π.
Given that probabilities and marginal utilities can be uniquely recovered from
prices and a discount rate (as explained above), we have a smooth map G from M to
X by mapping any triplet (δa, δb,Π) to (δa, ha, Pa), where (ha, Pa) are the recovered
marginal utility and probabilities. The image of this map consists exactly of those
elements of X for which F is not injective. The proof is complete if we can show that
this image has Lebesgue measure zero, which follows again by Sard’s theorem if we
can show that the dimension of M is strictly smaller than ST − T + S.
To study the dimension ofM , we note that we can think ofM as the space of triplets
such that the span of Π contains both the points (δa, δ
2
a, ..., δ
T
a )
′ and (δb, δ2b , ..., δ
T
b )
′.
The span of Π is given by VΠ := {Π · (1, h2, h3, ..., hS)′|hs > 0}, which is an affine
(S − 1)-dimensional subspace of RT for Π of full rank. The set of all those Π ∈ RT×S
such that VΠ passes through two given points of RT (in general position with re-
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spect to each other) form a subspace of dimension ST − 2(T − S + 1) since each
point imposes T − S + 1 equations (and saying that the points are in general po-
sition means that all these equations are independent). Therefore, M is a mani-
fold of dimension ST − 2T + 2S since the pair (δa, δb) depends on two parameters,
and, for a given pair, there is a (ST − 2T + 2S − 2)-dimensional subspace of possi-
ble Π (any two distinct points are always in general position). Hence, we see that
dim(M) = ST − 2T + 2S < ST − T + S = dim(X) since S < T , which implies
that G(M) has measure zero in X. Further, the prices where recovery is impossible,
F (G(M)), have measure zero in the space of all prices generated by the model F (X)
where we use the Lebesgue measure on X to define a measure16 on F (X).
Proof of Proposition 2. Let Π¯ be an S × S transition matrix corresponding to
an irreducible matrix (as in Ross). Without loss of generality we assume that the cur-
rent state is the first state. Since prices are generated by a Ross economy, the observed
matrix Π of multiperiod prices is given as
Π :=

(Π¯)1
(Π¯2)1
...
(Π¯S)1

where (Π¯)1 denotes the first row of Π¯, (Π¯
2)1 is the first row of Π¯
2, etc. We want to show
that all solutions to the eigenvalue problem for Π¯ give rise to solutions to our system
(both the “correct solution” and the ones that, by the Perron-Frobenius theorem, do
not generate viable solutions).
Observe that if z = (z1, . . . , zS)
′ is a (right) eigenvector of Π¯ with corresponding
eigenvalue δ, then
Πz = (δz1, δ
2z2, . . . , δ
SzS)
′.
If z is the eigenvector corresponding to the maximal eigenvalue of Π¯, then we know that
it is strictly positive. Generically, in the space of matrices Π¯, the matrix is diagonaliz-
16We can define a measure on F (X) by µ∗(A) := µ(F−1(A)) for any set A, where µ is the Lebesgue
measure on X.
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able with eigenvectors that contain no zeros and with distinct non-zero eigenvalues –
in particular, it has full rank. Therefore, generically, even for the other eigenvectors,
we have that the coordinates of z are non-zero, so we can normalize z to have first
coordinate 1. Now let the Ross probability matrix be defined (as in Ross)
P¯ =
1
δ
Diag−1(z)Π¯Diag(z) (1.40)
with corresponding multi-period probabilities given by
P :=

(P¯ )1
(P¯ 2)1
...
(P¯S)1
 .
Note that since the rows of P¯ sum to 1, so do rows of P . Further, using (1.40),
P =

( 1
δ1
Diag(z)−1Π¯1Diag(z))1
...
( 1
δS
Diag(z)−1Π¯SDiag(z))1
 =

( 1
δ1
Π¯1Diag(z))1
...
( 1
δS
Π¯SDiag(z))1
 = D−1ΠDiag(z),
where the second equality uses that z1 = 1 and that we only consider the first rows,
and the last equation uses our maintained notation D = Diag(δ, . . . , δS). We note
that this equation is the same as our equation (1.12), which means that all solutions to
Ross’s eigenvalue problem for the matrix Π¯ also appear as solutions to our equations.
The fact that P generated from the Ross solution P¯ is a solution to the generalized
problem required no assumptions other than irreducibility, and this proves part 1 of
the theorem.
To obtain uniqueness also of our solution, note that, generically, there are S eigen-
vectors for Ross’s matrix from which a matrix P can be generated using (1.40). Each
of these solutions can be used to generate a solution P to our problem, as shown above.
The S−1 solutions are “fake” in the sense that they imply that some marginal utilities
(elements in the eigenvector z above) are negative. Hence, these solutions are also fake
in the context of the generalized recovery framework. Given that Ross’s equations
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yield a total of S possible solutions to our problem, of which S − 1 are fake, we have
a unique viable solution (by Proposition 1) if we can ensure that Π12 has full rank.
This follows from the generic property of Π¯ as being diagnonalizable with distinct,
non-zero eigenvalues. In fact, we can show the stronger statement that Π has full
rank: Consider the diagonalization of Ross’s price matrix as Π¯ = V ZV ′, where Z =
diag(z1, ..., zS) is the matrix of eigenvalues and V is the matrix of eigenvectors. The
k’th row in the generalized-recovery pricing matrix is the first row (still assuming that
the starting state is 1) of Π¯k = V ZkV ′. Letting v denote the first row in V , we see
that the k’th row of Π is vZkV ′ = (v1zk1 , ..., vSzkS)V
′ so
Π =

1 ... 1
...
...
zT−11 ... z
T−1
S


v1z1 0
. . .
0 vSzS
V ′ (1.41)
Therefore, Π is full rank generically because it is the product of three full-rank matrices.
Indeed, the first matrix is a Vandermonde matrix, which is full rank when the z’s are
non-zero and different, which is true generically. The second matrix is clearly also
full-rank since the v’s are also non-zero generically, and the third matrix is full rank
by construction. Hence our set of equations can have no more than S solutions, and
since S − 1 of these are “fake”, we have unique recovery of the solution corresponding
to Ross’s solution also, generically.
To see how to derive Π¯ in an economy where Π arises from a time-homogeneous
Ross economy, note that the following equation set must hold:
(Π)2
...
(Π)S

︸ ︷︷ ︸
(S−1)×S
=

(Π)1
...
(Π)S−1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
(S−1)×S
Π¯ (1.42)
where (Π)i is the i’th row of Π. Further, using the notation from (1.14) for blocks of
Π and denoting the first row of Π¯ by Π¯1 and remaining rows by Π¯2, we can rewrite
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this equation as 
(Π)2
...
(Π)S
 = [Π11 Π12]
Π¯1
Π¯2
 (1.43)
Given that Π¯1 is known (because the one-period state prices from state 1 are observed),
it is useful to further rewrite this system as
(Π)2
...
(Π)S
−Π11Π¯1 = Π12Π¯2 (1.44)
Hence, when Π12 is full rank, the Ross price matrix Π¯2 can be derived uniquely and
explicitly by pre-multiplying by (Π12)
−1. We have already shown in Part 2, that Π12
has full rank generically. If Π12 does not have full rank, there exists a non-zero vector
v ∈ RS−1 for which Π12v = 0. In this case, if we start from a solution for which Π¯2 has
strictly positive elements, we can pick  > 0 small enough that adding v to a row of
Π¯2 yields a perturbed matrix Π¯

2 whose elements are also strictly positive. Clearly, Π¯

2
also satisfies (1.44), and hence the Ross price matrix is not unique, showing part 3.
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider first the case where S < T . The dimension
of the parameter set (transition probabilities + utility parameters) generating the
generalized-recovery price matrix Π is ST − T + S, which is strictly greater than the
dimension S2 of the parameter space generating price matrices in Ross’s homogeneous
case. Hence, generically no time-homogeneous solution can generate a generalized
recovery price Π.
Our framework is also more general in the the case S = T . Recalling that pτi
denotes the probability of going from the current state 1 to state i in τ periods, it is
clear that in a time-homogeneous setting we must have p22 ≥ p11p12, i.e., the proba-
bility of going from state 1 to state 2 in two periods is (conservatively) bounded below
by the probability obtained by considering the particular path that stays in state 1
in the first time period and then jumps to state 2 in the second. However, such a
bound need not apply for the true probabilities if the transition probabilities are not
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time-homogeneous. The set of parameters that can generate Π matrices that are not
attainable from homogeneous transition probabilities is clearly of Lebesgue measure
greater than zero in the S2−dimensional parameter space.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let R denote the diagonal matrix whose k’th diagonal
element is 1
(1+r)k
. Having a flat term structure means that the matrix Π of state prices
as seen from a particular starting state can be written as
Π = RQ
which defines Q as a stochastic matrix (i.e., with rows that sum to 1). Clearly, by
letting δ = 1/(1 + r) and having risk-neutrality, i.e. H = IS (the identity matrix of
dimension S), we obtain a solution to our recovery problem
Π = RQ = DPH = RPIS = RP
by setting P = Q.
Proof of Proposition 5. The result follows from the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Suppose that x∗ ∈ Rn is defined by f(x∗) = 0 for a differentiable function
f : Rn → Rn with full rank of the Jacobian df in the neighborhood of x∗, and x is
defined as the solution to the equation, f(x¯) + df(x¯)(x − x¯) = 0, where f has been
linearized around x¯ = x∗ + ∆x ε for ∆x ∈ Rn and ε ∈ R. Then x = x∗ + o(ε) for
ε→ 0.
Proof of Lemma 1. Since we have x = x¯− df−1f(x¯) we see that, as ε→ 0,
x− x∗
ε
=
x¯− x∗
ε
− df−1 f(x¯)− f(x
∗)
ε
→ ∆x− df−1df∆x = 0 (1.45)
Proof of Proposition 6. Following the same logic as the proof of Proposition 1,
we note that the set X of all (δ, θ, P ) is a manifold-with-boundary of dimension S ·
T − T + N + 1. The discount rate, marginal utility parameters, and probabilities
map into prices, which we denote by F (δ, θ, P ) = DPH = Π, where, as before, D =
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diag(δ, ..., δT ) and H = diag(h1(θ), h2(θ), ..., hS(θ))), and F is C
∞. Since N + 1 < T ,
the image F (X) has Lebesgue measure zero in RT×S by Sard’s theorem, proving part
1.
Turning to part 2, we first note that P can be uniquely recovered from (θ¯,Π) using
equation (1.12), where θ¯ = (δ, θ). Therefore, we can focus on (θ¯,Π), studying the
solutions to Π(h−11 (θ), ..., h
−1
S (θ))
′ = (δ, ..., δT )′.
For two different choices of the parameters (θ¯a, θ¯b) and a single set of prices Π,
we consider the triplet (θ¯a, θ¯b,Π). We are interested in showing that the different
parameters cannot both be consistent with the same prices, generically. To show this,
we consider the space M where the reverse is true, hoping to show that M is “small.”
Specifically, M is the set of triplets where Π is of full rank and both discount rates
are consistent with the prices, that is, there exists (unique) Pi (i = a, b) such that
DaPaHa = DbPbHb = Π.
Given that probabilities can be uniquely recovered from prices and parameters, we
have a smooth map G from M to X by mapping any triplet (θ¯a, θ¯b,Π) to (δa, θa, Pa).
The image of this map consists exactly of those elements of X for which F is not
injective. The proof is complete if we can show that this image has Lebesgue measure
zero, which follows again by Sard’s theorem if we can show that the dimension of M
is strictly smaller than S · T − T +N + 1.
To study the dimension of M , consider first VΠ := {Π(h−11 (θ), ..., h−1S (θ))′|θ ∈ Θ},
which is an N -dimensional submanifold of RT for Π of full rank and given that h is
a one-to-one embedding. We note that we can think of M as the space of triplets
such that VΠ contains both the points (δa, δ
2
a, ..., δ
T
a )
′ and (δb, δ2b , ..., δ
T
b )
′, where the
corresponding θ’s are given uniquely from the definition of VΠ since Π is full rank and
h is one-to-one. The set of all those Π ∈ RT×S such that VΠ passes through two given
points of RT form a subspace of dimension ST − 2(T − N) since each point imposes
T −N equations. Therefore, M is a manifold of dimension ST − 2T + 2N + 2. Hence,
we see that G(X) has measure zero in X and F (G(X)) has measure zero in F (X).
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B Details on Recovery in Mehra-Prescott
Let
Π =

pi0,d0,1 pi
1,u
0,1 0 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 . . . 0
0 0 pi0,d0,2 pi
1,d
0,2 pi
1,u
0,2 pi
2,u
0,2 0 . . . 0 0 0 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
... . . .
...
...
...
... . . .
...
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . . . 0 pi0,d0,T pi
1,d
0,T pi
1,u
0,T . . . pi
T,u
0,T

(1.46)
where pik,u0,t is the state price of making a total of k “up” moves in t periods where the last
move was “up,” that is, the Arrow-Debreu price for the state st = (yt, xt) = (u
kdt−k, u).
Similarly, pik,d0,t is the state price of making a total of k “up” moves in t periods where
the last move was “down”.
Π has dimension T × (∑Tt=1 2t). This implies that the h−1(γ) vector of inverse
marginal utility ratios must be (
∑T
t=1 2t)-dimensional. We fix this in the following
way. We let
h−1(γ) =
[
(y01)
γ (y11)
γ (y02)
γ (y12)
γ (y12)
γ (y22)
γ . . . (yTT )
γ
]′
(1.47)
where ykt = u
kdt−k is the level of aggregate consumption when making a total of k
“up” moves in t periods and γ is the risk-aversion parameter that we wish to recover.
There is no closed-form solution to the non-linear case of CRRA preferences. In
order to obtain model estimates we sort to a numerical exercise, that is to minimize
the objective function g:
min
γ,δ
g(γ, δ) := norm
Πh
−1(γ)−

δ
δ2
...
δT

 (1.48)
s.t. γ ∈ R+
δ ∈ (0, 1]
Based on the recovered (γ, δ) that solve this minimizition problem, we can recover the
50
natural probabilities from (1.33).
C Computing State Prices Empirically
Before we can recover probabilities, we need to know the Arrow-Debreu prices or, said
differently, characterize the risk-neutral distribution. There exist many ways to do this
in practice based on observed option prices, including various interpolation methods.
We implement two methods; (i) the parametric stochastic volatility model of Bates
(2000) and (ii) the non-parametric “Fast and Stable” method of Jackwerth (2004).
C.1 The Bates (2000) Stochastic Volatility Model with Jumps
To ensure that we start with an arbitrage-free collection of Arrow-Debreu prices by
strike and maturity, we use the model of Bates (2000) to derive state prices from
observed option prices. This parametric approach puts structure on the tails of the
risk-neutral density, which also allows us to extrapolate outside the range of observable
option quotes. While the Bates (2000) model may not be the “true” specification of
the economy, we simply use this framework as a standard method in the literature to
compute state prices, and, consistent with this pragmatic view, we allow parameters
to change over time (which also avoids look-ahead bias).
In this model, the risk-neutral process for the price of the underlying asset, St, and
the instantaneous variance, Vt, are assumed to be of the form
dSt/St = (r
f − d− λk¯)dt+
√
VtdZt + kdqt (1.49)
dVt = (α− βVt)dt+ σv
√
VtdZvt (1.50)
where Zt and Zvt are Brownian motions with correlation ρ, and qt is a Poisson counting
process that captures the risk of jumps in the price. The jumps occur with intensity λ
and each jump causes the price to be multiplied by the factor 1+k, which is lognormally
distributed, i.e., ln(1 + k) ∼ N(ln(1 + k¯)12δ2, δ2). Further, rf is the risk-free rate and
d is the dividend yield.
We calibrate these model parameters every fourth Wednesday as follows:17 On each
17We use data for every fourth Wednesday as a compromise between (i) the tradition in the asset
pricing literature on return predictability of focusing on monthly returns, and (ii) the tradition in the
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day, given the current level of the market St and the risk-free term structure r
f
t,t+τ ,
we find the model parameters (α, β, λ, k¯, σv, δ) and state variable Vt that minimize
the vega-weighted squared pricing errors for fifty call and put options, following the
methodology of Trolle and Schwartz (2009). The fifty chosen call/put options are those
with the highest volumes. We allow the model parameters to vary over time since we
simply use the model to smooth observed option prices (that may be noisy) such that
they are arbitrage-free.
Once we have obtained model estimates, we compute the risk-neutral density
f(τ, Sτ ) for any time τ periods into the future and state Sτ given the current time
state St as:
f(τ ;Sτ ) =
1
pi
∫ ∞
0
(
Sτ
St
)−iu
ψ(τ, u)du (1.51)
that is, by integrating the characteristic function ψ numerically using the Gauss-
Laguerre quadrature method. Knowing the risk-neutral density, the corresponding
state price density pi(τ ;ST ) is the density discounted by the τ -period risk-free rate
rft,t+τ :
pi(τ ;Sτ ) = e
−rft,t+τ f(T ;Sτ ) (1.52)
This completes the computation of state prices. Indeed, we think of pi(τ ;Sτ ) as the
Arrow-Debreu prices we need as starting point for our recovery for each index level.
For example pi(1, 2000) is the Arrow-Debreu price of receiving $1 in one year of the
S&P500 is between 2000 and 2001. We consider the grid of maturities and index levels
described in Section 8.2.
C.2 The Jackwerth (2004) “Fast and Stable” Method
We are interested in converting a (noisy) sparse set of implied volatilities into a full
risk-neutral distribution. In section C.1 we imposed a parametric form on the implied
volatility surface through a stochastic volatility model with jumps. In this section
we refrain from imposing any structure on implied volatilities, that is, we fit a non-
parametric method to implied volatilities. The method we have chosen is the “Fast and
Stable” method of Jackwerth (2004). This method has a single tuning parameter, λ,
which simultaneously controls the smoothness of the function and the fit to observed
option literature of focusing on Wednesdays, where among other reasons option liquidity is high.
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implied volatilities. Clearly, there is a trade-off in choosing the value of the tuning
parameter, which is: the smoother the function the worse the fit to observations.
We therefore control the smoothness of the fit by imposing two conditions; (i) the
estimated implied volatilities gives rise to a non-negative risk-neutral distribution, (ii)
the risk-neutral distribution is unimodal in the range from 0.8 to 1.2 in moneyness
(defined as St/S0, the index level at time t relative to the current index level). Under
these conditions we minimize the objective function:
min
σs
1
2(S + 1)
S∑
s=1
(
σ
′′
s
)2
+
λ
2I
I∑
i=1
(σi − σ¯i)2 (1.53)
Where S is the number of states. σs is the implied volatility associated with state
s. σ
′′
s is the second derivative of the implied volatility function with respect to strike
prices. i = 1, ..., I is the index for the observed implied volatilities and σ¯i is the i’th
observed implied volatility. As seen from (1.53), if λ is high then the fit to observations
will be good compared to when λ is low. We therefore choose the highest value of λ
which satisfies our two conditions described above. See Jackwerth (2004) for further
comments on the method.
Once a smooth function for the implied volatilities is obtained we can back out
a risk-neutral distribution by evaluating the Black and Scholes (1973) formula in the
estimated implied volatilities and then differentiate the resulting call function twice
with respect to strike prices as explained in Breeden and Litzenberger (1978).
The Fast and Stable method estimates a single option maturity at a time. In the
period from January 1996 until December 2015 we have at least 7 maturities on any
given last trading day of the month. In the framework of Proposition 6 this allows us
to parameterize the pricing kernel with up to 6 parameters and still obtain generalized
recovery.
D Pricing Kernels used in Empirical Analysis
Piecewise linear. The inverse marginal utilities are piecewise linear over states.
Given the initial state 1 at time 0 the τ -period inverse marginal utility ratio in state
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s is18:
(hτs(θ))
−1 = Bsθ (1.54)
Here θ is an N -dimensional column vector and Bs is the s
′th row of the known S ×
N “design matrix” B. In our empirical implementation N is 519. Interpreting the
parameters θ1, ..., θN we let the first parameter θ1 determine the initial level of the
inverse pricing kernel H−1e = Bθ. The next parameter, θ2, determines the initial
slope of the first line segment. Similarly, θ3 is the slope of the next line segment
generated by Bθ.
We impose that θ1, ..., θN ≥ 0 which means that the inverse pricing kernel is mono-
tonically increasing or, equivalently, that the pricing kernel is monotonically decreasing
i.e., that marginal utility decreases at higher levels of wealth.
The design matrix is characterized by its “break points” that separate the state
space into N−2 regions. These regions are chosen as follows. The lowest region ranges
over states from (1−2.5VIXt)St to (1−2VIXt)St where St is the current (time t) level
of the S&P 500 index. The highest region covers states ranging from (1 + 2VIXt)St
to (1 + 4VIXt)St. In between these extremes, we consider N − 3 regions of equal size
in the range (1− 2VIXt)S0 to (1 + 2VIXt)St. When using this specification of B and
the estimated Arrow-Debreu prices, we obtain an S ×N matrix ΠB with full rank for
every last trading day of the month for the period 1/1996 to 12/2015.
With this in place we set up the following minimization problem
min
θ,δ
norm
(
D−1ΠBθ − 1) (1.55)
s.t. θ > 0
δ ∈ (0, 1]
Given a state price matrix Π and a design matrix B we estimate the θ and δ that best
fit the model in a squared error sense. Once the marginal utilities and discount rate
18Notice again that (hτs (θ))
−1 = 1
hτs (θ)
and is not the inverse function.
19The lowest number of maturities with observed option prices in our sample is 7. Therefore, we
can impose a structure on the pricing kernel with at most 6 parameters and hence N can at most be
5 because of the sixth parameter δ.
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have been recovered, we back out the multi-period physical probabilities as
P = D−1Π diag(Bθ) (1.56)
where D is a diagonal matrix with elements Dii = δ
i and diag(Bθ) is a diagonal matrix
with elements diag(Bθ)jj = Bjθ where Bj is the j’th row of B. We normalize P to
have row sums of one, which is necessary since θ and δ are found from the minimization
problem in (1.55) and not solved perfectly.
Polynomial. The inverse marginal utility ratio is a polynomial in the return on the
market and time horizon. Given the initial state 1 at time 0 the τ -period inverse
marginal utility ratio in state s is:
(hτs(θ))
−1 = β0 + β1rs + β2r2s + β3τrs + β4τr
2
s (1.57)
Here rs = Ss/S1 − 1 is the return on the market in state s. The parameters of
interest are θ = (β0, β1, β2, β3, β4). In our implementation we impose three conditions
on the parameters; (i) β0 > 0, ensuring a positive pricing kernel when r = 0, (ii) the
risk-premium is non-negative and, (iii) the inverse marginal utility ratios are always
strictly positive (we set a lower bound on the inverse marginal utility ratio at 0.01.).
This means that the parameters β1, β2, β3, β4 can move freely (within the space of the
conditions) and are all allowed to be either positive or negative.
The polynomial specification of the inverse marginal utility ratios illustrates one
possible way of imposing structure on the marginal utilities, not only in the state
dimension, but also in the time horizon dimension. This specification allows marginal
utilities in a given state, say s, to differ when considering different time horizons, that
is, e.g. hτs(θ) 6= hτ+1s (θ). The polynomial specification nests the linear specification as
a special case when β2, β3, β4 are all zero.
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The minimization procedure for the polynomial specification is:
min
θ,δ
T∑
t=1
((
S∑
s=1
δ−tpits(hτs(θ))
−1
)
− 1
)2
(1.58)
s.t. β0 > 0
EP0 (rt|θ, δ)− rft ≥ 0 for all t ∈ (1, ..., T )
(hτs(θ))
−1 > 0 for all s ∈ (1, ..., S) and all τ ∈ (1, ..., T )
δ ∈ (0, 1]
where pits is the state price in state s with time horizon t. Here E
P
0 (rt|θ, δ)− rft is the
excess return given parameter values θ = (β0, β1, β2, β3, β4), and δ.
Given estimates of δ, β0, β1, β2, β3 and β4 we can arrive at the t period physical
probabilities as
Pt = δ
−tΠt diag
(
(hτs(θ))
−1) (1.59)
where Πt is the t’th row of the state price matrix Π and r is an S×1-dimensional vector
of returns over states. We normalize P to have row sums of one, this is necessary since
θ and δ are found from the minimization problem in (1.58) and not solved perfectly.
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Chapter 2
Higher-Moment Risk
Co-authored with Niels Joachim Gormsen
Abstract:
We show how the market’s higher order moments can be estimated ex ante using
methods based on Martin (2017). These ex ante higher order moments predict future
realized higher order moments, whereas trailing realized moments have little predic-
tive power. Higher-moment risks move together in the sense that skewness becomes
more negative when kurtosis becomes more positive. In addition, higher-moment risk
is high when volatility is low, suggesting that risk doesn’t go away – it hides in the
tails. Higher-moment risk has significant implications for investors; for example, the
tail loss probability of a volatility-targeting investor varies from 3.6% to 9.7%, entirely
driven by changes in higher-moment risk. We empirically analyze the economic drivers
of these risks, such as financial intermediary leverage, market and funding illiquidity,
and potential bubbles.
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1 Introduction
Times of financial market distress pose threats to the macroeconomy, as we witnessed
in the 2008-2009 financial crisis. For policymakers to act in a timely and preemp-
tive manner in the event of financial market distress, it is important to measure the
perceived tail risks in real time.
In this paper, we estimate higher-moment risk in real time using a new method and
arrive at the following five main results: (1) Moments of the market return, measured ex
ante using option prices, predict future realized moments. (2) Higher order moments
co-move in the sense that skewness (3rd moment) and hyperskewness (5th moment)
become more negative when kurtosis (4th moment) and hyperkurtosis (6th moment)
become more positive. In other words, there are times when higher-moment risk is high,
in the sense that the return distribution is both substantially left-skewed (due to large
negative odd-numbered moments) and fat tailed (due to large positive even-numbered
moments). (3) Higher-moment risks tend to be high after market run-ups where the
variance is low. (4) Higher-moment risk has important implications for investors; for
example, the tail loss probability of a volatility-targeting investor varies from 3.6% to
9.7%, entirely driven by changes in higher-moment risk. (5) The times when higher-
moment risks are high are characterized by high market and funding liquidity, high
turnover, and low expected future returns.
Our analysis is based on ex ante moments that are estimated from options prices.
Using methods based on Martin (2017), we translate risk-neutral moments into physical
moments as perceived by an unconstrained power utility investor who wants to hold
the market portfolio. Using S&P 500 as a proxy for the market portfolio, we estimate
ex ante monthly and quarterly moments. These moments are entirely forward looking
and, unlike risk-neutral moments, contain no adjustment for risk, which makes them
well suited for studying time-variation in higher-moment risk.
As our first main result, we show that our ex ante moments are positively correlated
with ex post realized moments. Consistent with previous research, our ex ante variance
predicts ex post realized variance well.1 More importantly, we show that our ex ante
1Previous literature has shown that ex post realized variance is well predicted by historical variance
or option implied variance, e.g. Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou (2009), Andersen, Fusari, and Todorov
(2015), and Bollerslev, Hood, Huss, and Pedersen (2016).
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higher order moments also predict ex post higher order moments. We show that
our ex ante skewness, kurtosis, hyperskewness, and hyperkurtosis all have significant
predictive power over ex post realized moments. We further show that our ex ante
moments are better at forecasting ex post realized moments than their trailing (lagged)
moments.
Next, we show that these predictability results are robust in several ways. First, we
show that our results are not driven by the large price moves that occurred during the
financial crisis of 2008 to 2009. Second, we show that our moment prediction holds even
when controlling for risk-neutral moments. The latter is important because option-
implied risk-neutral skewness has been shown to predict ex post realized skewness, e.g.
Neuberger (2012).
As our second main result, we find that higher order moments move together in the
sense that skewness and hyperskewness are more negative at times when kurtosis and
hyperkurtosis are more positive. Indeed, we find that skewness is negatively correlated
with kurtosis with a correlation coefficient of −0.80, a negative correlation of −0.66
with hyperkurtosis, and a positive correlation of 0.79 with hyperskewness. These co-
movements in higher order moments are so strong that the first principal component
of the space spanned by skewness, kurtosis, hyperskewness, and hyperkurtosis explains
90% of the joint variation in higher order moments.
The first principal component eigenvector has the same signs for skewness and
hyperskewness, while the sign is opposite for kurtosis and hyperkurtosis. As shown in
Ebert (2013), an investor with power utility has preferences for odd number moments
of any order and is averse to even number moments of any order. A high value of
the first principal component can therefore be interpreted as times when higher order
moment risks are, on average, large (negative for odd moments and positive for even
moments). We therefore define the first principal component as a higher-moment risk
index (HRI).
As our third main result, we find that higher-moment risk varies systematically
with variance. Specifically, the correlation between variance and the HRI is −0.53
with 95% bootstrapped confidence bounds of [−0.60,−0.48], which emphasizes that
higher-moment risks tend to be high at times when variance is low. In addition, we
find that higher-moment risks tend to be high subsequent to market run-ups, which
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are usually “calm” times as measured by variance. We find that the HRI is positively
related to the past two year return. The relation is statistically significant at a 99%
level, showing that the return distribution is more left skewed and fat tailed subsequent
to a “good” period where prices have increased significantly.
Fourth, we show that higher-moment risk has large economic implications for in-
vestors. To understand the importance of higher-moment risk, we study the portfolio
risk of a volatility-targeting investor who holds a portfolio of cash and the market.
The investor adjusts the portfolio weights to achieve a constant volatility of σvol target.
Despite having constant variance, the riskiness of the portfolio varies substantially over
time as higher moment risk varies. Because higher moment risk is high when variance
is low, the portfolio is the riskiest when market variance is low.
To understand the economic magnitude of the systematic variation in higher-
moment risks, we estimate the probability that the return on the volatility-targeting
investor’s portfolio is less than −2σvol target. The monthly probability peaked on June
30th 2014 with a probability of 9.7%, almost three times the size of its low, on Febru-
ary 27th 2008, where the probability was 3.6%. Furthermore, the average probability
of a −2σvol target event is 6.6%, which is large compared to the 2.5% that is implied
by a normal distribution. Similarly, the probability of a portfolio return that is less
than −3σvol target peaked on November 30th 2006 with a probability of 3.6%, which is
four times the size of its low on February 27th 2008, when the probability was 0.76%.
These probabilities are also far above what is implied by a normal distribution, which
is 0.13%.
Furthermore, we find that the probability of a portfolio return that is less than
−2σvol target for the volatility-targeting investor is negatively correlated with variance
with a correlation coefficient of −0.70 and 95% bootstrapped confidence bounds of
[−0.78,−0.65]. This strong negative correlation further emphasizes the importance
of considering higher-moment risks in portfolio choice problems. For example, this
finding can help explain why Moreira and Muir (2017b) find that investors can earn
high Sharpe-ratios by moving wealth into the market at times when variance is low and
moving wealth out of the market when variance increases. The relative (to variance)
high expected return in calm times may be compensation for elevated higher-moment
risks.
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Our fifth main result shows how higher-moment risk is associated with several
economic drivers. First, our results are closely related to the volatility paradox (Bun-
nermeier and Sannikov, 2014), which is the notion that systematic risk is high when
variance is low. In their model, risk increases when variance is low because specialized
investors are more levered. We therefore investigate how the level of financial interme-
diary leverage is associated with higher-moment risk. In particular, we test if financial
intermediaries are more levered when variance is low, and if such variation in financial
intermediary leverage can explain our observed variation in higher moment risk. Us-
ing the measure of financial intermediary leverage from He, Kelly, and Manela (2016),
we find no relation between higher-moment risks and aggregate financial intermediary
leverage.
We next investigate how higher-moment risk is related to market illiquidity and
funding illiquidity. We find that higher-moment risks are positively associated with
both market and funding liquidity. Specifically, using the average value-weighted bid-
ask spread of S&P 500 constituents as a proxy for market illiquidity, we find that times
when the average bid-ask spread is low are times when higher-moment risks are high.
Similarly, using the TED spread as a proxy for funding illiquidity, we find that a low
TED spread is associated with high higher-moment risks.
Lastly, we investigate how higher-moment risks are related to previously suggested
measures of “bubble” characteristics and market valuation. We consider the “bubble”
characteristics: acceleration (Greenwood, Shleifer, and You (2017)), turnover (Chen,
Hong, and Stein (2001)), issuance percentage (Pontiff and Woodgate (2008)), and the
market valuation measures: CAPE, the dividend-price ratio, and cay (Lettau and
Ludvigson (2001)). We find that higher-moment risk is positively related to price
acceleration: there is more higher-moment risk when the recent price path is more
convex. Also, higher turnover after market run-ups is associated with more higher-
moment risk. Furthermore, there is more higher-moment risk when cay (Lettau and
Ludvigson, 2001) is high. We find no conclusive relation between higher-moment risks
and CAPE, the dividend-price ratio, or equity issuance.
Our paper relates to and extends the existing literature on estimating time-varying
market tail risk by integrating two different approaches. Previous research on tail
risk is based on either (1) physical moments based on backward looking information
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or (2) risk-neutral moments based on forward looking option prices. We show that
physical higher-moment risks can be estimated in a forward looking manner, and in real
time, which complements the existing literature that uses historical (backward looking)
returns to estimate tail risks; e.g., using realized returns, Bollerslev and Todorov (2011)
suggest using high frequency intraday returns and fit an extreme value distribution to
the tails of returns. Also, Kelly and Jiang (2014) estimate market wide tail risks from
the cross-section of firm-level returns. Our paper also relates to the literature that
studies tail risk using option prices. However, while the existing literature studies
tail risk using risk-neutral moments (e.g. Siriwardane (2015), Gao, Gao, and Song
(2017), Gao, Lu, and Song (2017), Bates (2000), and Schneider and Trojani (2017b)),
we study tail risk using physical moments. Thereby, we can investigate physical tail
probabilities and study which economic drivers can explain the time-varying patterns
in higher-moment risks.
In summary, higher-moment risks can be measured in real time, and a single factor
explains 90% of the joint variation in higher order moments. Furthermore, times
when higher-moment risks are high are characterized by: (1) low variance, (2) large
(and accelerating) recent price run-ups, (3) low market and funding frictions, (4) high
turnover, and (5) low future expected returns.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 covers the theory behind how we estimate
higher order moments and tail probabilities. Section 3 covers the data and the empir-
ical implementation. Section 4 investigates the relation between our ex ante moments
and ex post realized moments. Section 5 studies the commonalities in higher order mo-
ments. Section 6 investigates the systematic patterns in higher-moment risks. Section
7 studies the implications of time-varying higher-moment risks for investors. Section
8 studies the economic drivers of higher-moment risks. Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 Inferring Ex Ante Moments from Asset Prices
We consider an economy where agents can trade two assets, a risk-free asset and a
risky asset. The risk-free asset earns a gross risk-free rate of return Rft,T between time
t and time T . The risky asset has a price of S and earns a random gross return Rt,T .
The risky asset pays dividends, Dt,T , between time t and time T such that its gross
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return is Rt,T = (ST +Dt,T )/St.
Starting from the standard asset pricing formula, we can relate risk-neutral and
physical expected values of the time T random payoff, XT , as
Et[XTmt,T ] = E
∗
t [XT ]/R
f
t,T (2.1)
where the asterisk denotes risk-neutral expectation and mt,T is a stochastic discount
factor. If we define the time T random payoff, Xt,T (n), in the following way
Xt,T (n) = R
n
t,Tm
−1
t,T (2.2)
then equation (2.1) implies that the n’th moment of the risky asset’s physical return
distribution can be expressed in terms of the risk-neutral expectation of Xt,T (n):
Et[R
n
t,T ] = Et[R
n
t,Tm
−1
t,T︸ ︷︷ ︸
Xt,T (n)
mt,T ] = E
∗
t [R
n
t,Tm
−1
t,T︸ ︷︷ ︸
Xt,T (n)
]/Rft,T (2.3)
So if we know the pricing kernel m, then we can derive all moments of Rt,T directly
from risk-neutral pricing of the claim to Xt,T (n). Following Martin (2017), we compute
the physical expected value of Rnt,T from the point of view of an unconstrained rational
power-utility investor who chooses to be fully invested in the market. This investor
has initial wealth W0 and terminal wealth WT = W0Rt,T . Given the investor’s utility
function, U(x) = x1−γ/(1 − γ), with relative risk-aversion, γ, we can determine the
investor’s stochastic discount factor. Specifically, combining the first order condition
from the investor’s portfolio choice problem with the fact that the investor holds the
market, the stochastic discount factor becomes proportional to R−γt,T :
mt,T = kR
−γ
t,T (2.4)
for some constant k which is unobservable to us. However, we do not need to learn k
to estimate physical moments; we can correct for k by rewriting (2.3) in the following
way. First, setting n = 0 in (2.2) we get Xt,T (0) = m
−1
t,T and the standard asset pricing
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formula (2.1) then implies the relation:
E∗t [m
−1
t,T ] = R
f
t,T (2.5)
Then, inserting (2.5) and (2.4) into (2.3), we obtain an expression of the n’th physical
moment perceived by an unconstrained rational power utility investor who chooses to
be fully invested in the market:
Et[R
n
t,T ] =
E∗t [Rnt,T
m−1t,T︷ ︸︸ ︷
Rγt,T /k]
E∗t [R
γ
t,T /k︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−1t,T
]
=
E∗t [R
n+γ
t,T ]
E∗t [R
γ
t,T ]
(2.6)
since k is a constant.
The relation between physical and risk-neutral moments shown in (2.6) is central
to our empirical analysis. The key insight is that we can estimate the n’th physical
moment directly from risk-neutral pricing of Rγt,T and R
n+γ
t,T . Furthermore, by pricing
claims to the payoffs Rm+γt,T for m ∈ {1, ..., n}, we can then estimate standardized
moments.
To understand how we estimate standardized moments from (2.6), recall the notion
of the n’th standardized moment formula:
n’th standardized moment of Rt,T = Et
[(
Rt,T − Et[Rt,T ]
Var[Rt,T ]1/2
)n]
(2.7)
Expanding (2.7) and replacing physical moments with risk-neutral counterparts as
presented in equation (2.6), we can arrive at expressions for all physical standardized
moments as functions of risk-neutral moments. For example, the third standardized
physical moment (skewness) can be expressed in terms of risk-neutral moments by first
expanding (2.7) with n = 3:
Skewnesst,T =
Et[R
3
t,T ]− 3Et[Rt,T ]Et[R2t,T ] + 2Et[Rt,T ]3
(Et[R2t,T ]− Et[Rt,T ]2)3/2
(2.8)
and then replacing the physical moments in (2.8) with the risk-neutral counterparts
using equation (2.6). Similar expressions can be written up for other higher order
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moments of interest, as seen in Appendix A. Importantly, the right-hand-side of (2.6)
consists of asset prices which can be estimated directly from current and observable
call and put options written on the risky asset. Hence, higher order moments can be
estimated in real time, without using historical realized returns or accounting data.
2.1 Inferring Ex Ante Market Tail Probabilities
Next, we show how we estimate ex ante tail probabilities from option prices written
on the market. To understand our approach, note first that the probability at time
t of a market return that is lower than α at time T can be written as the physical
expectation of an indicator function in the following way
Pt(Rt,T < α) = Et[1{Rt,T<α}] (2.9)
Using the standard asset pricing formula in (2.1), we can rewrite the probability in
terms of the risk-neutral measure by adjusting the right hand side of equation (2.9)
for the inverse of the stochastic discount factor in (2.4)
Pt(Rt,T < α) =
E∗t [R
γ
t,T 1{Rt,T<α}]
E∗t [R
γ
t,T ]
(2.10)
The right hand side of (2.10) is an asset price that has the simple representation
presented in Proposition 8, which generalizes Result 2 in Martin (2017) from log-utility
to general power utility for any level of relative risk-aversion.
Proposition 8. For the unconstrained rational power utility investor who wants to
hold the market, the conditional physical probability that market return from time t to
T is lower than α is:
Pt(Rt,T < α) =
Rft,T
E∗t [R
γ
t,T ]
[
αγput′t,T (αSt −Dt,T )−
γ
St
αγ−1putt,T (αSt −Dt,T ) (2.11)
+
∫ αSt−Dt,T
0
γ(γ − 1)
S2t
(
K +Dt,T
St
)γ−2
putt,T (K)dK
]
(2.12)
where put′t,T (αSt−Dt,T ) is the first derivative of the put option price with strike αSt−
Dt,T .
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Proof. The results of Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) imply the equality
E∗t [R
γ
t,T 1{Rt,T<α}] = R
f
t,T
∫ ∞
0
(
K +Dt,T
St
)γ
1{K<αSt−Dt,T }put
′′
t,T (K)dK (2.13)
where put′′t,T (K) is the second derivative of the put option price written on the under-
lying process S. Splitting the integral at αSt −Dt,T we have
E∗t [R
γ
t,T 1{Rt,T<α}] = R
f
t,T
∫ αSt−Dt,T
0
(
K +Dt,T
St
)γ
put′′t,T (K)dK (2.14)
Proposition 8 then follows from using integration by parts twice.
3 Data and Empirical Implementation
We use the Ivy DB database from OptionMetrics to collect information on call options
and put options that are written on the S&P 500 index for the last trading day of every
month. The data ranges from January 1996 to December 2015. We obtain implied
volatilities, strikes, closing bid-prices, closing ask-prices, and maturities. We proxy the
risk-free rate with the zero-coupon yield curve from the Ivy DB database, which is
derived from the LIBOR rates and settlement prices of CME Eurodollar futures. We
also obtain expected dividend payments. We consider options with times to maturity
between 10 and 360 calender days, and apply common filters, excluding contracts with
zero open interest, zero trading volume, quotes with best bid below $0.50, and options
with implied volatility higher than 100%.
We use daily realized returns to estimate realized daily moments. We also estimate
monthly moments from monthly returns. In Appendix A, we discuss the estimation of
realized moments in detail.
3.1 Estimating Market Moments
There is a large body of literature devoted to pricing asset derivatives such as those in
(2.6), using observable option prices written on the asset. Indeed, Breeden and Litzen-
berger (1978), Bakshi and Madan (2000), and Bakshi, Kapadia, and Madan (2003)
show that the arbitrage free price of a claim on some future (twice differentiable) pay-
off can be expressed in terms of a continuum of put and call option prices. Specifically
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for our purposes, using the results of Breeden and Litzenberger (1978), Martin (2017)
shows that we can write the n’th physical moment of Rt,T as
Et[R
n
t,T ] =
E∗t [R
n+γ
t,T ]
E∗t [R
γ
t,T ]
=
(Rft,T )
n+γ +Rft,T [p(n+ γ) + c(n+ γ)]
(Rft,T )
γ +Rft,T [p(γ) + c(γ)]
(2.15)
with
p(θ) =
∫ Ft,T
0
θ(θ − 1)
Sθt
(
StR
f
t,T − Ft,T +K
)θ−2
putt,T (K)dK (2.16)
c(θ) =
∫ ∞
Ft,T
θ(θ − 1)
Sθt
(
StR
f
t,T − Ft,T +K
)θ−2
callt,T (K)dK (2.17)
where Ft,T is the forward price and callt,T (K) and putt,T (K) are call and put option
prices written on the risky asset at time t with horizon T − t and strike K.
In practice, we do not observe a continuum of call and put options and therefore
(2.15) must be numerically approximated. Let Ft,T be the forward price and, using
the notation from Martin (2017), we can write the price, Ωt,T (K), at time t of an
out-of-the money option with strike K and maturity T as
Ωt,T (K) =
 callt,T (K) if K ≥ Ft,Tputt,T (K) if K < Ft,T (2.18)
We let K1, ...,KN be the (increasing) sequence of observable strikes for the N out-of-the
money put and call options and define ∆Ki =
Ki+1−Ki−1
2 with
∆Ki =
 Ki+1 −Ki if i = 1Ki −Ki−1 if i = N . (2.19)
We approximate the integrals in (2.16) by observable sums such that the n’th physical
moment becomes:
Et[R
n
t,T ] =
(Rft,T )
n+γ +Rft,T
[∑N
i=1
(n+γ)(n+γ−1)
Sn+γ
(StR
f
t,T − Ft,T +Ki)n+γ−2Ωt,T (Ki)∆Ki
]
(Rft,T )
γ +Rft,T
[∑N
i=1
γ(γ−1)
Sγ (StR
f
t,T − Ft,T +Ki)γ−2Ωt,T (Ki)∆Ki
]
(2.20)
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In summary, combining equation (2.20) with the standardized moment formula in equa-
tion (2.7), we can express standardized physical moments in terms of the derivatives
prices written on the risky asset.
When we estimate physical moments for a given horizon, say T , for which we do
not observe put and call prices, we linearly interpolate the (standardized) moments
between the two closest horizons available in the data. In a few cases, we need to
extrapolate to obtain moments for the desired horizon.
Our benchmark investor has power utility and a coefficient of relative risk-aversion
of 3, that is, γ = 3. This level of risk-aversion as the benchmark is motivated by the re-
sults of Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004), i.e., using our sample we replicate their results
and find that 3 is the optimal option-implied level of risk aversion when matching re-
alized returns at the monthly horizon. We also estimate moments for the risk-neutral
investor, the log-utility investor, and the power utility investor with a risk-aversion
coefficient of 5.
Figure 2.1 shows monthly higher order moments and Table 2.1 shows the moment
summary statistics. The average ex ante estimated skewness is negative for both
horizons and all levels of risk aversion, suggesting that the physical distributions are
left skewed. Consistent with the results of Neuberger (2012), we find that average
skewness is not diminishing in the horizon, in the sense that skewness is close to the
same on a monthly and quarterly horizon. Similarly, average kurtosis is larger than
3 for both horizons and all levels of risk aversion, which means that the physical
distributions are leptokurtic; that is, the tails of the physical return distributions are
fatter than what is implied by a normal distribution.
3.2 Estimating Market Tail Probabilities
The main challenge when implementing Proposition 8 is that we are required to es-
timate the first derivative of the put option price written on the risky asset at strike
αSt−Dt,T . To handle a sparse and discrete set of observed option prices, we smoothen
observed option prices using a Gaussian kernel smoothening procedure. Specifically,
we smoothen implied volatilities around the strike αSt − Dt,T and choose the kernel
bandwidth to minimize the squared errors between the observed and estimated im-
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plied volatilities under the constraint that the estimated option prices do not allow for
arbitrage.
Given a smooth set of option prices around the strike αSt −Dt,T , we compute the
first derivative as the slope between the two adjacent prices:
put′t,T (αSt −Dt,T ) =
putt,T (αSt −Dt,T + h)− putt,T (αSt −Dt,T − h)
2h
(2.21)
where h is the chosen grid step size in the discretization.
Let K1, ...,KM be the (increasing) sequence of observable strikes for the M out-of-
the money put options where KM is the observed strike that is closest to αSt −Dt,T .
We approximate the integral in Proposition 8 by the observable sum:
M∑
i=1
γ(γ − 1)
S2t
(
Ki +Dt,T
St
)γ−2
putt,T (Ki)∆Ki (2.22)
Inserting (2.21) and (2.22) into Proposition 8, we can estimate physical probabilities.
4 Estimated Moments Predict Realized Moments
In this section, we show that the ex ante higher order moments estimated using the
methods described in Sections 2 and 3 predict ex post realized higher order moments.
We start with a simple sorting exercise. For each moment, we first sort ex post
realized monthly returns into a “low” or “high” bucket depending on whether the ex
ante moment is lower or higher than its median time series value. Next, we estimate the
ex post moments for each bucket; for example, we estimate moments using the monthly
ex post returns sorted into the “high” bucket. Figure 2.2 shows the monthly ex post
realized moments of the two buckets for all moments. The ex post realized returns
sorted into the “high” buckets exhibit in-sample higher moment values, suggesting
that our ex ante moments predict ex post moments, for example, the “high” bucket
for kurtosis has an in-sample kurtosis of 5.93, while the “low” bucket has a kurtosis of
2.85.
Next, we test more formally the relation between ex ante and ex post moments.
Specifically, we conduct two tests which differ in the way we estimate ex post realized
higher order moments. First, we test if the bucket values following our sorting exercise
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are extreme compared to what a random sample would produce. For each moment,
we bootstrap a distribution using permutations and then evaluate where in this distri-
bution our observed “low” and “high” bucket values lie. Panel A of Table 2.2 reports
the values from the ex ante sorting and significance, which is computed from the boot-
strapped distribution in the following way: for the “low” buckets, we estimate the
frequency at which a random permutation lies below what we observe. For the “high”
buckets, we estimate the frequency at which a random permutation lies above what
we observe. For example, the −0.83 value for skewness in the “low ex ante” bucket is
not in the lower 10% of the bootstrapped distribution and is therefore insignificant at
a 90% level. However, the 5.93 value for kurtosis in the “high ex ante” bucket is in
the upper 5% of the bootstrapped distribution for kurtosis and is therefore significant
at a 95% level. Importantly, our ex ante moments show statistical significance at a
95% level at least once, for every moment except skewness. Comparing these results
to the results we get when sorting the ex post realized returns into two buckets based
on the trailing monthly moments (estimated using daily returns), we find that our ex
ante moments clearly outperform.
Second, we estimate time-varying ex post monthly (and quarterly) realized mo-
ments using daily returns; that is, for a given month, we estimate the in-sample
moments for that month using the daily returns during that month. The first two
columns of Panel B of Table 2.2 report correlations between our ex ante moments and
the ex post realized moments. The latter two columns report correlations between ex
post realized moments and their trailing (lagged) moment. We report bootstrapped
standard errors in the appendix.
Correlations between our ex ante variances and ex post variances are 49% to 67%,
and these correlations are both statistically significant at a 99% level. We also find
strong correlations between ex ante and ex post skewness, ranging from 21% to 25%,
which are both significantly different from zero at a 99% level. Correlations of our ex
ante and ex post hyperskewness are positive and significant at the 99% level. Compar-
ing the correlations of our ex ante moments to those of the trailing moments we find
that, on a monthly horizon, trailing moments do not predict either skewness or hyper-
skewness whereas our ex ante moments do. On a quarterly horizon, trailing moments
do predict ex post realized moments, however the correlations are lower than for our
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ex ante moments.
Neither our ex ante moments nor the trailing moments seem to be able to predict
ex post kurtosis or hyperkurtosis. For our ex ante moments, this might be because of
the fact that there are fewer available option prices in the right tail of the distribution,
that is, deep out-of-the-money call options are traded less frequently than deep out-of-
the-money put options. We therefore test if our ex ante kurtosis (and hyperkurtosis)
can predict left kurtosis, which is for our purposes the important tail of the distribution
to be able to predict. Therefore, we follow Denbee, Julliard, Li, and Yuan (2016), and
estimate ex post realized left kurtosis in the following way:
Realized left kurtosist,T =
∑
s
(
Daily returns−Realized daily meant,T
Realized daily variance
1/2
t,T
)4
Realized kurtosist,T
(2.23)
where s is the days in the month where Daily return < Realized daily meant,T . The
realized right kurtosis is defined in the obvious way, where daily returns are larger than
the realized mean.
Panel C of Table 2.2 shows the correlations between our ex ante kurtosis and the
ex post realized left kurtosis and left hyperkurtosis. Both on a monthly and quarterly
horizon, our ex ante kurtosis and hyperkurtosis are positively and statistically signif-
icantly correlated to ex post realized left kurtosis and left hyperkurtosis. This result
should be interpreted in the following way: times when our ex ante kurtosis is high are
times when the ex post realized kurtosis can be attributed primarily to the left tail of
the return distribution. Comparing the correlations between our ex ante moments and
ex post realized left kurtosis and left hyperkurtosis to the correlations between trailing
moments and ex post left kurtosis and left hyperkurtosis, we find that while monthly
trailing moments do not predict ex post moments, quarterly trailing moments do pre-
dict ex post realized left kurtosis and hyperkurtosis, but the correlations are smaller
than for our ex ante moments.
Overall, Figure 2.2 and Panel A, B, and C of Table 2.2 show that our ex ante
moments predict ex post realized moments. It is natural to worry that the results are
driven by the large price moves that occurred during the period of financial distress
from 2008 to 2009. To address this concern, Panel A of Table 2.3 shows correlations be-
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tween our ex ante moments and ex post realized moments when removing observations
that overlap with the period August 1st 2008-July 31st 2009. The results are largely
unchanged, suggesting that the financial crisis does not drive the strong predictive
results.
Panel B of Table 2.3 shows th correlations for other levels of risk-aversion. The
results from the point of view of a log-utility investor or a power-utility investor with
a risk-aversion of 5 are not remarkably different from the results presented in Panel B
of Table 2.2 for the power-utility investor with a risk-aversion of 3.
As a second robustness test of moment predictability, we ask if physical higher order
moments predict ex post realized moments when controlling for risk-neutral moments.
Another way to put it is to ask: do we gain anything in terms of predictability for
moving from risk-neutral to physical moments? Table 2.3 shows the results of the
following two-stage procedure. In the first stage, we run the two regressions:
Realized Momentt,T = α1 + β1E
∗
t [Momentt,T ] + t,T (2.24)
Et[Momentt,T ] = α2 + β2E
∗
t [Momentt,T ] + ηt,T (2.25)
where Et[Momentt,T ] is our ex ante physical moment and E
∗
t [Momentt,T ] is the corre-
sponding risk-neutral moment. The residuals,  and η, are by construction orthogonal
to risk-neutral moments, and their correlation therefore determines whether physical
moments can explain the variation in realized moments in excess of what is explained
by risk-neutral moments. In the second stage we estimate the correlation between 
and η. The first two columns of Panel C of Table 2.3 report these correlations, and
bootstrapped standard errors that correct for the generated regressor problem we face
when estimating the residuals in the first stage regressions are in the appendix.
The correlations between  and η on a monthly horizon range from 0.09 to 0.16 and
are statistically significant at a 95% level for kurtosis, hyperskewnes, and hyperkurtosis,
implying that our monthly ex ante moments still predict ex post realized moments when
controlling for risk-neutral moments. The results are weaker for quarterly moments;
only hyperskewness is statistically significant and positive.
As a third robustness test of predictability, we test if our ex ante estimated higher
order moments predict ex post realized moments when controlling for trailing (lagged)
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moments. We therefore repeat the two-stage procedure described above. In the first
stage we run the following two regressions
Realized Momentt,T = α3 + β3Realized Momentt−(T−t),t + κt,T (2.26)
Et[Momentt,T ] = α4 + β4Realized Momentt−(T−t),t + ψt,T (2.27)
The residuals, κ and ψ, are by construction orthogonal to the historical moments
and their correlation therefore determines whether physical moments can explain the
variation in the realized moments in excess of what is explained by historical moments.
In the second stage we estimate the correlation between κ and ψ. The last two columns
of Panel C of Table 2.3 report these correlations, and bootstrapped standard errors
that correct for the generated regressor problem we face when estimating the residuals
in the first stage regressions are in the appendix. Controlling for historical (lagged)
moments does not change our results. Our ex ante moments have predictive power for
ex post realized moments in excess of what is explained by historical moments. Since
trailing quarterly moments do predict ex post realized moments, it is particularly
important to notice that our quarterly moments add predictability in excess of what
the realized trailing moment counterpart can predict.
5 Commonalities in Higher-Moment Risks
Higher order moments exhibit persistent and interesting time-series co-movements, i.e.,
higher-moment risks move together, in the sense that skewness and hyperskewness are
more negative at times when kurtosis and hyperkurtosis are more positive. To see
this, Table 2.4 shows monthly (Panel A) and quarterly (Panel B) pairwise correlations
between the first six moments of the physical return distribution. The green (lower
right) box shows pairwise correlations between higher order moments. We have flipped
the signs for skewness and hyperskewness such that a higher (more positive) value
can be translated into higher risk — recall that lower (more negative) skewness and
hyperskewness implies more mass in the left tail of the return distribution and therefore
higher probabilities of large down movements. These correlations are all positive and
large, suggesting that risk as measured by individual higher order moments tends to
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be simultaneously high or low.
The strong co-movement of higher order moments suggests that the joint variation
in higher order moments can be attributed to a single factor. We therefore estimate the
principal components of the space spanned by skewness, kurtosis, hyperskewness, and
hyperkurtosis. The four principal components are shown in Table 2.5. Interestingly,
at both the monthly and quarterly horizon, the first principal components explains
about 90% of the joint variation in higher order moments, underlining the strong co-
movement in higher-moment risks.
As was expected, the first principal component eigenvectors have the same signs
for skewness and hyperskewness, while the sign is opposite for kurtosis and hyperkur-
tosis. We standardize each moment to make the eigenvector loadings comparable. The
size of the loadings for the first principal components are very similar across the mo-
ments, namely −0.45 (−0.47 quarterly) for skewness, 0.52 (0.51 quarterly) for kurtosis,
−0.52 (−0.52 quarterly) for hyperskewness, and 0.50 (0.50 quarterly) for hyperkurto-
sis, implying that the first principal component is approximately the average of the
standardized higher order moments with the signs flipped for skewness and hyper-
skewness. As shown in Ebert (2013), an investor with power utility has a preference
for odd number moments of any order and is averse to even number moments of any
order. A high value of the first principal component can therefore be interpreted as
times when higher order moments (the moments that add mass to the lower tail of
the return distribution) are on average large. It is therefore natural to define the first
principal component as a higher-moment risk index.
Higher-Moment Risk Index: We define a higher-moment risk index (HRI) as the
first principal component of the space spanned by skewness, kurtosis, hyperskewness,
and hyperkurtosis.
6 Systematic Variation in Higher-Moment Risks
Figure 2.1 displays the time-series plot of the monthly HRI which shows clear system-
atic variation in higher-moment risk. During the period of financial market distress
from 2008 to 2009, HRI was low, whereas during the low variance period from 2004 to
2007, leading up to the financial crisis, monthly HRI was high, suggesting that higher-
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moment risks are high at times when markets are calm. In this section we investigate
these systematic patterns.
The blue (upper right) box of Panel A of Table 2.4 shows the pairwise correlations
between variance and higher order moments. Variance is negatively correlated to the
negative of skewness, kurtosis, the negative of hyperskewness, and hyperkurtosis with
correlations ranging from 0.41 to 0.54. This finding is interesting because it reveals
the systematic variation in higher-moment risks; that is, higher-moment risks are high
at times when the market is perceived to be safe and calm as measured by variance.
Said differently, risk doesn’t go away – it hides in the tails.
Figure 2.3 shows time-series plots of variance and the HRI. In the years after the
high variance period in 2003 (following the dot.com bubble), as the market became
more and more safe as measured by variance, higher-moment risks move steadily in
the opposite direction, i.e., skewness became more negative, kurtosis became more
positive, and overall the HRI increase significantly. Furthermore, as the financial crisis
started to reveal itself, following the default of the Bear Sterns hedge funds, then
market uncertainty spread through higher variance – as the tail of the distribution
diminished, higher-moment risks decreased.
Somewhat surprisingly, the HRI peaked on June 30th 2014, when monthly ex ante
variance was at its lowest point in seven years. This period, which was calm as mea-
sured by variance, was associated with high higher-moment risks. The main political
and economical uncertainty during this period was associated with the economic sanc-
tions made by the US targeting Russia over Russia’s continuing involvement in Crimea.
Panel A of Table 2.6 shows correlations between variances and the HRI. Generally,
higher-moment risk as measured through the HRI is high at times when variance is low.
On a monthly horizon, the magnitude of the correlation between variance and HRI is
−0.53 with 95% bootstrapped confidence bounds of [−0.60,−0.48]. The magnitudes
and confidence bounds are quantitatively the same for the quarterly HRI.
Related to the co-movements between variance and higher-moment risks, we also
find that higher-moment risks tend to be high after recent market run-ups. To show
this, Figure 2.4 shows time-series plots of the past two year return and the HRI. Past
returns and the HRI are positively correlated with correlations of 0.38 and 0.35 on
monthly and quarterly horizons respectively. To further investigate the dependencies
75
between market run-ups and subsequent higher-moment risks we run a set of regres-
sions of ex ante moments onto the past two year return,2 rt−24,t = Rt−24,t − 1:
Mt,T = β0 + β1rt−24,t + t,T (2.28)
where the moments, Mt,T , are variance, skewness, kurtosis, hyperkurtosis, hyperskew-
ness, and the higher-moment risk index (HRI). Panel B of Table 2.6 shows the β1
coefficients of regression (2.28) and in Panel C of Table 2.6 we show β1 coefficients of
regression (2.28) when controlling for the lagged ex ante moment.
We find a negative and significant relation between past returns and variance. This
finding is consistent with the intuition that times after market run-ups are “calm”
times where risk, as measured by variance, is low. Looking at skewness, we find
a statistically significant and negative relation with past returns, implying that the
return distribution tilts to the right and leaves more probability mass in the left tail of
the return distribution subsequent to market run-ups. Similarly, kurtosis is statistically
significant and positive in past returns, hyperskewness is negative in past returns, and
hyperkurtosis is positive in past returns. The results are quantitatively similar for
monthly and quarterly moments. Panel C of Table 2.6 shows that controlling for
lagged risk does not change our results. We still find strong significant systematic
variation in higher order moments.
7 Implications for Investors
The results presented in Table 2.4, Table 2.5, and Table 2.6 show that times when
variance is low are times when the market’s return distribution is highly left skewed
(due to large negative skewness and hyperskewness) and fat tailed (due to large positive
kurtosis and hyperkurtosis). That higher-moment risks are high at times when variance
is low runs counter to the way we usually think about risk, i.e., we often equate risk
with variance, saying that risk is high at times when variance is high. To better
understand the importance of higher-moment risks, we next investigate portfolio risks
for two investors who both hold a portfolio of cash and the market.
The first investor holds a constant notional in the market. The probability that
2This is similar to the market run-up period of Greenwood, Shleifer, and You (2017).
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the investor’s portfolio realizes an unexpected return (the shock to the portfolio),
rshockt,T = Rt,T − Et[Rt,T ], less than α is:
Pt(r
shock
t,T < α) (2.29)
The constant notional investor is exposed to both time-varying variance risk and time-
varying higher-moment risks; that is, the probability that the portfolio realizes an
unexpected return less than α depends on both conditional variance and conditional
higher order moments.
The second investor targets a constant level of portfolio volatility, i.e., the investor
moves wealth in and out of the market such that the portfolio has constant volatil-
ity. Such volatility-targeting strategies are common practice and have been shown to
generate high risk-adjusted returns (e.g. Moskowitz, Ooi, and Pedersen (2012), As-
ness, Frazzini, and Pedersen (2012), Moreira and Muir (2017a), and Moreira and Muir
(2017b)). If σt,T is the market’s conditional volatility, rt,T = Rt,T − 1 is the return on
the market, and rft,T is the risk-free rate of return, then r
vol target
t,T is the return on the
volatility-targeting investor’s portfolio who targets a constant volatility of σvol target:
rvol targett,T =
σvol target
σt,T︸ ︷︷ ︸
ωt,T
rt,T +
(
1− σ
vol target
σt,T
)
rft,T (2.30)
where ωt,T is the fraction of wealth held in the market. If ωt,T > 1, the investor levers
up by borrowing cash to invest more than all the initial wealth in the market. We
assume for simplicity that the investor is unconstrained. The unexpected return of
the volatility-targeting investor’s portfolio is rvol target,shockt,T = r
vol target
t,T − Et[rvol targett,T ]
which can be rewritten as:
rvol target,shockt,T = ωt,T rt,T + (1− ωt,T ) rft,T −
(
ωt,TEt[rt,T ] + (1− ωt,T ) rft,T
)
(2.31)
= ωt,T r
shock
t,T (2.32)
The probability that the volatility-targeting investor’s portfolio realizes an unexpected
77
return less than α is:
Pt(r
vol target,shock
t,T < α) = Pt
(
σvol target
σt,T
rshockt,T < α
)
(2.33)
= Pt
(
rshockt,T <
α
σvol target
σt,T
)
(2.34)
For example, if σvol target = 5% and α = −10%, then the probability that the volatility-
targeting investor’s portfolio realizes a return that is 10% lower than expected is
Pt
(
rshockt,T < −2σt,T
)
.3 The volatility-targeting investor’s portfolio is only exposed to
time-varying higher-moment risks, that is, given a level of σvol target, the probability
that the investor’s portfolio realizes a return less than α depends only on conditional
higher order moments. Time-varying variance risk is eliminated by targeting a constant
level of portfolio volatility.
Recall that σt,t+h is the ex ante volatility from time t to t+ h, and we then define
σ¯h as the time series average of σt,t+h. For example, the time-series average of monthly
volatility for the S&P 500 index is σ¯h = 5.0%. Figure 2.5 shows time-series plots of
monthly probabilities, as shown in (2.29) and (2.33), where α = −2σ¯month = −10.1%
and the volatility-target is σvol target = 5.0%.
The top figure shows the probabilities of−2σt,t+1 drops in the market, which are the
probabilities of the volatility-targeting investor’s portfolio return. The horizontal line
shows the probability of a−2σt,t+1 drop in the market implied by a normal distribution,
which is 2.5%. The shaded area between the two lines is higher-moment risk; that is,
the excess probability of a tail event due to negative skewness, excess kurtosis, and
all other higher order moments. Interestingly, the probabilities, in excess of what is
implied by a normal distribution, range from 1.1% to 7.2%, showing that time-varying
higher-moment risks have large economic implications for the risk of the volatility-
targeting investor’s portfolio. The probability of a −2σt,t+1 drop peaked on June 30th
2014 with a probability of 9.7%, almost three times the size of its low on February 27th
2008, where the probability was 3.6%. The systematic variation in the tail probabilities,
from 3.6% at high variance times to 9.7% at low variance times, emphasizes that
investors who manage risk by managing variance are implicitly imposing more risk
3Notice that this probability is not necessarily the same as the probability of a portfolio return of
−10%. In the example, the probability of a portfolio return of −10% is Pt
(
rshockt,T < −2σt,T − Et[rt,T ]
)
.
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into their portfolio when variance is low.
The bottom figure shows the probabilities of −2σ¯ = −10.1% drops in the mar-
ket along with the probabilities implied by a normal distribution. The shaded area
between the two lines is higher-moment risk for the constant notional investor. The
probability of a −10.1% drop in the market is, as expected, high when variance is high.
Importantly, higher-moment risk also contributes to the portfolio risk for the constant
notional investor, and the economic magnitude is large. For example, the probabilities,
in excess of what is implied by a normal distribution, range from 0.5% on October 31st
2006 to 4.8% on August 31st 2015. On August 31st 2015, the total probability of a
−10.1% drop was 9.90%, which means that, on that day, 48% of the probability mass
in the left tail of the return distribution beyond −10.1% was due to higher-moment
risk.
Figure 2.6 shows time-series plots of monthly probabilities, as shown in (2.29)
and (2.33), where α = −3σ¯month = −15.1%. The probability of a portfolio return
that is less than −3σt,t+1 peaked on November 30th 2006 with a probability of 3.6%,
which is four times the size of its low on February 27th 2008, where the probability
was 0.8%. These probabilities are far from what is implied by a normal distribution,
which is 0.13%. Specifically, the average probability of a −3σt,t+1 event is 1.8%, which
is fourteen times higher than what is implied by the normal distribution. Figure 2.6
shows that higher-moment risk is even more important when evaluating the probability
of events further out in the lower tail of the return distribution; that is, the relative
amount of probability mass in the lower tail that is due to higher-moment risk increases
the further we go out in the tail.
The probabilities co-move in the sense that, when the probability of a −2σt,T event
is high, then the probability of a−2σ¯ event is low. To further investigate these patterns,
Panel A of Table 2.7 reports correlations between variance and the probability of a
portfolio return that is less than α for the constant notional investor and the volatility-
targeting investor. The first column of Panel A shows the correlations between variance
and the probability that the market realizes an unexpected return less than −2σ¯h (the
probability of a constant notional investor)
Pt(r
shock
t,t+h < −2σ¯h) (2.35)
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The correlations range from 0.94 to 0.98 with tight bootstrapped confidence bounds,
showing that the conditional probability that the market realizes a return less than
−10.1% monthly or −15.1% quarterly is highly correlated with conditional variance,
which would be expected just from looking at Figure 2.5.
Panel A of Table 2.7 also reports correlations between variance and the probability
of a portfolio return that is less than α for the volatility-targeting investor. Specifically,
we estimate the correlations between variance and the probabilities of a −2σt,t+h
Pt(r
shock
t,t+h < −2σt,t+h) (2.36)
This probability is equivalent to the probability in (2.33) with α
σvol target
= −2. Inter-
estingly, the correlations in the last two column of Panel A are all negative and range
from −0.70 to −0.44, with tight bootstrapped confidence bounds. These high negative
correlations show that the portfolio of the volatility-targeting investor is most risky at
times when variance is low, even though the investor has eliminated all dependencies
on variance in the portfolio.
This finding can help explain why Moreira and Muir (2017a) and Moreira and
Muir (2017b) find that investors can earn high Sharpe ratios by moving wealth into
the market at times of low variance and moving wealth out of the market when variance
increases (in some sense mimicking a volatility targeting strategy). The relatively (to
variance) high expected return in calm periods may be compensation for the elevated
higher-moment risks.
To better understand the systematic variation in higher-moment risks, we next
investigate the relation between tail probabilities and past returns. Specifically, we
regress tail probabilities onto past two year returns, e.g. the probability of a −2σt,t+1
drop as
Pt(r
shock
t,t+h < −2σt,t+h) = β0 + β1rt−24,t + t,T (2.37)
Panel B of Table 2.7 reports β1 coefficients from regressions such as in (2.37). We find
that the probability of both a −2σt,t+1 and a −3σt,t+1 drop in the market is statistically
significant and positively related to past returns. The economic magnitude is such
that a 50% market run-up over the past two years implies a 1% higher probability of
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a monthly −2σt,t+1 drop in the market. Furthermore, the monthly probability of a
−10% drop in the market is negatively related to past returns, which is to be expected,
because this probability is highly correlated to variance, as shown in Table 2.6, and
periods after market run-ups are usually associated with low variance. Panel C of
Table 2.7 reports β1 coefficients from regressions such as in (2.37) when controlling for
lagged probabilities. Controlling for lagged probabilities does not change our results:
high past two year returns imply higher current tail probabilities for the volatility-
targeting investor.
Our finding that market run-ups are related to contemporaneously higher higher-
moment risks supplements the existing literature that relates market run-ups to subse-
quent (realized) market “crashes”, e.g. Greenwood, Shleifer, and You (2017). Specifi-
cally, we find that the probability of an x% drop in the market decreases in past returns.
High past returns means low current volatility and a low probability of a subsequent
x% drop in the market price. However, conditional on variance, the probability of an
x% drop in the market increases in past returns.
8 What Explains Higher-Moment Risk?
In this section we investigate three possible explanations for the systematic variation in
higher-moment risk. First, we investigate how higher-moment risk is associated with
financial intermediary leverage. Second, we study how market and funding liquidity
relates to higher-moment risk. Third, we investigate how higher-moment risk is asso-
ciated with common “bubble” characteristics. Throughout this section, we will focus
on monthly horizon ex ante higher-moment risk.
8.1 The Volatility Paradox and Intermediary Leverage
The volatility paradox is the phenomenon that endogenous risk is high even though
exogenous risk is low (Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014)). Loosely speaking, exoge-
nous risk can be seen as variance and endogenous risk can be seen as higher-moment
risk. When variance is low, investors take on more risk in their positions, for in-
stance through leverage, which creates endogenous risk. This negative relation be-
tween higher-moment risk and variance is closely related to our empirical findings,
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we therefore test if our finding can be linked to the economic drivers suggested by
Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014).
One way in which this endogenous risk may arise is through intermediary leverage.4
We test if financial intermediary leverage can help explain higher-moment risks by
running the following regression:
Mt,T = β0 + β1Leveraget + t,T (2.38)
where the risk, Mt,T , is variance, skewness, kurtosis, hyperkurtosis, hyperskewness, and
the higher-moment risk index (HRI). Leverage is the financial intermediary leverage
ratio of He, Kelly, and Manela (2016). Regression (2.38) relates aggregate financial
intermediary leverage to contemporaneous higher-moment risks. Panel A of Table 2.8
shows the results of regression (2.38). We find that leverage is positively associated
with contemporaneous ex ante variance, which is consistent with financial intermediary
leverage being counter-cyclical, as noted in He, Kelly, and Manela (2016). The first
column of Panel A shows that aggregate financial intermediary leverage is not related
to the HRI: we find a regression coefficient pf −0.15 which is statistically insignificant.
Decomposing higher-moment risks into individual moments, we do not find a significant
relation between financial intermediary leverage and individual higher order moments.
Overall, aggregate leverage does not help explain higher-moment risks.
Next, we test if conditional (on variance) financial intermediary leverage is associ-
ated with higher-moment risks. We run the regression:
Mt,T = β0 + β1Leveraget + β2Variancet,T + t,T (2.39)
Panel B of Table 2.8 reports the results of regression (2.39). Interestingly, we find that,
conditioning on ex ante variance, financial intermediary leverage can help explain con-
temporaneous higher-moment risks. We find that skewness, kurtosis, hyperskewness,
and hyperkurtosis all load statistically significantly on financial intermediary leverage,
with negative signs for skewness and hyperskewness and positive signs for kurtosis
4Several papers have shown that financial intermediary leverage is associated with asset returns,
e.g. He, Kelly, and Manela (2016), He and Krishnamurthy (2013), Adrian and Boyarchenko (2012),
and Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014).
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and hyperkurtosis. Furthermore, the HRI is positively related to conditional financial
intermediary leverage. Given a level of ex ante variance, higher leverage is associated
with higher contemporaneous higher-moment risks.
Panel C in Table 2.8 reports regression (2.39) when controlling for lagged risk.
Controlling for lagged risk does not change our results. Aggregate financial intermedi-
ary leverage is in general not associated with higher-moment risks. Given a level of ex
ante variance, and controlling for lagged risk, higher leverage is associated with higher
contemporaneous higher-moment risks.
8.2 Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity.
Several previous papers link market liquidity and funding liquidity to aspects of the
stock market’s return distribution. Christoffersen, Feunou, Jeon, and Ornthanalai
(2016) suggest market illiquidity as an economic factor driving risk-neutral market
variance and jump risks, or equivalently, higher order moments. They argue that mar-
ket illiquidity is the common culprit of market price drops in cases when the price
drop happened without news about fundamentals, and it is therefore a reasonable eco-
nomic driver of market moments. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) show that, from
a theoretical point of view, stocks with low market (and funding) liquidity have high
variance because they are associated with high margin requirements. Furthermore,
Danilova and Julliard (2015) develop a model in which volatility and illiquidity are
jointly determined by the same equilibrium forces.
First, we test if high market illiquidity is associated with high contemporaneous
ex ante variance. Thereafter, we investigate the relation between market illiquidity
and higher-moment risks. When testing the relation between higher-moment risks (or
variance) and market illiquidity, we run the regression:
Mt,T = β0 + β1Bid-ask spreadt + t,T (2.40)
where the risk, Mt,T , is variance, skewness, kurtosis, hyperkurtosis, hyperskewness,
and the higher-moment risk index (HRI). As a proxy for market illiquidity, we fol-
low Christoffersen, Feunou, Jeon, and Ornthanalai (2016), and use the average value-
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weighted bid-ask spread of constituents of the S&P 500 index.
Panel A of Table 2.9 reports the results of regression (2.40). We find that higher
market illiquidity is associated with higher contemporaneous ex ante variance, which
is consistent with the model of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). The effect is
statistically significant at a 99% level and controlling for lagged variance does not
change the result.
The HRI is negatively related to market illiquidity with a regression coefficient of
−1.22, which is statistically significant at a 99% level. When we control for lagged
HRI, we still get a negative relation between market illiquidity and higher-moment
risks, but the relation is insignificant. The negative relation between the HRI and
market illiquidity shows that higher-moment risks tend to be high at times when the
market is most liquid.
Next, we test the relation between funding illiquidity and higher-moment risks. We
run the regression:
Mt,T = β0 + β1TED spreadt + t,T (2.41)
where the risk, Mt,T , is variance, skewness, kurtosis, hyperkurtosis, hyperskewness,
and the higher-moment risk index (HRI). The TED spread is a common proxy for
funding illiquidity, e.g. Frazzini and Pedersen (2014). The TED spread is the three
month LIBOR intrabank interest rate minus the three month T-bill interest rate and
it is available from the St. Louis FED.
Panel B of Table 2.9 reports the results of regression (2.41). Contemporaneous ex
ante variance is positively related to funding illiquidity, higher TED spread is associated
with higher ex ante variance. We find that the HRI is negatively related to funding
illiquidity which means that, higher-moment risks are high at times when there is low
friction in the funding market. Controlling for the lagged HRI does not change our
result.
Figure 2.7 shows time-series plots of market illiquidity and funding illiquidity with
the HRI. Consistent with the results presented in Table 2.9, we see that the HRI is
negatively correlated with both the bid-ask spread and the TED spread.
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8.3 “Bubble” Characteristics
A range of macroeconomic variables have been proposed as possible indicators of in-
creased market “crash” risks, or equivalently, increased higher-moment risks. A partial
list of the variables include the suggestion of Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001), who sug-
gest turnover, Pontiff and Woodgate (2008), who use issuance as a characteristic, and
Greenwood, Shleifer, and You (2017), who propose price acceleration as a higher-
moment risk characteristic.
In this section we investigate the relation between common market “crash” indica-
tors and contemporaneous ex ante higher-moment risks. We therefore run regressions
on the form:
HRIt,T = β0 + β1Characteristict + t,T (2.42)
where the “bubble” characteristics are: 1) The Greenwood, Shleifer, and You (2017)
variable acceleration, which is defined as the annualized past two year return minus the
return of the first year of the two year return. Acceleration captures the convexity in
the recent price path and a high value of acceleration is intended to be associated with
high contemporaneous ex ante higher-moment risks. 2) Issuance as the percentage of
firms in the S&P 500 index that issued equity in the past year. We follow Greenwood,
Shleifer, and You (2017), and define an equity issuance as the event that a firm’s
split-adjusted share count increased by five percent or more. 3) Market turnover. The
market valuation measures are: 4) CAPE, the Shiller cyclically adjusted price-earnings
ratio. 5) The dividend price ratio as the past two year dividends divided by the current
market price. 6) Cay, the Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) log consumption - aggregate
wealth ratio.
Table 2.10 reports the results of regression (2.42). Marginally, we find that cay is
negatively and significantly related to the HRI. Calm times when expected returns, as
proxied by cay, are low are times when higher-moment risks are high.
Interacting turnover with the past two year return, we find that turnover is posi-
tively related to the HRI. This finding is consistent with the findings in Chen, Hong,
and Stein (2001), that is, subsequent to market run-ups, a higher turnover is associated
with higher higher-moment risks.
For issuance, we find that, subsequent to market run-ups, a higher level of equity
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issuance implies a lower level of contemporaneous higher-moment risks. This finding is
counter to the results of Pontiff and Woodgate (2008). Firms have incentives to issue
equity when the stock price is higher than its fundamental value, which should be
associated with higher contemporaneous higher-moment risks. Other characteristics
show no marginal relation with higher-moment risks.
As a last test, we run a horse race including all “bubble” characteristics. The last
column of Table 2.10 reports the results of the horse race. Jointly, we find that acceler-
ation is statistically significant and positively related to the HRI, and cay is negatively
related to the HRI. Conditional on market run-ups, turnover is positively associated
with the HRI. Interestingly, issuance changes sign in the horse race compared to the
marginal regressions. Indeed, we find that higher issuance is associated with higher
contemporaneous higher-moment risks when controlling for other characteristics.
Figure 2.8 shows time-series plots of the HRI and cay. The two time-series are
negatively correlated with an in-sample correlation coefficient of −0.57. Figure 2.9
shows time-series plots of the HRI and turnover times past two year return. The two
time-series are positively correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.43, implying that,
after market run-ups when turnover is high, then so are higher-moment risks.
9 Conclusion: when volatility is low, risk hides in the tails
We show that ex ante physical moments estimated using methods based on Martin
(2017) are superior to historical moments and risk-neutral moments at predicting ex
ante realized moments.
Ex ante higher order moment risks co-move such that the first principal component
of the space spanned by skewness, kurtosis, hyperskewness, and hyperkurtosis explains
90% of the joint variation. We define this first principal component as a higher-moment
risk index (HRI) which captures the time-variation in higher-moment risks.
Interestingly, the HRI is negatively related to variance. We show that times when
variance is low are the times when the physical return distribution is most left skewed
(due to large negative skewness and hyperskewness) and fat tailed (due to large positive
kurtosis and hyperkurtosis). The economic importance of higher-moment risk is most
easily understood from the point of view of a volatility-targeting investor. The portfolio
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risk of this investor is high at times when variance is low, even though the investor
has eliminated variance risk in the portfolio. For example, the probability that the
investor’s portfolio realizes a return less than two standard deviations varies from 3.6%
during times of financial distress to 9.7% during periods of low variance.
We show empirically how higher-moment risk is associated with market liquidity,
funding liquidity, turnover, and the market valuation variable cay. Times with low
liquidity frictions, low cay, and high turnover are times when higher-moment risks are
high.
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Figure 2.1: Higher order moments and the higher-moment risk index. The fig-
ures show a time-series plot of monthly higher order moments and the higher-moment
risk index (HRI) for the S&P 500 index. HRI is estimated as the first principal com-
ponent of the space spanned by skewness, kurtosis, hyperskewness, and hyperkurtosis.
Times when the HRI is high are times when higher-moment risks are high.
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Figure 2.2: Moments of ex post realized returns sorted on ex ante expected
moments. For each moment, we sort ex post realized monthly returns into a “low” and
“high” bucket based on the median ex ante expected value of that moment. Thereafter,
we compute the corresponding realized moment for each bucket.
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Figure 2.3: Higher-moment risk index and variance. This figure shows time-
series plots of monthly and quarterly higher-moment risk index (HRI) and variances.
The HRI is high at times when variance is low.
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Figure 2.4: Higher-moment risk index and the past two year return. These
figures show time-series plots of the past two year return and the S&P 500 higher-
moment risk index (HRI). Past return and the HRI are positively correlated, implying
that higher-moment risk is high subsequent to market run-ups.
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Figure 2.5: Market tail loss probabilities – two sigma. The top figure shows port-
folio tail loss probabilities for the volatility-targeting investor; that is, the probability of
an unexpected return lower than −2σmontht . The dashed line is the tail loss probabilities
implied by a normal distribution. The shaded area between the lines is higher-moment
risk, that is, the part of the tail loss probability that is entirely driven by changes in
higher order moments. The bottom figure shows portfolio tail loss probabilities for the
constant notional investor. Here, σmontht is the conditional monthly ex ante variance
and σ¯month is the time-series average of σmontht . In our sample, σ¯
month = 5.0%.
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Figure 2.6: Market tail loss probabilities – three sigma. The top figure shows
portfolio tail loss probabilities for the volatility-targeting investor; that is, the proba-
bility of an unexpected return lower than −3σmontht . The dashed line is the tail loss
probabilities implied by a normal distribution. The shaded area between the lines
is higher-moment risk, that is, the part of the tail loss probability that is entirely
driven by changes in higher order moments. The bottom figure shows portfolio tail
loss probabilities for the constant notional investor. Here, σmontht is the conditional
monthly ex ante variance and σ¯month is the time-series average of σmontht . In our sample,
σ¯month = 5.0%.
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Figure 2.7: Higher-moment risk index and market and funding illiquidity.
The top figure shows time series plots of the HRI and market illiquidity (proxied by
the average value-weighted bid-ask spread of S&P 500 constituents). The bottom
figure shows time series plots of the HRI and funding illiquidity (proxied by the TED
spread).
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Figure 2.8: Higher-moment risk index and cay. The figure shows time series plots
of the HRI and cay.
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Figure 2.9: Higher-moment risk index and turnover. The figure shows time
series plots of the HRI and turnover times the past two year return.
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Table 2.1: Moment Summary Statistics. In this table we report the average
time-series values for ex ante estimated moments: excess return (ER−Rf), standard
deviation (St. dev.), skewness (Skew), kurtosis (Kurt), hyperskewness (Hskew), and
hyperkurtosis (Hkurt). We estimate ex ante moments from the point of view of a risk-
neutral investor (γ = 0), a log-utility investor (γ = 1), and two power-utility investors
(γ = 3, γ = 5).
Annualized (%)
Horizon Risk-aversion ER−Rf St. dev. Skew Kurt Hskew Hkurt
Month γ = 0 0 21.07 -1.45 8.90 -46.58 347.41
Month γ = 1 4.44 19.89 -1.31 8.25 -41.01 307.44
Month γ = 3 12.00 18.33 -1.08 7.20 -31.16 233.07
Month γ = 5 18.36 17.32 -0.89 6.43 -23.47 175.88
Quarter γ = 0 0 21.07 -1.17 5.78 -20.58 110.36
Quarter γ = 1 4.44 19.59 -1.09 5.57 -18.64 97.45
Quarter γ = 3 11.48 17.55 -0.95 5.23 -15.56 80.69
Quarter γ = 5 17.12 16.25 -0.81 4.94 -12.93 68.19
96
Table 2.2: Ex Ante Conditional Moments Predict Ex Post Realized Mo-
ments. Panel A reports ex post moments for monthly returns sorted into a low or
high bucket based on the ex ante moment. Panel B reports correlations between our
ex ante moments and ex post realized moments. Panel C reports correlations between
our ex ante kurtosis and hyperkurtosis with ex post left kurtosis and left hyperkur-
tosis. We also report correlations between historical moments and ex post moments.
We report bootstrapped standard errors in the appendix and significance as; * when
p < 0.1, ** when p < 0.05, and *** when p < 0.01.
Panel A: Sorting on ex ante monthly moments
Our moments Historical moments
Low ex ante High ex ante Low ex ante High ex ante
Variance (%) 0.08∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
Skewness −0.83 −0.48 −0.49 −0.75
Kurtosis 2.85 5.93∗∗ 3.35 4.46
Hyperskewness −19.03∗∗ −4.24 −5.40 −9.01
Hyperkurtosis 15.70 95.24∗∗∗ 15.34 40.10
Panel B: Correlation between ex ante moments and ex post realized moments
Our moments Historical moments
Month Quarter Month Quarter
Variance 0.67∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗
Skewness 0.21∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.07 0.24∗∗∗
Kurtosis −0.01 0.00 0.06 0.04
Hyperskewness 0.17∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.07 0.15∗∗∗
Hyperkurtosis −0.03 0.06 0.03 0.01
Panel C: Left kurtosis and left hyperkurtosis
Our moments Historical moments
Month Quarter Month Quarter
Left kurtosis 0.19∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.02 0.14∗∗
Left hyperkurtosis 0.17∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.05 0.13∗∗
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Table 2.3: Ex Ante Conditional Moments Predict Ex Post Realized Moments
— Robustness. Panel A reports correlations between our ex ante moments and ex
post realized moments when we remove observations that overlap with the period from
August 1st 2008 to July 31st 2009. Panel B reports correlations between our ex ante
moments (estimated with different levels of relative risk aversion) and ex post realized
moments. Panel C reports correlations when controlling for risk-neutral moments or
historical moments. We report bootstrapped standard errors in the appendix and
significance as; * when p < 0.1, ** when p < 0.05, and *** when p < 0.01..
Panel A: Excluding August 1st 2008 to July 31st 2009
Our moments Historical moments
Month Quarter Month Quarter
Variance 0.52∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
Skewness 0.23∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.11 0.25∗∗∗
Kurtosis −0.01 0.00 0.07 0.06
Hyperskewness 0.18∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.09 0.13∗∗∗
Hyperkurtosis −0.03 0.04 0.04 0.01
Panel B: Other levels of risk-aversion
γ = 1 γ = 5
Month Quarter Month Quarter
Variance 0.67∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗
Skewness 0.20∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
Kurtosis −0.03 0.00 0.01 0.02
Hyperskewness 0.13∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
Hyperkurtosis −0.06 0.04 −0.01 0.07
Panel C: Marginal correlations
Controlling for Controlling for
risk-neutral moments historical moments
Month Quarter Month Quarter
Variance 0.09 0.12 0.18∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
Skewness 0.09 0.01 0.20∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
Kurtosis 0.11∗∗ −0.02 −0.02 0.01
Hyperskewness 0.16∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗
Hyperkurtosis 0.09∗∗ 0.07 −0.03 0.05
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Table 2.4: Correlations Between S&P 500 Moments. Panel A reports pairwise
correlations between monthly S&P 500 moments. Expected return (Er), variance
(Var), skewness (Skew), kurtosis (Kurt), hyperskewness (Hskew), and hyperkurtosis
(Hkurt). Panel B shows the correlation between quarterly horizon moments. We report
95% bootstrapped confidence bounds in brackets.
Panel A: Month
Er Var −Skew Kurt −Hskew Hkurt
Er 1 0.99 −0.46 −0.50 −0.48 −0.41
[0.99,1] [−0.56,−0.37] [−0.57,−0.46] [−0.55,−0.43] [−0.48,−0.37]
Var 1 −0.52 −0.54 −0.51 −0.44
[−0.60,−0.43] [−0.60,−0.50] [−0.58,−0.47] [−0.51,−0.40]
-Skew 1 0.80 0.78 0.66
[0.76,0.84] [0.74,0.82] [0.60,0.72]
Kurt 1 0.97 0.93
[0.95,0.98] [0.90,0.95]
-Hskew 1 0.98
[0.97,0.98]
Hkurt 1
Panel A: Quarter
Er Var −Skew Kurt −Hskew Hkurt
Er 1 0.99 −0.46 −0.54 −0.58 −0.56
[0.99,0.99] [−0.55,−0.37] [−0.60,−0.49] [−0.64,−0.54] [−0.62,−0.52]
Var 1 −0.54 −0.62 −0.65 −0.62
[−0.62,−0.47] [−0.67,−0.57] [−0.71,−0.61] [−0.68,−0.57]
-Skew 1 0.83 0.86 0.74
[0.79,0.86] [0.82,0.90] [0.68,0.79]
Kurt 1 0.96 0.94
[0.95,0.97] [0.92,0.96]
-Hskew 1 0.97
[0.96,0.98]
Hkurt 1
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Table 2.5: Principal Components of Higher-Moment Risks. We estimate the
four principal components (PC) spanning the space of monthly (Panel A) and quarterly
(Panel B) skewness (Skew), kurtosis (Kurt), hyperskewness (Hskew), and hyperkur-
tosis (Hkurt). Panel A reports the loadings on each of the monthly moments. Panel
B reports the loadings on each of the quarterly moments. The last column of Panel
A shows that the first principal component (PC 1) explains 89% of the variation in
monthly higher order moments. Similarly, the last column of Panel B shows that 91%
of the variation in quarterly higher order moments is captured by the first principal
component.
Panel A: Month
Skew Kurt Hskew Hkurt Variation explained
PC 1 eigenvector −0.45 0.52 −0.52 0.50 89%
PC 2 eigenvector 0.85 0.07 −0.20 0.48 10%
PC 3 eigenvector −0.23 −0.83 −0.16 0.48 1%
PC 4 eigenvector −0.13 0.19 0.81 0.54 0%
PC 1 correlation −0.85 0.98 −0.99 0.95
Panel B: Quarter
Skew Kurt Hskew Hkurt Variation explained
PC 1 eigenvector −0.47 0.51 −0.52 0.50 91%
PC 2 eigenvector −0.84 −0.16 0.11 −0.51 7%
PC 3 eigenvector −0.13 −0.84 −0.32 0.40 2%
PC 4 eigenvector −0.25 0.01 0.78 0.57 0%
PC 1 correlation −0.89 0.98 −0.99 0.96
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Table 2.6: Cyclicality in Higher-Moment Risks. Panel A reports correlations
between ex ante variance and the higher-moment risk index (HRI). We report
bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals in brackets. Panel B reports β1 coefficients
when regressing physical moments onto the past two year returns:
Mt,T = β0 + β1rt−24,t + t,T
where the moment Mt,T is variance (Var), skewness (Skew), kurtosis (Kurt), hyper-
skewness (Hskew), hyperkurtosis (Hkurt), and the higher-moment risk index. Panel
C reports the regression when controlling for lagged moments. We report t-statistics
in parentheses and significance as; * when p < 0.1, ** when p < 0.05, and *** when
p < 0.01. We correct standard errors for autocorrelation using Newey and West (1987).
Panel A: Variance and the higher-moment risk index
Horizon HRI
Month −0.53
95% CI [−0.60,−0.48]
Quarter −0.64
95% CI [−0.69,−0.59]
Panel B: Past return and higher-moment risks
Horizon HRI Var (%) Skew Kurt Hskew Hkurt
Month 2.26∗∗∗ −0.30∗ −0.61∗∗∗ 2.75∗∗∗ −24.57∗∗∗ 201.65∗∗
(sd) (0.79) (0.16) (0.14) (1.01) (9.41) (98.06)
Quarter 2.13∗∗ −0.68∗ −0.45∗∗∗ 1.02∗ −9.62∗∗ 50.63∗∗
(sd) (0.88) (0.39) (0.12) (0.56) (3.83) (25.23)
Panel C: Past return and higher-moment risks — controlling for lagged risk
Horizon HRI Var (%) Skew Kurt Hskew Hkurt
Month 0.94∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗ 1.16∗∗∗ −11.11∗∗ 109.07∗
(sd) (0.34) (0.03) (0.06) (0.39) (4.53) (57.91)
Quarter 0.47∗∗ −0.14∗∗ −0.15∗∗∗ 0.25∗ −2.04∗∗ 11.98∗∗
(sd) (0.19) (0.06) (0.04) (0.14) (0.86) (5.33)
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Table 2.7: Constant Notional, Volatility-Targeting, and Higher-Moment
Risks. Panel A reports correlations between ex ante variance and tail loss prob-
abilities. The probabilities are P (rht < −2σ¯h) and P (rht < −2σht ) where rht =
Rt,t+h − Et[Rt,t+h], σht is the ex ante volatility from time t to t + h, and we define
σ¯h as the time series average of σht . We report bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals
in brackets. Panel B reports regression slope coefficients when regressing physical tail
loss probabilities onto the past two year returns. Panel C reports coefficients when
controlling for lagged probabilities. We report t-statistics in parentheses and signif-
icance as; * when p < 0.1, ** when p < 0.05, and *** when p < 0.01. We correct
standard errors for autocorrelation using Newey and West (1987)
Panel A: Correlations between variance and tail probabilities
Horizon P (rht < −2σ¯h) P (rht < −3σ¯h) P (rht < −2σht ) P (rht < −3σht )
Month 0.97 0.98 −0.70 −0.54
95% CI [0.96,0.98] [0.96,0.99] [−0.78, −0.65] [−0.62,−0.47]
Quarter 0.97 0.94 −0.58 −0.44
95% CI [0.96,0.98] [0.92,0.96] [−0.66,−0.51] [−0.53,−0.35]
Panel B: Tail probabilities (%) and past return
Horizon P (rht < −2σ¯h) P (rht < −3σ¯h) P (rht < −2σht ) P (rht < −3σht )
Month −5.28∗ −2.23 2.02∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗
(sd) (3.03) (1.44) (0.63) (0.17)
Quarter −5.67 −2.09 1.24∗∗ 0.38∗∗
(sd) (3.61) (1.46) (0.57) (0.18)
Panel C: Tail probabilities (%) and past return - controlling for lagged probabilities
Horizon P (rht < −2σ¯h) P (rht < −3σ¯h) P (rht < −2σht ) P (rht < −3σht )
Month −1.17∗ −0.56∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(sd) (0.60) (0.30) (0.20) (0.09)
Quarter −0.96∗ −0.44∗ 0.38∗∗ 0.11∗∗
(sd) (0.54) (0.26) (0.16) (0.05)
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Table 2.8: Financial Intermediary Leverage and Higher-Moment Risk. Panel
A reports regression slope coefficients when regressing higher-moment risks onto the
financial intermediary leverage of He, Kelly, and Manela (2016). Panel B reports
coefficients when conditioning on ex ante variance. Panel C reports coefficients when
conditioning on ex ante variance and controlling for lagged risk. We report standard
errors in parentheses and significance as; * when p < 0.1, ** when p < 0.05, and ***
when p < 0.01. We correct standard errors for autocorrelation using Newey and West
(1987).
Panel A: Leverage and higher-moment risks
Horizon HRI Var (%) Skew Kurt Hskew Hkurt
Month −0.14 0.11∗∗∗ 0.05 −0.22 1.27 −4.65
(sd) (0.29) (0.03) (0.07) (0.30) (3.41) (28.54)
Quarter −0.03 0.24∗∗ 0.01 −0.00 0.23 0.37
(sd) (0.51) (0.10) (0.06) (0.39) (2.00) (15.64)
Panel B: Conditional leverage and higher-moment risks
Horizon HRI Var (%) Skew Kurt Hskew Hkurt
Month 0.51∗∗ — −0.07 0.65∗∗∗ −6.59∗∗∗ 68.43∗∗∗
(sd) (0.20) — (0.05) (0.24) (2.49) (24.94)
Quarter 0.76∗∗∗ — −0.10∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ −3.28∗∗∗ 22.29∗∗∗
(sd) (0.19) — (0.03) (0.08) (0.80) (2.60)
Panel C: Conditional leverage and higher-moment risks — controlling for lagged risk
Horizon HRI Var (%) Skew Kurt Hskew Hkurt
Month 0.29∗∗∗ — −0.03∗ 0.38∗∗∗ −3.93∗∗∗ 45.12∗∗∗
(sd) (0.10) — (0.02) (0.13) (1.35) (15.42)
Quarter 0.34∗∗∗ — −0.05∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ −1.44∗∗∗ 10.16∗∗∗
(sd) (0.10) — (0.02) (0.08) (0.37) (2.37)
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Table 2.9: Market Liquidity, Funding Liquidity, and Higher-Moment Risks.
This table reports the results when regressing higher-moment risks onto market liq-
uidity (Panel A) and funding liquidity (Panel B). We use the value-weighted bid-ask
spread of S&P 500 constituents as a proxy for market illiquidity. We use the TED
spread as a proxy for funding illiquidity. Panel C and Panel D report results when
controlling for lagged market or funding illiquidity respectively. We report t-statistics
in parentheses and significance as; * when p < 0.1, ** when p < 0.05, and *** when
p < 0.01. We correct standard errors for autocorrelation using Newey and West (1987).
Panel A: Market illiquidity
Horizon HRI Var (%) Skew Kurt Hskew Hkurt
Month −1.22∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ −1.53∗∗∗ 14.18∗∗∗ −128.26∗∗∗
(sd) (0.20) (0.05) (0.04) (0.25) (2.47) (28.29)
Quarter −1.44∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ −0.85∗∗∗ 6.30∗∗∗ −37.05∗∗∗
(sd) (0.19) (0.11) (0.03) (0.12) (0.81) (5.85)
Panel B: Funding illiquidity
Horizon HRI Var (%) Skew Kurt Hskew Hkurt
Month −1.41∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.18 −2.12∗∗∗ 14.19∗∗∗ −128.26∗∗∗
(sd) (0.39) (0.11) (0.11) (0.52) (2.47) (28.28)
Quarter −1.37∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗ 0.08 −1.07∗∗∗ 6.30∗∗∗ −37.05∗∗∗
(sd) (0.51) (0.22) (0.11) (0.32) (0.81) (5.85)
Panel C: Market illiquidity — controlling for lagged risk
Horizon HRI Var (%) Skew Kurt Hskew Hkurt
Month −0.68∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ −0.78∗∗∗ 8.37∗∗∗ −83.77∗∗∗
(sd) (0.17) (0.02) (0.02) (0.20) (2.15) (24.75)
Quarter −0.55∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗ 2.51∗∗∗ −14.96∗∗∗
(sd) (0.11) (0.05) (0.02) (0.07) (0.51) (3.93)
Panel D: Funding illiquidity — controlling for lagged risk
Horizon HRI Var (%) Skew Kurt Hskew Hkurt
Month −0.57∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ −0.88∗∗∗ 8.37∗∗∗ −83.77∗∗∗
(sd) (0.18) (0.02) (0.03) (0.23) (2.15) (24.75)
Quarter −0.38∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.05∗ −0.31∗∗∗ 2.51∗∗∗ −14.96∗∗∗
(sd) (0.12) (0.07) (0.03) (0.08) (0.51) (3.93)
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A Ex Ante Physical Moments, Risk-Neutral Pricing, and Realized
Moments
Ex ante physical moments and risk-neutral pricing
Using equation (2.6) we can represent physical ex ante moments in terms of asset
prices:
Et[R
i
t,T ] =
E∗t [R
i+γ
t,T ]
E∗t [R
γ
t,T ]
(2.43)
for i ∈ {1, ..., 6}. These asset prices can be used to estimate ex ante physical mo-
ments by expanding the standardized moment formula in equation (2.7). We estimate
kurtosis, hyperskewness, and hyperkurtosis in the following way:
Kurtosist,T =
Et[R4t,T ]− 3Et[Rt,T ]4 + 6Et[Rt,T ]2Et[R2t,T ]− 4Et[Rt,T ]Et[R3t,T ]
(Et[R2t,T ]− Et[Rt,T ]2)2
(2.44)
(2.45)
Hyperskewnesst,T =
Et[R5t,T ] + 4Et[Rt,T ]
5 + 10Et[Rt,T ]
2Et[R3t,T ]− 10Et[Rt,T ]3Et[R2t,T ]− 5Et[Rt,T ]Et[R4t,T ]
(Et[R2t,T ]− Et[Rt,T ]2)5/2
(2.46)
(2.47)
Hyperkurtosist,T =
Et[R6t,T ]− 5Et[Rt,T ]6 + 15Et[Rt,T ]4Et[R2t,T ]− 20Et[Rt,T ]3Et[R3t,T ] + 15Et[Rt,T ]2Et[R4t,T ]
(Et[R2t,T ]− Et[Rt,T ]2)3
(2.48)
−
6Et[Rt,T ]Et[R
5
t,T ]
(Et[R2t,T ]− Et[Rt,T ]2)3
(2.49)
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Estimating ex post realized moments
Let N be the number of daily realized returns between time t and T and denote the
daily return between day s and s+ 1 as rs,s+1. The realized moments between time t
and T are estimated from daily realizations in the following way:
µt,T =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ri−1,i (2.50)
(2.51)
σ2t,T =
N
∑N
i=1(ri−1,i − µt,T )2
N − 1 (2.52)
(2.53)
Realized Skewnesst,T =
N1/2
∑N
i=1 (ri−1,i − µt,T )3
σ3t,T
(2.54)
(2.55)
Realized Kurtosist,T =
N
∑N
i=1 (ri−1,i − µt,T )4
σ4t,T
(2.56)
(2.57)
Realized Hyperskewnesst,T =
N3/2
∑N
i=1 (ri−1,i − µt,T )5
σ5t,T
(2.58)
(2.59)
Realized Hyperkurtosist,T =
N2
∑N
i=1 (ri−1,i − µt,T )6
σ6t,T
(2.60)
This is similar to the methods used by Amaya, Christoffersen, Jacobs, and Vasquez
(2015).
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B Appendix Tables
Table AI: Ex Ante Conditional Moments Predict Ex Post Realized Moments
(Test statistics). This Table reports test statistics for the results reported in Table
2.2. Panel A reports p-values from the bootstrapped distribution. Panel B reports
bootstrapped standard errors for the correlation coefficient between ex ante moments
and ex post realized moments. Panel C reports bootstrapped standard errors for the
correlation coefficient between ex ante kurtosis and ex post realized left kurtosis. Panel
C reports also reports correlations for hyperkurtosis.
Panel A: Sorting on ex ante monthly moments
Our moments Historical moments
Low ex ante High ex ante Low ex ante High ex ante
Variance 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Skewness 0.19 0.46 0.54 0.74
Kurtosis 0.21 0.03 0.46 0.20
Hyperskewness 0.02 0.45 0.47 0.75
Hyperkurtosis 0.39 0.01 0.38 0.20
Panel B: Correlation between ex ante moments and ex post realized moments
Our moments Historical moments
Month Quarter Month Quarter
Variance 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.10
Skewness 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06
Kurtosis 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.04
Hyperskewness 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.04
Hyperkurtosis 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.03
Panel C: Left kurtosis and left hyperkurtosis
Our moments Historical moments
Month Quarter Month Quarter
Left kurtosis 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06
Left hyperkurtosis 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06
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Table AII: Ex Ante Conditional Moments Predict Ex Post Realized Moments
— Robustness (Test statistics). Panel A reports bootstrapped standard errors for
the correlations between our ex ante moments and ex post realized moments when we
remove observations that overlap with the period from August 1, 2008 to July 31, 2009.
Panel B reports bootstrapped standard errors for the correlations between our ex ante
moments (estimated with different levels of relative risk aversion) and ex post realized
moments. Panel C reports bootstrapped standard errors for the correlations when
controlling for risk-neutral moments or historical moments. We report bootstrapped
standard errors in the appendix and significance as; * when p < 0.1, ** when p < 0.05,
and *** when p < 0.01..
Panel A: Excluding August 1, 2008 to July 31, 2009
Our moments Historical moments
Month Quarter Month Quarter
Variance 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.08
Skewness 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.06
Kurtosis 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.07
Hyperskewness 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07
Hyperkurtosis 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.05
Panel B: Other levels of risk-aversion
γ = 1 γ = 5
Month Quarter Month Quarter
Variance 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.09
Skewness 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Kurtosis 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06
Hyperskewness 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07
Hyperkurtosis 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06
Panel C: Marginal correlations
Controlling for Controlling for
risk-neutral moments historical moments
Month Quarter Month Quarter
Variance 0.17 0.10 0.12 0.06
Skewness 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Kurtosis 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07
Hyperskewness 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06
Hyperkurtosis 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.06
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Chapter 3
The Market’s Time-Varying Risk
Aversion
Abstract:
I present a new method for estimating the market’s time-varying risk aversion using
historical market returns and option prices written on the S&P 500 index. Market risk
aversion varies in a systematic way; it tends to be low during times of financial market
distress, e.g., during the 2008-2009 financial crisis, and it tends to be high at times
when the market is considered to be calm as measured by variance. This systematic
variation in market risk aversion is difficult to reconcile with the leading asset pricing
models. I discuss several possible explanations for these time-varying patterns in risk
aversion including investor salience and time-varying correlations between aggregate
consumption and the market.
I am grateful for helpful comments from Niels Joachim Gormsen, David Lando, and Lasse Heje
Pedersen. I gratefully acknowledge support from the FRIC Center for Financial Frictions (grant no.
DNRF102) and from the European Research Council (ERC grant no. 312417).
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1 Introduction
Risk averse market participants require compensation for taking on market risk. The
amount of compensation required depends on the level of investor risk aversion and
the expected distribution of future market returns. Understanding how risk aversion
and the expected distribution of future market returns co-vary over time is therefore
important in understanding market prices.
In this paper, I provide a new method for estimating the market’s time-varying
risk aversion. My methodology allows me to investigate the co-movements between
market risk aversion and the physical distribution of market returns. I arrive at the
following two main results: (i) Market risk aversion varies over time and tends to
be low when volatility is high, e.g., during the recent 2008-2009 financial crisis. (ii)
Market risk aversion tends to be high at times when market tail risk is high. This
systematic variation in market risk aversion is difficult to reconcile with the leading
asset pricing models. In the last part of the paper, I discuss possible explanations for
the systematic variation in risk aversion. Specifically, I consider salience theory as a
behavioral explanation and time-varying correlation between the market and aggregate
consumption as a rational explanation.
Before I go into the details on my results, it is instructive to understand how I
estimate the market’s time-varying risk aversion. As in Martin (2017) and Gormsen
and Jensen (2017b), I consider the preferences of a power utility investor who chooses
to be fully invested in the market. I estimate option implied risk neutral distributions
for multiple horizons corresponding to the last trading day of the month from January
1996 until December 2015. Using these risk neutral distributions, I estimate the time
series of risk aversion coefficients which best match the historical realized monthly
returns on the market while still being consistent with observable option prices. To do
so, I rely on the generalized recovery methodology developed in Jensen, Lando, and
Pedersen (2017) combined with the Berkowitz test as used in Bliss and Panigirtzoglou
(2004). Specifically, I estimate the power utility investor’s time preference parameter
by minimizing the Berkowitz test statistic under the constraint that, for a given value
of the time preference parameter, the time-varying risk aversion coefficients solves the
generalized recovery equation set.
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As my first main result, I show that the market’s risk aversion varies systematically
with variance. Specifically, risk aversion is negatively correlated with market variance
with a correlation coefficient of −0.65 and tight bootstrapped 95% confidence bounds
of [−0.70,−0.62].1 The negative correlation suggests that market participants are more
risk tolerant at times when the market is generally considered highly risky, i.e., during
times of high market volatility. This finding is hard to reconcile with the leading asset
pricing models. For example, Campbell and Cochrane (1993) explain asset prices with
a risk aversion that is countercyclical.
To understand why it is reasonable that market risk aversion is low at times when
variance is high, consider the following heuristic example. Under power utility and
log-normality of the market return distribution then the expected excess return on the
market is equal to γσ2, where γ is market risk aversion and σ2 is market variance.
Suppose risk aversion is equal to 3 and constant, which is a commonly chosen value
in the financial economics literature, see e.g. Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004) and
Gormsen and Jensen (2017b). Then, during the peak of the financial crisis in 2008-2009
where annualized realized market variance reached almost 60%, the implied annual
expected return on the market was about 180%. It is hard to believe that the market
participants believed that, in expectation, the market was going to bounce back with
an increase of 180% from the peak of the crisis. Therefore, if annualized expected
returns were truly lower than 180% during the financial crisis, then either risk aversion
is lower than 3 and constant or it fluctuates and was low during the crisis.
I find that risk aversion on average is 2.77 and that it falls to 1.49 during the peak
of the financial crisis. Using the heuristic argument above, this level of risk aversion
implies an expected excess return on the market during the peak of the crisis of about
90% annually and 7.5% on a monthly horizon.
As my second main result, I show that the market’s risk aversion varies system-
atically with market tail risk. Specifically, I find that risk aversion is: (i) negatively
correlated with market skewness with a correlation of −0.42 with bootstrapped 95%
confidence bounds of [−0.51,−0.31] and (ii) positively correlated with market kurtosis
with a correlation of 0.62 and bootstrapped confidence bounds of [0.54, 0.70]. This
1Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004) also find evidence of a risk aversion which is negatively related to
variance.
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finding suggests that the investor becomes more risk averse as the market’s higher
order moments become more risky, i.e., there is more probability mass in the tail of
the market return distribution.
Next, I discuss evidence of this systematic variation in risk aversion that is already
in the finance literature. For example, in a recent paper by Moreira and Muir (2017b),
the authors show that investors can earn large alphas by timing market volatility.
They find that investors should exit the market when volatility increases and enter
the market when it drops. Their result arises because expected excess returns are high
relative to variance during low variance periods, i.e., the ratio ERt
σ2t
varies over time and
becomes high when variance is low. Their findings imply a time variation in market
risk aversion which is consistent with the results I present. To see why, recall that we
can express the expected excess return on the market as ERt = γtσ
2
t which implies
a market risk aversion of γt =
ERt
σ2t
. Their results are therefore reminiscent of a risk
aversion that is low at times when volatility is high. Similarly, Gormsen and Jensen
(2017a) also find evidence that the market price of risk is high during low volatility
periods.
In the final part of the paper, I discuss two possible explanations for the systematic
variation in market risk aversion. First, I show that my results are consistent with
aspects of salience theory by Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2012). Specifically,
I follow Lian, Ma, and Wang (2018) who argue that, at times of low interest rates
the relatively high expected returns on risky assets are salient, and this salience on
the upside of a higher return on the risky asset induces heightened risk tolerance
and “reaching for yield” tendencies among investors. I therefore regress the ratio of
expected gross returns on the market to gross risk-free returns, Et(Rt,T )/R
f
t,T , onto
risk aversion. Consistently with the findings of Lian, Ma, and Wang (2018), I find
that investors become more risk tolerant as the ratio of expected returns to risk-free
returns increases.
Lastly, I discuss how the systematic variation in risk aversion can arise if the stock
market is not a perfect proxy for aggregate consumption. Specifically, for an investor
with power utility who cares about aggregate consumption, then the stock market
implied risk aversion can be expressed as αt = ρtγ
c
tσ
c
t/σt where ρt is the correlation
between the stock market and aggregate consumption, σct is consumption volatility,
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γct is the investor’s risk aversion, and σt is the volatility of the stock market. As an
illustrative example, I consider the case where risk aversion and consumption volatility
are constant, i.e., γct = γ
c and σct = σ
c. In this case, the stock market implied risk
aversion is proportional to the ratio of the correlation between the stock market and
aggregate consumption and the volatility of the stock market. During times of financial
distress, stock market volatility increases, if the correlation between the stock market
and aggregate consumption does not increase enough to offset the increase in stock
market volatility then αt will decrease.
My paper relates to and extends the existing literature on estimating market risk
aversion. I present a new method for estimating the market’s risk aversion by integrat-
ing the Berkowitz test with the generalized recovery method of Jensen, Lando, and
Pedersen (2017). Previous research which use option prises to estimate time-varying
risk aversion is based either (1) a full identification (e.g. a parameterization through a
GARCH model) of the market’s physical return distribution from historical returns or
(2) parameterization of investor preferences, e.g. Ross (2015) and Jensen, Lando, and
Pedersen (2017). My method allows for the identification of time-varying risk aver-
sion while leaving the physical probability distribution fully free, which compliments
the existing literature that imposes structure on the physical return distribution, e.g.
Barone-Adesi, Engle, and Mancini (2008), Jackwerth (2004), Jackwerth (2000), Ait-
Sahalia and Lo (2000). My paper also relates to Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004) who
use the Berkowitz test, but they use it to estimate a constant risk aversion.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes how I estimate the market’s
time-varying risk aversion. Section 3 covers data and details on the empirical im-
plementation. Section 4 studies the empirical results of the time-varying market risk
aversion. Section 5 studies the relation between market risk aversion and the market’s
physical moments. Section 6 investigates what might explain the systematic variation
in the market’s time-varying risk aversion. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Inferring Financial Market Risk Aversion
I consider the preferences and beliefs of a power utility investor who optimally chooses
to be fully invested in the market. The economy consists of a risk-free asset with gross
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risk-free return of Rft,T and a risky asset, the stock market, with price S, dividends
Dt,T , and gross returns
Rt,T =
ST +Dt,T
St
(3.1)
The power utility investor’s utility function at time t is Ut(x) = x
1−γ(t)/(1−γ(t)) where
γ(t) is the investor’s (possibly time-varying) risk aversion coefficient. The investor has
initial wealth W0 and terminal wealth W0Rt,T . Given that the power utility investor
chooses to be fully invested in the stock market, I can express the investor’s stochastic
discount factor in the following way:
mt,T (Rt,T ) = δ(t, T )R
−γ(t)
t,T (3.2)
where δ(t, T ) is a time-preference parameter and γ(t) is the market’s risk aversion2.
Table 3.1 reports the five different specifications of the stochastic discount factor in
(3.2) which I investigate in this paper.
Next, I show how I infer the market’s time-varying risk aversion. I combine the
results of two related papers, the generalized recovery methodology of Jensen, Lando,
and Pedersen (2017) and the Berkowitz test as used in Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004).
The main methodological objective of both these papers is to backward engineer pref-
erence parameters from observable asset prices,3 in this paper I exploit these methods
in a joint setting.
I start by fixing some notation. I write the standard asset pricing formula in the
following common way:
pit,T (r) = pt,T (r)mt,T (r) (3.3)
where pit,T is the time t and T − t horizon known state price density, pt,T is the cor-
responding unknown physical probability density, and mt,T is the unknown stochastic
discount factor. In Section 3, I discuss how I estimate state price densities using option
prices written on the market. Given the standard asset pricing formula, I can write
2I assume that the market’s risk aversion is independent of the horizon. There are several papers
that address horizon dependent risk aversion, see e.g., Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004) and Lazarus
(2018). The methodology I use in this paper can accommodate a horizon specific risk aversion, however,
I choose to focus on the variation in the time series of risk aversion rather than the term structure of
risk aversion.
3
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the market’s probability distribution function, say F , as
Ft,T (r) =
∫ r
−∞
pt,T (x)dx =
∫ r
−∞
pit,T (x)
mt,T (x)
dx (3.4)
If I insert the power utility investor’s stochastic discount factor from (3.2) into (3.4),
then I can rewrite the market’s distribution function as follows
Ft,T (r) =
∫ r
−∞
pit,T (x)x
γ(t)
δ(t, T )
dx (3.5)
Given values of the parameters δ(t, T ) and γ(t), I can estimate the market’s probability
distribution as perceived by the power utility investor who chooses to invest everything
in the market. The objective now is figuring out what the true values of δ(t, T ) and
γ(t) are.
To estimate these true values of the preference parameters, I follow Bliss and Pani-
girtzoglou (2004) and use the so-called Berkowitz test, cf. Berkowitz (2001). The idea
behind the Berkowitz test is that, for the true values δˆ(t, T ) and γˆ(t), the distribution
of ut,T = Fˆt,T (Rt,T ) is uniform and the distribution yt,T = Φ
−1(ut,T ) is standard nor-
mal. Here Fˆt,T (Rt,T ) denotes the distribution function in (3.5) with the true values,
δˆ(t, T ) and γˆ(t), inserted. In the Berkowitz test, I estimate the coefficients in the
regression model:
yt,T = aˆ+ βˆyt−1,T−1 + t,T , t,T ∼ N(0, σˆ) (3.6)
and perform a likelihood ratio test of the joint hypothesis that a = β = 0 and
Var(t,T ) = 1. The hypothesis that b = 0 is natural when considering non-overlapping
returns, for overlapping returns see e.g. Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004) for a thorough
discussion of the test. It is also worth noticing that, even though there might be mo-
mentum effects in returns, then we will still want b = 0 because the true distribution
should take these momentum effects into account.
The Berkowitz likelihood ratio test for non-overlapping returns is then:
LR = −2(LL(0, 0, 1)− LL(aˆ, βˆ, σˆ)) ∼ χ23 (3.7)
117
where LL(aˆ, βˆ, σˆ) is the log likelihood of (3.6).
I find the true values of δ(t, T ) and γ(t) by minimizing the Berkowitz test statistic
in (3.7) under the constraint that, for all dates t and horizons T − t, the equation∫∞
−∞
pit,T (x)x
γ(t)
δ(t,T ) dx = 1 must hold. This constraint ensures that the resulting physical
return distribution integrates to one. The optimization problem is therefore:
min
δ(t,T )
− 2
(
LL(0, 0, 1)− LL(aˆ, βˆ, σˆ)
)
(3.8)
s.t. γ(t) solves
∫ ∞
−∞
pit,T (x)x
γ(t)
δ(t, T )
dx = 1, for all t, T (3.9)
For a given level of δ(t, T ),4 the constraints provide enough equations to solve for the
time-varying risk aversion, γ(t). Specifically, for a given level of δ(t, T ), at any point
in time, I only have to solve for the risk aversion coefficient, γ(t). If γ(t) were linear
in the constraint, then solving for the parameter would be straightforward. However,
γ(t) enters non-linearly in the equation
∫∞
−∞
pit,T (x)x
γ(t)
δ(t,T ) dx = 1 and I need to address
this non-linearity. Luckily, the generalized recovery methodology of Jensen, Lando,
and Pedersen (2017) provides me with a way of recovering γ(t). The authors show
that, at any point in time, if we know the state price densities for multiple horizons,
say M different horizons, then recovery is possible if the stochastic discount factor is
characterized by a number of of parameters, say N , that is less than the number of
horizons with known state price densities, i.e., if M > N . At any point in time and for
a given level of δ(t, T ), I have N = 1 (the risk aversion parameter) and can therefore
solve for γ(t) if I know state price densities for two or more horizons.
My methodology is closely related to the methodology used in Bliss and Panigirt-
zoglou (2004), specification (3) in Table 3.1, and it is therefore instructive to under-
stand how my methodology differs from theirs. In short, their methodology implies a
constant level of risk aversion but time-varying time preferences. My methodology on
the other hand implies structure on time preferences and allows for time-varying risk
aversion. To understand their approach in my setting, notice that for a constant level
of risk aversion, γ(t) = γ,5 I can write the Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004) distribution
4I need to add structure on the time preference parameter in order to minimize (3.8). Specifically,
I need to make δ(t, T ) a function of just one free parameter. Table 3.1 shows the five specifications I
investigate in this paper.
5Note that Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004) minimize (3.8) over γ and not over δ(t, T ). Specifically,
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function, F
(3)
t,T
6 as
F
(3)
t,T (r) =
∫ r
−∞ pit,T (x)x
γdx∫∞
−∞ pit,T (x)x
γdx
(3.12)
The denominator is time-varying due to time-varying state price densities. I can restate
the denominator in terms of time preferences as δ(t, T ) =
∫∞
−∞ pit,T (x)x
γdx. Essentially,
at any point in time, for a given (constant) level of risk aversion, they force the time-
varying time preference parameter to solve the equation
∫∞
−∞
pit,T (x)x
γ
δ(t,T ) dx = 1, simply
because the resulting physical probabilities must integrate to one. This condition is
similar to the one I impose, but, as noted above, I impose structure on time preferences
and allow for time-varying risk aversion. Using one method over the other is simply a
question of whether you find it more reasonable to have time-varying risk aversion or
time-varying time preferences.
3 Data and Risk Neutral Distributions
I use the Ivy DB database from OptionMetrics to gather information on call and put
options written on the S&P 500 index for the last trading day of every month. The data
are from January 1996 to December 2015. I obtain implied volatilities, strikes, closing
bid-prices, closing ask-prices, and maturities. As a proxy for the risk- free rate, I use
the zero-coupon yield curve from the Ivy DB database. I also obtain expected dividend
payments. I apply standard filters, excluding contracts with zero open interest, zero
trading volume, quotes with best bid below $0.50, and options with implied volatility
higher than 100%.
Using prices of options written on the market, I estimate risk neutral distributions
using the “Fast and Stable” method proposed by Jackwerth (2004). I follow the im-
plementation procedure described in Jensen, Lando, and Pedersen (2017). For each
last trading day of the month in the period from January 1996 until December 2015,
their minimization problem is:
min
γ
− 2
(
LL(0, 0, 1)− LL(aˆ, βˆ, σˆ)
)
(3.10)
s.t. δ(t, T ) solves
∫ ∞
−∞
pit,T (x)x
γ
δ(t, T )
dx = 1, ∀t (3.11)
6Here the superscript in F
(3)
t,T denotes the third specification in Table 3.1.
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I estimate risk neutral distributions for two different horizons. I choose the horizon
which is closest to 30 calender days along with the horizon with the shortest maturity
that is longer than 30 calender days and which has observable options written on the
market.
4 Testing the Estimated Distributions
Next, I test how the estimated physical distributions match the historical return dis-
tributions. I have estimated the parameters for each specification of the stochastic
discount factor shown in Table 3.1 using the methods described in Section 2. Then I
convert the risk neutral distributions into the corresponding physical return distribu-
tions using the estimated parameters of the stochastic discount factor.
For example, for specification (4) in Table 3.1, on the last trading day of January
1996, I estimate the monthly horizon risk neutral distribution, say qt,t+1(Rt,t+1),
7 using
options written on that date and convert this risk neutral distribution into a physical
distribution:
p
(4)
t,t+1(Rt,t+1) =
qt,t+1(Rt,t+1)
m
(4)
t,t+1(Rt,t+1)
(3.13)
=
qt,t+1(Rt,t+1)
1.0056×R−3.17t,t+1
(3.14)
where γ(t) = 3.17 was the market’s risk aversion on the last trading day of January
1996 and δ(t, T ) = 1.0056 is the time preference parameter. Also, the superscript of
p
(4)
t,t+1(Rt,t+1) denotes that I am talking about the 4’th specification of the stochastic
discount factor in Table 3.1. I then compute the cumulative distribution function and
evaluate the realized return over the subsequent month, R˜t,t+1:
F
(4)
t,t+1(R˜t,t+1) =
∫ R˜t,t+1
−∞
p
(4)
t,t+1(x)dx (3.15)
For each last trading of the month from January 1996 until December 2015, I estimate
these probabilities, giving me 240 non-overlapping periods with cumulative proba-
7If there are no observable options with exactly one month maturity, then I estimate risk neutral
distributions for maturities closest to one month and linearly interpolate the cumulative probabilities
estimated in (3.15) between these maturities.
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bilities F
(4)
s,s+1(R˜s,s+1) for s ∈ {1, ..., 240}. Given this time series of probabilities, I
perform a Berkowitz test on both the full distribution and parts of the distribution. If
the estimated distributions reflect the ’true’ realized distribution, then F
(4)
t,t+1(R˜t,t+1)
is uniformly distributed and any partition of the distribution should not be rejected
by the Berkowitz test. Therefore, I test if the estimated distribution reflects the ’true’
distribution using multiple partitions of the uniform distribution.
Table 3.2 shows the result of Berkowitz tests of the five specifications of the stochas-
tic discount factors as shown in Table 3.1. Panel A shows the results when testing the
full distribution. Panel B reports results when testing partitions of the distribution.
The second column reports the results when testing the risk neutral specification, that
is, specification (1) in Table 3.1. The first row of Panel B reports the results when
testing the distribution of F
(1)
t,t+1(R˜t,t+1) on the interval from 0 to 0.5. This means that,
when looking strictly at those cumulative probabilities that are lower than 0.5, I test
whether these probabilities are uniform on 0 to 0.5. The test statistic is 5.20 which
gives a p-value of 0.16 when evaluated in a χ2-distribution with 3 degrees of freedom.
Therefore, I cannot reject that the realized returns that fall within the lowest 50% of
the risk neutral distributions are actually drawn from these distributions. Looking at
the remaining rows, I can reject that the risk neutral distributions match the realized
returns, that is, the test statistics for the intervals from 0 to 0.7 or higher are all
statistically significant. The risk neutral distribution is therefore a poor proxy for the
historical ’true’ distribution. This result is not surprising as we expect investors to be
risk averse and thereby adjust their physical beliefs accordingly when pricing financial
assets.
The third column of Table 3.2 reports the results of the Berkowitz test when eval-
uating the second specification of the stochastic discount factor in Table 3.1. The
distribution of F
(2)
t,t+1(R˜t,t+1) is rejected on the interval from 0 to 0.8 and higher, which
means that this specification is a poor match for the realized return distribution.
The fourth column of Table 3.2 reports the results of the Berkowitz test when eval-
uating the Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004) parameterization of the stochastic discount
factor (3.2), that is, specification (3) in Table 3.1. Their specification of the stochastic
discount factor performs very well. The estimated physical distributions, F
(3)
t,t+1(R˜t,t+1),
arising from a constant level of risk aversion, γ = 2.44, and time-varying time pref-
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erences match realized returns very well. However, I can reject the full distribution
estimated using the Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004) methodology simply because there
are too few realized observations in the far right tail (upper 2.5%) of the estimated
distributions.
The fifth column of Table 3.2 reports the result of the Berkowitz test when risk
aversion is time-varying and time preferences are constant, that is, specification (4) in
Table 3.1. The distribution F
(4)
t,t+1(R˜t,t+1) cannot be rejected by the Berkowitz test on
the interval from 0 to 0.975 and any partition within these boundaries. However, as
for specification (3), the full distribution is rejected because of too few realizations in
the far right tail of the estimated distribution.
The last column of Table 3.2 reports the result of the Berkowitz test when risk
aversion is time-varying and time preferences are affine in the inverse of the gross
risk-free return, that is, specification (5) in Table 3.1. As with specifications (3) and
(4), the distribution F
(5)
t,t+1(R˜t,t+1) is not rejected by the Berkowitz test on the interval
from 0 to 0.975 and any partition within these boundaries but it is rejected on the full
distribution.
Table 3.2 shows that the transformation from the risk neutral distributions to the
physical distributions using constant relative risk aversion preferences with parame-
terization (3), (4), or (5) of the stochastic discount factor as shown in Table 3.1 can
help explain historical realized returns. According to the Berkowitz tests, the three
specifications perform equally well. This result is not surprising since the number of
free parameters in each specification is the same. Specification (3) has 1 degree of free-
dom in the risk aversion parameter and 240 degrees of freedom in the time preference
parameters (one for each month in my sample). Specification (4) has 240 free variables
in the risk aversion parameters and 1 time preference parameter. Specification (5) has
240 free variables in the risk aversion parameters and 1 time preference parameter,
however, this free variable in the time preference parameter measures the (constant)
difference between the inverse of the gross risk-free return and the time preference
parameter.
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4.1 Empirical Risk Aversion Estimates
In this section, I focus on three of the specifications of the stochastic discount factor as
shown in Table 3.1, that is, specifications (3), (4), and (5). Figure 3.1 shows empirical
estimates of market risk aversion, that is, the market’s time-varying risk aversion, γt,
along with the constant risk aversion implied by the Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004)
methodology.
As seen from the figure, the time-varying risk aversion implied by specifications (4)
and (5) are almost identical. Therefore, for the remainder of the paper, I will focus on
one just of them. My choice falls on specification (5), simply because it allows time
preferences to be dependent on the risk-free rate.
Panel A of Table 3.3 reports summary statistics for the estimated risk aversion
parameter. The market’s time-varying risk aversion implied by specification (5) varies
from 1.49 during the peak of the financial crisis in 2008-2009 to 5.03 in the post crisis
period of 2014-2015. The average risk aversion is 2.77, slightly higher than the constant
risk aversion estimate implied by the Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004) methodology
which is 2.44.
4.2 Empirical Time Preference Estimates
Panel B of Table 3.3 reports summary statistics for the estimated time preference
parameter. The time-varying time preferences implied by the Bliss and Panigirtzoglou
(2004) methodology, specification (3), vary from 0.9985 to 1.0239. Similarly, the time
preferences implied by specification (5) vary from 0.9982 to 1.0076 with an average
value of 1.0057. The constant time preference parameter implied by specification (4)
is 1.0056. A value of the time preference parameter which is larger than one implies
that investors prefer future over immediate consumption. It is therefore surprising that
the estimates of the time preference parameter are on average above one. However,
given the form of the stochastic discount factor in (3.2), a value of the time preference
parameter above one fits the data best.
To better understand the magnitude of the time preference parameter, I first in-
vestigate how a commonly used value for the time preference parameter fits the data.
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Therefore, in specification (2) from Table 3.1, I fix δ(t, T ) = 0.98T−t.8 The second
column of Table 3.2 shows the Berkowitz test for specification (2). The constant time
preference parameter with an annualized value of 0.98 is strongly rejected by the data.
This result means that, if δ(t, T ) = 0.98T−t, there is no time series of γ(t) which can
simultaneously match the historical returns on the market and the observable option
prices. From the point of view of a power utility investor who wants to hold the mar-
ket, if we want to match both option prices and returns, then we need to accept that
time preferences are on average above one.
It is worth noting that, even though δ(t, T ) is above one, the setting I adopt will
always (and by constriction) match interest rates. To understand how, recall that the
law of one price gives us the following relation:
Et [mt,T (Rt,T )] =
1
Rft,T
(3.16)
which for the power utility investor is equivalent to:
Et
[
δ(t, T )R
−γ(t)
t,T
]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
pt,T (x)δ(t, T )x
−γ(t)dx (3.17)
From the standard asset pricing formula in (3.3), I am given the relation pt,T (r) =
pit,T (r)/mt,T (r) which is equal to pit,T (r)r
γ(t)/δ(t, T ) for the power utility investor.
Inserting this expression of physical probabilities into (3.17), I get:
∫ ∞
−∞
pit,T (x)x
γ(t)
δ(t, T )
δ(t, T )x−γ(t)dx =
∫ ∞
−∞
pit,T (x)dx =
1
Rft,T
∫ ∞
−∞
qt,T (x)dx (3.18)
where qt,T (r) is the risk-neutral distribution. The integral on the rhs. of (3.18) is equal
to one since qt,T (r) is a probability distribution. Therefore, for any level of δ(t, T ), my
setting will by construction match interest rates.
Next, I want to better understand the scenarios in which δ(t, T ) > 1. Therefore,
I consider the following equation which again arises from the law of one price and a
8E.g. Campbell and Cochrane (1993) derive an annualized value of the time preference parameter
close to 0.98.
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power utility investor who choses to hold the market
δ(t, T )
∫ ∞
−∞
pt,T (x)x
−γ(t)dx =
1
Rft,T
(3.19)
Now, if
∫∞
−∞ pt,T (x)x
−γ(t)dx < 1
Rft,T
then δ(t, T ) must, by the law of one price, be above
one. This scenario can for example arise if the physical return distribution has most
of its probability mass in the states where the market increases in value, that is, when∫∞
1 pt,T (x)dx is large (close to one). In this case, the integral
∫∞
−∞ pt,T (x)x
−γ(t)dx could
potentially be lower than 1/Rft,T because x
−γ(t) < 1 for values of x > 1 and γ(t) > 0.
Therefore, a value of δ(t, T ) which is larger than one can arise in a scenario where
the probability of a positive return on the market is large. That is, the investor is
more willing to postpone consumption into the future when the probability of a future
good state (a state with high consumption) is high.9 This result is highly unintuitive.
I expected the exact opposite result, that the investor is willing to postpone (smooth)
consumption if the probability of a bad state in the future is high.
The result may arise for several reasons. For example, it might be a consequence of
a misspecified functional form of the stochastic discount factor. Also, it can be because
the state variable is wrong, that is, market returns might not be a perfect proxy for
aggregate consumption. There are of course several other possible explanations.
5 Systematic Variation in Market Risk Aversion
Figure 3.1 shows the market’s time-varying risk aversion. As seen from the figure,
risk aversion was low during the 2008-2009 financial crisis and high both in the years
leading up to the crisis and in the post crisis period of 2010-2015. This variation in
risk aversion suggests that the market became less risk averse during the peak of the
financial crisis and more risk averse after the crisis. In this section, I investigate these
time-varying patterns of market risk aversion.
First, using methods developed in Martin (2017) and Gormsen and Jensen (2017b),
I estimate the market’s physical return distribution. Table 3.4 shows the summary
9Similarly, a value of δ(t, T ) which is lower than one can arise in a scenario where the probability
of a negative return on the market is large. That is, the investor is more willing to consume today if
the probability of a future bad state (a state with low consumption) is high.
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statistics for the first four moments of the physical return distribution: expected excess
return, variance, skewness, and kurtosis. Looking at the last row of Table 3.4 we see
the market’s time-varying moments implied by specification (5) of Table 3.1. The
physical return distribution implied by this specification of the stochastic discount
factor is on average negatively skewed and exhibit excess kurtosis. Results are similar
for specification (3) and (4).
Figure 3.2 shows a time-series plot of the market’s time-varying risk aversion and its
physical conditional variance. Clearly, risk aversion tend to be low at turbulent times
when variance is high. Panel A of Table 3.5 shows the correlations between the market’s
time-varying risk aversion and the market’s physical moments. The correlation between
market risk aversion and variance is −0.65 with bootstrapped 95% confidence bounds
of [−0.70,−0.62].
Figure 3.3 shows the market’s risk aversion and its physical conditional skewness.
Risk aversion and skewness are negatively correlated with a correlation of −0.42 and
95% bootstrapped confidence bounds of [−0.51,−0.31] as shown in Table 3.5. The
negative correlation between risk aversion and skewness suggests that the market is
more risk averse at times when market tail risk is high.
The expected return on the market is negatively related to risk aversion with a cor-
relation coefficient of−0.56 and bootstrapped 95% confidence bounds of [−0.61,−0.52].
This negative relation suggests that the expected return on the market is high during
times of financial market distress when risk aversion is low. Similarly, the market’s
Sharpe ratio tends to be high during periods of high volatility. To better understand
why the market’s Sharpe ratio is high at times when risk aversion is low, notice that,
under power utility and log-normal market returns, the expected excess return on the
market is ERt = γtσ
2
t . Rewriting this equation leads to the following expression of
risk aversion:
γt = SRt/σt (3.20)
where SRt = ERt/σt is the market’s Sharpe ratio. Even though the market’s Sharpe
ratio might increase at times of financial market distress when volatility also increases,
then the market’s risk aversion can decrease if the increase in the Sharpe ratio is too
low to offset the higher market volatility.
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6 Understanding the Market’s Time-Varying Risk Aversion
As shown in the previous section, market risk aversion varies in a systematic way,
that is, it tends to be high at times when volatility is low and vice versa. A natural
question to ask is; does it make sense at all that market risk aversion is low during
times of financial distress when volatility is high? It is definitely difficult to reconcile
this systematic variation in market risk aversion with the leading asset pricing models.
For example, Campbell and Cochrane (1993) use habit formation as a mechanism for
time-varying risk aversion and find that a countercyclical risk aversion can help explain
asset prices and the behavior of the stock market.
As a start to understanding this systematic variation in market risk aversion, it is
instructive to think about the following heuristic argument: standard textbook asset
pricing tells us that, under power utility and a log-normal assumption on market
returns, the expected excess return on the market is:
ERt = γtσ
2
t (3.21)
During the financial crisis of 2008-2009, annualized monthly variance reached 60%. If
I assume that risk aversion is constant and at a level of 3, which is a common choice
in the financial literature10, then (3.21) implies an annualized expected excess return
of 180% and a monthly expected excess return of 15%. It is hard to believe that the
market expected the excess returns on the monthly horizon was as high as 15% during
the peak of financial crisis, not to mention the extremely high annualized expected
excess returns. Therefore, since we can estimate market variance rather accurately,
then if we want expected excess returns to be at a realistic level during times of high
volatility, then market risk aversion should go down when volatility spikes.
As noted above, this systematic variation in market risk aversion is difficult to rec-
oncile with the leading asset pricing models. However, when looking at the intersection
between option prices and market returns, this variation seems to be a persistent pat-
tern and it is therefore interesting to understand how it can arise in our data.
10See e.g. Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004) and Gormsen and Jensen (2017b)
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6.1 Evidence of a Procyclical Market Risk Aversion
In a recent paper, Moreira and Muir (2017b) show that investors can earn large alphas
by timing market volatility. They find that investors should exit the market when
volatility increases and enter the market when it drops. Their result arises because
expected excess returns are high relative to variance during low variance periods, i.e.,
the ratio ERt
σ2t
varies over time and becomes high when variance is low. Similarly,
Gormsen and Jensen (2017a) also find evidence that the market price of risk is high
during low volatility periods.
These findings have implications for how we should think about the time variation
in market risk aversion. To see why, consider again equation (3.21) which tells us that
the expected excess return to variance ratio is equivalent to market risk aversion and
their results are therefore reminiscent of a risk aversion that is high at times when
volatility is low.
The results of Moreira and Muir (2017b) can also in part be explained by the
fact that market tail risk is higher at times of low volatility, see e.g. Gormsen and
Jensen (2017b). The higher expected excess return to variance during low volatility
periods could simply be compensation for higher tail risk (or a combination of higher
tail risk and higher risk aversion). Nevertheless, it is an artifact of the data that
risk aversion tends to be high at times when the market is generally considered to be
calm. In the following two subsections, I discuss two possible explanations for these
time-varying patterns. First, I investigate a behavioral explanation through investor
salience. Second, I consider a rational explanation through time-varying correlations
between the market and aggregate consumption.
6.2 Salience Theory and Market Risk Aversion
In this subsection, I discuss investor salience as a possible explanation for the sys-
tematic variation in market risk aversion which I document in this paper. Bordalo,
Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2012) develop a model in which the focus of investors are
drawn to unusual, different or odd events. Specifically, an investor is risk-seeking if his
attention is drawn to the “upside” of a lottery and risk-averse if his attention is drawn
to the “downside” of a lottery. They refer to the state which has drawn the investor’s
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attention as the salient state or salient outcome.
A practical example of salience theory can be found in Lian, Ma, and Wang (2018).
The authors show that, investors have greater appetite for risk taking when interest
rates are low. They argue that, at times of low interest rates the relatively high
expected returns on risky assets become salient, and this salience on the upside of
a higher return on the risky asset induces heightened risk tolerance and “reaching
for yield” tendencies. Also, they refer to Weber’s law and argue that investors tend
to evaluate assets in terms of proportional returns rather than by differences. In
my setting both the risk-free rate and the expected return on the market fluctuate.
Therefore, to test how their hypothesis fits into my setting, I regress my measure of
risk aversion onto the ratio of gross expected returns to gross risk-free returns:11
γ(t) = β0 + β1
Et(Rt,T )
Rft,T
+ t,T (3.22)
The idea is that, as expected returns on the risky asset increase relative to the safe
return on the risk-free asset, investors will find the higher return on the risky asset
salient and therefore increase their risk tolerance which results in a lower γ(t).
Table 3.6 presents the results of regression (3.22). The coefficient β1 is −6.97 with
95% bootstrapped confidence bounds of [−8.63,−5.92]. This results suggests that an
increase in the ratio of gross expected return on the market to risk-free gross return
of, say 0.1, results in a decrease in risk aversion of almost 0.7, that is, as expected
returns on the market increase relative to the return on the risk-free asset, the investor
becomes more risk tolerant.
6.3 Consumption and Stock Market Correlation
A natural critique of the method I apply in this paper is that the power utility investor
only cares about how the stock market develops and gains all utility from market
movements. In this subsection, I discuss what can drive my results if I in fact have
11Lian, Ma, and Wang (2018) argue that, when looking at gross returns the effect of salience is lower
than when considering ’normal’ returns because the ratio of, say 1.1/1.05, is much smaller than the
ratio 0.1/0.05. Nevertheless, they find evidence that investors still exhibit salient preferences when
considering gross returns. I do not consider ’normal’ returns because they, at the end of my sample,
are very close to zero.
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postulated the wrong state variable.
Suppose for now that the true state variable is aggregate consumption and that
the stock market is not a prefect proxy for aggregate consumption. Also, suppose that
risk aversion is actually constant, say γc, the power utility investor’s ’true’ stochastic
discount factor is then:
mt,T = δ
T−t
(
CT
Ct
)γc
(3.23)
where Ct is aggregate consumption at time t. If I assume that consumption is log-
normally distributed with constant variance, σ2c , then in the standard Merton (1973)
model, I can express expected return on the stock market in the following way:
ERt = γcσtσcρt (3.24)
where ρt is the time-varying correlation between the stock market and aggregate con-
sumption. Keeping the stock market volatility constant, then as the correlation be-
tween the stock market and aggregate consumption increases, so does the required
expected return on the stock market.
Now, if I define the time-varying parameter αt =
ρtγcσc
σt
12 then I can rewrite (3.24)
as
ERt = αtσ
2
t (3.25)
which is equivalent to imposing that the stock market is the state variable, log-normally
distributed, and that the power utility investor has time-varying risk aversion αt.
Therefore, even though risk aversion is constant at γc, the stock market implied risk
aversion can be time-varying because the correlation between consumption and the
stock market is time-varying.
As a consequence of the assumptions made in this subsection, the time-varying
correlation between consumption and the stock market is proportional to the market’s
Sharpe ratio, ρt ∝ ERtσt , and the stock market implied time-varying risk aversion is pro-
portional to the consumption to stock market correlation over stock market volatility,
12In a (more realistic) setting where risk aversion (γct ), consumption volatility, and the correlation
between the market and aggregate consumption are time-varying, then αt =
ρtγ
c
t σ
c
t
σt
is the market’s
implied risk aversion as seen from the point of view of a power utility investor who holds the market.
Clearly, in this setting, I cannot distinguish between the contributions in the time variation of αt which
comes from either of the time-varying parameters.
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αt ∝ ρtσt .
The correlation between consumption and the stock market is proportional to the
Sharpe ratio of the market and is therefore high during high volatility periods. For
instance, during the recent financial crisis when stock market volatility spiked, then
so did the correlation between consumption and the stock market. However, the in-
crease in correlation between consumption and the stock market was not enough to
offset the increase in stock market volatility and as a consequence stock market risk
aversion decreased. Figure 3.4 shows the time series of implied correlations between
consumption and the stock market when consumption risk aversion is constant at 38 as
implied by the equity premium puzzle, cf. Mehra and Prescott (1985b), and monthly
consumption volatility is constant at 0.0075.
Clearly, a setting in which both risk aversion and consumption volatility are con-
stant is too simplified to fully capture the real world. Many of the conclusions which I
draw in this subsection can be altered simply by assuming that, for example, risk aver-
sion (γc) is time-varying or consumption volatility is time-varying. Nevertheless, the
discussion in this subsection highlights that the time variation in market risk aversion,
which I document in this paper, can be a consequence of a misinterpretation of the
implied risk aversion. That is, the risk aversion implied by the market is time-varying
and tends to be low at times when volatility is high because the mapping from the true
state variable, aggregate consumption, onto the market is time-varying, e.g., through
time-varying correlations.
7 Conclusion
I present a new method for estimating the market’s time-varying risk aversion directly
from option written on the market and historical market returns. My method com-
bines the generalized recovery method of Jensen, Lando, and Pedersen (2017) and the
Berkowitz test as used in Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004).
The estimated market risk aversion coefficients are on average 2.77 and vary from
1.49 to 5.03 over the period from 1996 to 2016. Interestingly, market risk aversion is
negatively related to variance. During the peak of the financial crisis in 2008-2009 when
market volatility was high, risk aversion was at its all-time low. These co-movements
131
between risk aversion and variance are difficult to reconcile with the leading asset
pricing models.
I discuss two possible explanations for the negative relation between risk aversion
and variance. First, I show that my results are consistent with salience theory. Specif-
ically, during periods of high volatility when expected returns on the market are high
relative to the risk-free returns, investors find the relatively high expected return on
the market salient and therefore become more risk tolerant. Secondly, I show that my
results can arise if the stock market is a poor proxy for aggregate consumption.
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Table 3.1: Specifications of the stochastic discount factor. This table reports
five different specifications of the CRRA stochastic discount factor that I use in this
paper. The stochastic discount factors take the form:
mt,T (Rt,T ) = δ(t, T )R
−γ(t)
t,T (3.26)
Here δ(t, T ) is a time preference parameter and γ(t) is the coefficient of relative risk
aversion.
Parameterization
# Comments δ(t, T ) γ(t)
(1) Risk neutral distribution 1/Rft,T 0
(2) Fixed time preferences 0.98T−t γt
Time-varying risk aversion
(3) Time-varying time preferences (Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004)) δT−tt γ
Constant risk aversion
(4) Constant time preferences δT−t γt
Time-varying risk aversion
(5) Time preferences affine in the inverse of the gross risk-free return 1/Rft,T + δ
T−t − 1 γt
Time-varying risk aversion
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Table 3.2: Berkowitz tests. This table reports Berkowitz test statistics for five
different specifications of the stochastic discount factor (SDF) as shown in Table 3.1.
Specifically, I test if the distribution of Ft,T (Rt,T ) =
∫ Rt,T
−∞
pit,T (x)x
γ(t)
δ(t,T ) dx is uniform on
the interval from 0 to 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 0.95, 0.975, and 1. If the specification
of the stochastic discount factor perfectly captures the ’true’ historical distribution of
realized returns, then any partition of the interval from 0 to 1 should not be rejected by
the Berkowitz test. I report significance as: * when p < 0.1, ** when p < 0.05, and ***
when p < 0.01. P-values are found by evaluating the test statistic in a χ2-distribution
with three degrees of freedom.
Panel A: The full distribution
Specification of SDF (#)
Uniform on (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0 to 1 15.84∗∗∗ 14.08∗∗∗ 12.08∗∗∗ 12.33∗∗∗ 12.25∗∗∗
Panel B: Partitions of the distribution
Specification of SDF (#)
Uniform on (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0 to 0.5 5.20 6.14 3.38 0.35 1.26
0 to 0.6 5.53 3.49 1.49 1.41 1.84
0 to 0.7 8.06∗∗ 5.21 4.77 0.81 0.83
0 to 0.8 7.83∗∗ 6.94∗ 3.06 2.20 2.15
0 to 0.9 10.99∗∗ 7.83∗∗ 5.38 2.80 3.87
0 to 0.95 12.32∗∗∗ 7.24∗ 2.87 2.62 2.70
0 to 0.975 12.28∗∗∗ 9.76∗∗ 6.93∗ 6.98∗ 6.92∗
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Table 3.3: Parameter summary statistics. This table reports the average time-
series values for the estimated preference parameters, δ(t, T ) and γ(t). The number
(#) refers to the specification of the stochastic discount factor from Table 3.1. I do
not show results for specification (1) and (2) since they were strongly rejected in the
data as seen from Table 3.2.
Panel A: Risk aversion
# γ(t) Mean St. dev. Min Median Max
(3) γ 2.44 - - - -
(4) γt 2.76 0.83 1.54 2.58 5.38
(5) γt 2.77 0.71 1.49 2.62 5.03
Panel B: Time preferences
# δ(t, T ) Mean St. dev. Min Median Max
(3) δT−tt 1.0055 0.0046 0.9985 1.0047 1.0239
(4) δT−t 1.0056 - - - -
(5) 1/Rft,T + δ
T−t − 1 1.0057 0.0019 0.9982 1.0063 1.0076
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Table 3.4: Moment summary statistics. This table reports the average time-series
values for estimated physical moments: expected excess return (ER−Rf), standard
deviation (St. dev.), skewness, and kurtosis. Moments are estimated using methods
developed in Gormsen and Jensen (2017b). The number (#) refers to the specification
of the stochastic discount factor from Table 3.1. I do not show results for specification
(1) and (2) since they were strongly rejected in the data as seen from Table 3.2.
Parameterization Annualized (%)
# δ(t, T ) γ(t) ER−Rf St. dev. Skewness Kurtosis
(3) δT−tt γ 9.98 18.81 −1.14 7.46
(4) δT−t γt 9.78 17.82 −1.09 7.09
(5) 1/Rft,T + δ
T−t − 1 γt 9.83 17.81 −1.09 7.12
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Table 3.5: Correlations. Panel A reports correlations between the market’s time-
varying risk aversion (estimated using specification (5) from Table 3.1) and the market’s
physical moments estimated using methods developed in Gormsen and Jensen (2017b):
expected excess return (ER−Rf), variance, skewness , and kurtosis. Panel B reports
correlations between the market’s physical moments. The number (#) refers to the
specification of the stochastic discount factor from Table 3.1.
Panel A: Risk aversion and moment correlations
# ER−Rf Variance Skewness Kurtosis
(5) γt −0.56 −0.65 −0.42 0.63
[−0.61,−0.52] [−0.70,−0.62] [−0.51,−0.31] [0.54, 0.70]
Panel B: Moment correlations
# ER-Rf Variance Skewness Kurtosis
(5) ER−Rf 1 0.97 0.36 −0.50
[0.96, 0.98] [0.25, 0.46] [−0.56,−0.44]
(5) Variance 1 0.41 −0.53
[0.32, 0.50] [−0.60,−0.49]
(5) Skewness 1 −0.75
[−0.80,−0.69]
(5) Kurtosis 1
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Table 3.6: Salience Theory. This table reports the regression result when regressing
the market’s risk aversion onto the ratio of gross expected return on the market to
gross risk-free returns:
γ(t) = β0 + β1
Et(Rt,T )
Rft,T
+ t,T (3.27)
γ(t) is estimated using specification (5) in Table 3.1. The expected return on the
market is estimated using methods developed in Gormsen and Jensen (2017b). As the
ratio of expected return on the risky asset to the risk-free return increases, then the
high expected return on the risky asset becomes salient making the investor more risk
tolerant. I report 95% bootstrapped confidence bounds on the estimates.
β0 β1 Adj. R
2
Coefficient 10.41 −6.97 0.29
95% CI [8.89, 11.93] [−8.63,−5.92]
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Figure 3.1: Risk aversion estimates. This figures shows risk aversion estimates for
specification (3), (4), and (5) from Table 3.1. The solid blue line is when risk aversion
is time-varying and time preferences are proportional to the gross risk-free return.
The dashed black line is when risk aversion is time-varying and time preferences are
constant. The dashed gray line is the constant risk aversion implied by the Bliss and
Panigirtzoglou (2004) methodology. I do not show results for specification (1) and (2)
since they were strongly rejected in the data as seen from Table 3.2.
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Figure 3.2: Risk aversion and market variance. This figure shows the market’s
time-varying risk aversion (left axis) and the physical conditional variance of the market
(right axis). Conditional variance is estimated using methods developed in Martin
(2017) and Gormsen and Jensen (2017b). Risk aversion is estimated using specification
(5) from Table 3.1. Correlation: −0.65.
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Figure 3.3: Risk aversion and market skewness. This figure shows the market’s
time-varying risk aversion (left axis) and the physical conditional skewness of the mar-
ket (right axis). Conditional skewness is estimated using methods developed in Martin
(2017) and Gormsen and Jensen (2017b). Risk aversion is estimated using specification
(5) from Table 3.1. Correlation: −0.42.
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Figure 3.4: Implied consumption and stock market correlation. This figure
shows the implied correlation between the stock market and aggregate consumption
(left axis) and the markets condition monthly horizon volatility (right axis). Condi-
tional variance is estimated using methods developed in Martin (2017) and Gormsen
and Jensen (2017b)
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